## Mapping Between

# Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP) Extended Package Session Border Controller, Version 1.1, 2016-09-28

### and

#### NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5

#### **Important Caveats**

- Product vs. System. The Common Criteria is designed for the evaluation of products; the Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2, DOD 8510.01) and associated control/control interpretations (NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5, CNSSI № 1253) are used for the assessment and authorization of mission systems. Products cannot satisfy controls outside of the system context. Products may support a system satisfying particular controls, but typically satisfaction also requires the implementation of operational procedures; further, given that systems are typically the product of integration of multiple products configured to meet mission requirements, an overall system assessment is required to determine if the control is satisfied in the overall system context.
- SC-7. The primary purpose of a Session Border Controller (SBC) product is to act as a network boundary protection device between Voice/Video over IP (VVoIP) devices and communications networks. An SBC product therefore supports the enforcement of SC-7 in general at a high level. Individual SFRs may relate to other security controls to ensure the secure implementation of the functions that are performed in support of this, but the reader should be aware that SC-7 and relevant sub-controls are the behaviors that an SBC is intended to address. Note that SBC products are also generally deployed to facilitate interoperability between different communications networks (e.g. VVoIP and legacy telephone networks), but this is beyond the scope of 800-53 controls.
- SA-4(7). Perhaps it is needless to say, but satisfaction of any NIAP PP or PP-Configuration supports system satisfaction of SA-4(7), which is the implementation of CNSSP № 11.
- System context of supported controls. For a conformant TOE to support these controls in the context of an information system, the selections and assignments completed in the TOE's Security Target must be congruent with those made for the supported controls. For example, if the TOE claims the optional requirement FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1, it will enforce password-based authentication on SIP registration. Any password composition requirements on SIP registration will be enforced on that function and that interface only. Additionally, FIA\_SIPS\_EXT.1 only addresses the character composition of passwords, it does not address other aspects of the control such as password history requirements. The security control assessor must compare the TOE's functional claims to the behavior required for the system to determine the extent to which the applicable controls are supported.

• Extended Package. A TOE that conforms to this Extended Package (EP) will also conform to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) by definition. Therefore, the TOE will satisfy additional security controls through its conformance to that PP. This EP refines some of the NDcPP requirements to ensure consistency between the PP and the EP. Generally, applicable security controls do not change as a result of the modification but they have been included under "NDcPP Security Functional Requirements" below for reference. The only exception to this is that a network device product may or may not support IA-3(1) because support for mutually-authenticated communications is optional in the NDcPP, but a TOE that conforms to this EP is required to implement mutually-authenticated TLS, so this control will always be addressed by a conformant TOE.

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR			00-53 Revision 5 rol Supports	Comments and Observations
NDcPP Security Functi	onal Requirements			
FAU_GEN.1  Audit Data Generation	AU-2	Event Logging	A conformant TOE has the ability to generate audit records for various events. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing.	
		AU-3	Content of Audit	A conformant TOE will ensure that audit records include date, type, outcome, and subject identity data. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing.
		AU-3(1)	Content of Audit Records: Additional Audit Information	A conformant TOE will ensure that audit records include date, type, outcome, and subject identity data. The TOE supports the enforcement of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing.
		AU-12	Audit Record Generation	A conformant TOE has the ability to generate audit logs. The TOE supports the enforcement of parts (a) and (c) of the control if its auditable events are consistent with the assignments chosen for the control and if the TOE's audit log is part of the overall system's auditing. Part (b) is not satisfied by a

Common Criteri	a Version 3.x SFR	NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 Control Supports		Comments and Observations
				conformant TOE because the PP does not define functionality to suppress/enable the generation of specific audit records (which would typically be expressed in CC as FAU SEL.1).
FCS_COP.1(1)	Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryptio n)	SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE has the ability to perform symmetric encryption and decryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	TLS Client Protocol with Authentication	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: Public Key-Based Authentication	The TOE requires peers to possess a valid certificate before establishing trusted communications and provides its own client certificate to the peer, supporting this control.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.
		SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	The TOE provides cryptographic methods to secure data in transit, which may satisfy organization-defined uses if the functionality claimed by the TSF is consistent with organizational requirements.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2	TLS Server Protocol with Authentication	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: Public Key-Based Authentication	The TOE requires peers to possess a valid certificate before establishing trusted communications and provides its own server certificate to the peer, supporting this control.

