Network Device Interpretation # 201733

Correction of section numbers in SD Table 1

Status:	Active	☐ Inactive	2
Date: 27-Mar-2018			
End of proposed Tra	nsition Period (to be updated	after TR2TD process): 4-	May-2018
Type of Change:		☐ Minor change	☐ Major change
Type of Document:	☐ Technical Decision	☐ Technic	cal Recommendation
Approved by:	Network iTC Interpreto	ations Team 🔀 Networ	·k iTC
Affected Document(s): ND SD V2.0		
Affected Section(s):	Table 1		
Superseded Interpre	etation(s): None		

Issue:

Table 1 (page 118-119) of the Supporting Documents (SD v2.0) for cpp_nd (v2.0) (https://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/cpp_nd_v2.0-sd.pdf) provides mapping of CEM ADV_FSP.1 Work Units to the respective section numbers in the SD. Some of the references (the section numbers in the "Evaluation Activities" column) in that table are incorrect.

The correct mapping should be as in the following table:

CEM ADV_FSP.1 Work Units	Correct Section for Evaluation Activities	Note
ADV_FSP.1-1		Correctly mapped to in the 5.2.1.1
ADV_FSP.1-2	Section 5.2.1.1	Incorrectly mapped to 5.2.1.2
ADV_FSP.1-3	Section 5.2.1.2	Incorrectly is mapped to 5.2.1.3
ADV_FSP.1-4	Not mapped	Correctly not mapped (this work unit is satisfied)
ADV_FSP.1-5	Section 5.2.1.3	Incorrectly is mapped to 5.2.1.4 which does not exist in SD
ADV_FSP.1-6		Correctly not mapped - the intent of this work unit is covered
ADV_FSP.1-7		Correctly not mapped - the intent of this work unit is covered

Proposed Resolution:

Provide the correct section numbers in Table 1 (page 118-119) of SD v2.0.

Resolutions:

The NIT acknowledges the issue described in the 'Issue' section. Test 4 shall therefore be changed as follows:

< old > "

CEM ADV_FSP.1 Work Units	Evaluation Activities
ADV_FSP.1-1 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that it states the purpose of each SFR-supporting and SFR-enforcing TSFI.	5.2.1.1 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to ensure it describes the purpose and method of use for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.
ADV_FSP.1-2 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that the method of use for each SFR- supporting and SFR-enforcing TSFI is given.	5.2.1.2 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to ensure it describes the purpose and method of use for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.
ADV_FSP.1-3 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the presentation of the TSFI to determine that it identifies all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR supporting TSFI.	5.2.1.3 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall check the interface documentation to ensure it identifies and describes the parameters for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.
ADV_FSP.1-4 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the rationale provided by the developer for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering to determine that it is accurate.	Paragraph 561 from the CEM: "In the case where the developer has provided adequate documentation to perform the analysis called for by the rest of the work units for this component without explicitly identifying SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting interfaces, this work unit should be considered satisfied." Since the rest of the ADV_FSP.1 work units will have been satisfied upon completion of the EAs, it follows that this work unit is satisfied as well.

ADV_FSP.1-5 The evaluator <i>shall check</i> that the tracing links the SFRs to the corresponding TSFIs.	5.2.1.4 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to develop a mapping of the interfaces to SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1-6 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that it is a complete instantiation of the SFRs.	EAs that are associated with the SFRs in Section 2, and, if applicable, Sections 3 and 4, are performed to ensure that all the SFRs where the security functionality is externally visible (i.e. at the TSFI) are covered. Therefore, the intent of this work unit is covered.
ADV_FSP.1-7 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that it is an accurate instantiation of the SFRs.	EAs that are associated with the SFRs in Section 2, and, if applicable, Sections 3 and 4, are performed to ensure that all the SFRs where the security functionality is externally visible (i.e. at the TSFI) are addressed, and that the description of the interfaces is accurate with respect to the specification captured in the SFRs. Therefore, the intent of this work unit is covered.

"</old>

shall be replaced by

<new>"

CEM ADV_FSP.1 Work Units	Evaluation Activities
ADV_FSP.1-1 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that it states the purpose of each SFR-supporting and SFR-enforcing TSFI.	5.2.1.1 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to ensure it describes the purpose and method of use for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.
ADV_FSP.1-2 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that the method of use for each SFR- supporting and SFR-enforcing TSFI is given.	5.2.1.1 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to ensure it describes the purpose and method of use for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.

ADV_FSP.1-3 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the presentation of the TSFI to determine that it identifies all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR supporting TSFI.	5.2.1.2 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall check the interface documentation to ensure it identifies and describes the parameters for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.
ADV_FSP.1-4 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the rationale provided by the developer for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering to determine that it is accurate.	Paragraph 561 from the CEM: "In the case where the developer has provided adequate documentation to perform the analysis called for by the rest of the work units for this component without explicitly identifying SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting interfaces, this work unit should be considered satisfied." Since the rest of the ADV_FSP.1 work units will have been satisfied upon completion of the EAs, it follows that this work unit is satisfied as well.
ADV_FSP.1-5 The evaluator <i>shall check</i> that the tracing links the SFRs to the corresponding TSFIs.	5.2.1.3 Evaluation Activity: The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to develop a mapping of the interfaces to SFRs.
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ADV_FSP.1-7 The evaluator <i>shall examine</i> the functional specification to determine that it is an accurate instantiation of the SFRs.	EAs that are associated with the SFRs in Section 2, and, if applicable, Sections 3 and 4, are performed to ensure that all the SFRs where the security functionality is externally visible (i.e. at the TSFI) are addressed, and that the description of the interfaces is accurate with respect to the specification captured in the SFRs. Therefore, the intent of this work unit is covered.

Rationale:
As stated in the 'Issue' section.
Further Action:
None
Action by Network iTC:
None