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR			800-53 Revision 5	Comments and Observations
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.
		SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	The TOE provides cryptographic methods to secure data in transit, which may satisfy organization-defined uses if the functionality claimed by the TSF is consistent with organizational requirements.
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	CM-6	Configuration Settings	A conformant TOE may satisfy one or more optional capabilities defined in this SFR. In general, a conformant TOE will satisfy this control to the extent that the TOE provides a method to configure its behavior in accordance with organizational requirements. Specific additional controls may be supported depending on the functionality claimed by the TOE.
FPT_STM.1	Reliable Time Stamps	AU-8	Time Stamps	A conformant TOE can generate or use time stamps to address the actions defined in this control.
		SC-45(1)	System Time Synchronization: Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source	A conformant TOE may have the ability to synchronize with an NTP server in its operational environment, satisfying this control.
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel	IA-3(1)	Device Identification and Authentication:	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control through its

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR			800-53 Revision 5	Comments and Observations
		Cont	rol Supports	
			Cryptographic	implementation of
			Bidirectional	mutually-authenticated
			Authentication	protocol(s) used to
				establish trusted
		56.0	Transmission	communications.
		SC-8	Confidentiality	A conformant TOE has the
			and Integrity	ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity
			and integrity	of information transmitted
				between the TOE and
				another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission	The TOE supports a
		30-0(1)	Confidentiality	cryptographic method of
			and Integrity:	protecting data in transit.
			Cryptographic	protecting data in transit.
			Protection	
TOE Security Functiona	l Requirements		110000001	
FAU_ARP.1	Security Alarms	SI-4(5)	System	A conformant TOE supports
170_AIII .1	Security Alarms	31 4(3)	Monitoring:	this control by generating
			System-Generated	an alert when suspicious
			Alerts	activity is detected.
		SI-4(7)	System	A conformant TOE supports
		0. 1(7)	Monitoring:	this control by generating a
			Automated	notification in response to
			Response to	detecting suspicious
			Suspicious Events	activity.
		SC-8	Transmission	A conformant TOE uses a
			Confidentiality	trusted channel (SNMPv3)
			and Integrity	to transmit alarms.
FAU_SAA.1	Potential Violation	SI-4	System	A conformant TOE supports
	<u>Analysis</u>		Monitoring	this control by having the
				ability to flag certain events
				as potential security
		-		violations.
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1	Secure Real-time	SC-7(4)	Boundary	A conformant TOE uses
	Transport Protocol		Protection:	SRTP to ensure
			External	confidentiality and integrity
			Telecommunicatio	of telecommunications
			ns Services	traffic, which supports part
		SC 9	Transmission	(c) of this control.  A conformant TOE
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality	implements SRTP to ensure
			and Integrity	confidentiality and integrity
			and milegrity	of data in transit.
FDP_IFC.1	Information Flow	AC-4	Information Flow	A conformant TOE enforces
1 Dr_II C.1	Control Policy	70-4	Enforcement	information flow
	<u>control rolley</u>		Linorcement	
				I
				connection between
	<u>Control Policy</u>		Linorcement	enforcement by determining when a

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR			300-53 Revision 5	Comments and Observations
		SC-7	Boundary	remote entities is authorized.  A conformant TOE enforces
			Protection	an information flow control policy that determines when communications across the network boundary are authorized.
		SC-7(4)	Boundary Protection: External Telecommunicatio ns Services	A conformant TOE supports part (b) of this control through its enforcement of a traffic flow policy.
FDP_IFF.1	Information Flow Control Functions	AC-4	Information Flow Enforcement	A conformant TOE enforces information flow enforcement by determining when a connection between remote entities is authorized.
		SC-7	Boundary Protection	A conformant TOE enforces an information flow control policy that determines when communications across the network boundary are authorized.
		SC-7(4)	Boundary Protection: External Telecommunicatio ns Services	A conformant TOE supports part (b) of this control through its enforcement of a traffic flow policy.
FFW_ACL_EXT.1	Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering	SC-7	Boundary Protection	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control by acting as a boundary device for its managed interfaces.
		SC-7(4)	Boundary Protection: External Telecommunicatio ns Services	A conformant TOE supports part b of this control through its enforcement of a traffic flow policy. Part c is enforced through other SFRs, and parts d and e are not enforced because these relate to organizational policies. Parts (f), (g) are enforced for the prevention of unauthorized of exchange of control plane traffic with external and internal networks. Part (h)

Common Criteri	a Version 3.x SFR		300-53 Revision 5	Comments and
		Cont	trol Supports	Observations
				is enforced to filter unauthorized control plane traffic from external networks.
		SC-7(5)	<b>Boundary Protection:</b> Deny by Default – Allow by Exception	A conformant TOE supports this control by denying packet flow if a matching rule is not identified.
		SC-7(11)	Boundary Protection: Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic	A conformant TOE determines that the source and destination address pairs represent authorized/allowed communications.
FFW_ACL_EXT.2	Stateful VVoIP Traffic Filtering	AC-4	Information Flow Enforcement	A conformant TOE supports this control by enforcing when an information flow is allowed or disallowed based on stateful elements of the supported protocols.
		AU-2	Event Logging	A conformant TOE supports this control by generating an audit record for violation of the traffic filtering rules.
		SC-7	Boundary Protection	A conformant TOE supports this control through enforcement of stateful traffic filtering rules.
		SC-7(4)	Boundary Protection: External Telecommunicatio ns Services	A conformant TOE supports part b of this control through its enforcement of a traffic flow policy. Part c is enforced through other SFRs, and parts d and e are not enforced because these relate to organizational policies. Parts (f), (g) are enforced for the prevention of unauthorized of exchange of control plane traffic with external and internal networks. Part (h) is enforced to filter unauthorized control plane traffic from external networks.
		SC-7(17)	Boundary Protection: Automated	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control by ensuring that

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR			300-53 Revision 5 trol Supports	Comments and Observations
			Enforcement of Protocol Formats	supported VVoIP protocols are properly formatted.
FFW_DPI_EXT.1	Deep Packet Inspection	SC-7(17)	Boundary Protection: Automated Enforcement of Protocol Formats	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control by performing deep packet inspection to verify adherence to protocol formats and specifications.
FFW_NAT_EXT.1	Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal	SC-7(16)	Boundary Protection: Prevent Discovery of System Components	A conformant TOE will satisfy this control through the use of NAT to obfuscate the addresses of devices residing in a protected network.
FIA_SIPT_EXT.1	Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Trunking	IA-3	Device Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE supports this control by using authentication to validate SIP trunking between the TOE and a peer device.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE supports this control by ensuring the confidentiality of SIP trunk communications.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE supports this control by enforcing the use of TLS to secure SIP trunk communications.
FRU_PRS_EXT.1	<u>Limited Priority of</u> <u>Service</u>	SC-6	Resource Availability	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control by assigning priority of service to network traffic.
FRU_RSA.1	Maximum Quotas	SC-5	Denial-of-Service Protection	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control by ensuring that TOE resources cannot be deliberately exhausted by a subject.
		SC-6	Resource Availability	A conformant TOE supports the enforcement of this control through the enforcement of maximum quotas on system resources.
FTP_ITC.1(2)	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel	SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of VVoIP signaling and

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR			800-53 Revision 5	Comments and
	T	Con	trol Supports	Observations
				media communications between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting VVoIP signaling and media communications.
FTP_ITC.1(3)	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel	SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of signaling communications between itself and an Enterprise Session Controller (ESC).
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting signaling communications.
Optional Requirements	5		1	
FIA_SIPS_EXT.1	Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Registration	CM-7(3)	Least Functionality: Registration Compliance	A conformant TOE supports this control by providing a SIP registration process.
		IA-5(1)	Authenticator Management: Password-Based Authentication	A conformant TOE will have the ability to enforce some minimum password complexity requirements, which supports part (h) of this control.
Selection-Based Requir	ements	•	•	
FCS_DTLS_EXT.1	Datagram Transport Layer Security	IA-5(2)	Authenticator Management: Public Key-Based Authentication	The TOE requires peers to possess a valid certificate before establishing trusted communications and provides its own client certificate to the peer, supporting this control.
		SC-8	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity	A conformant TOE has the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information transmitted between the TOE and another trusted IT product.
		SC-8(1)	Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: Cryptographic	The TOE supports a cryptographic method of protecting data in transit.

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR		NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 Control Supports		Comments and Observations	
			Protection		
		SC-13	Cryptographic	The TOE provides	
			Protection	cryptographic methods to	
				secure data in transit,	
				which may satisfy	
				organization-defined uses if	
				the functionality claimed by	
				the TSF is consistent with	
				organizational	
				requirements.	
FTP_ITC.1(4)	Inter-TSF Trusted	SC-8	Transmission	A conformant TOE has the	
	<u>Channel</u>		Confidentiality	ability to ensure the	
			and Integrity	confidentiality and integrity	
				of H.323 communications	
				between the TOE and	
				another trusted IT product.	
		SC-8(1)	Transmission	The TOE supports a	
			Confidentiality	cryptographic method of	
			and Integrity:	protecting H.323	
			Cryptographic	communications.	
			Protection		
Objective Requirements					
This EP has no objective requirements.					