

PP-Module for Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)



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Revision History

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

The scope of this PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) system in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

- Protection Profile for Application Software [AppPP], Version 1.3.

This Base-PP is valid because an EDR is deployed as a software application on a general-purpose operating system.

1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build aPP-Configuration.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.

1.2.2 Technical Terms

Alert	An event or notification on the management dashboard that highlights potentially unauthorized activity.
Endpoint	A computing device that runs a general purpose OS, a mobile device OS, or network device OS. Endpoints can include desktops, servers, and mobile devices.
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)	Server software that analyzes collected EDR Host Agent data for detecting, investigating, and remediating unauthorized activities on endpoints. The terms <i>TOE</i> and <i>EDR</i> are interchangeable in this document.
Endpoint Detection and Response System	The EDR server and the Host Agents they operate with.
Enroll	The act of registering an HA endpoint with the EDR.
Host Agent	Complementary software that executes on endpoints to collect data about the endpoint and executes commands sent to the endpoint from an Enterprise Security Management (ESM) server or service. An example command sent to an endpoint could be to enforce a policy from an ESM, to collect some files, or to run an OS command.
Management Dashboard	A management interface for the configuration of EDR policy, visualization of collected endpoint alert data, and issuing of remediation commands.
Potentially Unauthorized Activity	This refers to the set of activities detected by the TOE, specific items detected may be unique to the TOE
SOC Analyst	Security Operations Center (SOC) Analyst is typically the person responsible for reviewing potentially unauthorized activities via alerts and performing remediation and clean up.

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

An EDR is enterprise management software that collects endpoint host data to detect potentially unauthorized activity on endpoints and to enable threat hunting and other incident response actions to remediate malicious behaviors. These requirements cover basic security characteristics and behaviors for EDR products; the platform on which the EDR runs may be a physical or virtual Operating System (OS), and on-premises or in a cloud environment.

EDR products rely on additional software running on the endpoint, called the Host Agent, to communicate commands or policy changes and to receive endpoint host data. Security requirements for the Host Agent are addressed in the separate [\[Host Agent\]](#) PP-Module. Evaluation of an EDR system will require evaluations of different system components consisting of EDR and [\[Host Agent\]](#). Each evaluation must satisfy the requirements in both the EDR and HA in addition to its Base-PP Application Software. Evaluation of an EDR system will require evaluation of different system components consisting of one EDR and at least one Host Agent. Therefore, the evaluation must claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the PP-Module for Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and the PP-Module for Host Agent.

There are two primary architectural categories addressed by requirements in this PP-Module, as seen in Figure 1.

- Endpoints communicate over the Internet to an EDR hosted by a cloud service provider (Software as a Service).
- Endpoints communicate with an on-premises EDR in a hub and spoke network model.




Figure 1: Primary EDR Architectures

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The TOE boundary for the EDR encompasses all the software from the TOE vendor that represents the server or enterprise management side of the EDR system. This will typically, but not always, be software running behind a web application or dashboard, and possibly with other software services running to send and receive data with a Host Agent. The EDR may also make use of a database to store collected and analyzed data. Any database software itself is outside the scope of the TOE, as is any web server software used to serve a web application or dashboard, and the underlying operating system or cloud platform. The figure below shows EDR (right) communicating with its Host Agent (left) over an untrusted network.

The requirements for the Host Agent are not covered in this PP-Module, however it is expected that an ESM system will evaluate against a PP-Configuration that includes both the EDR PP-Module and the [\[Host Agent\]](#) PP-Module.




Figure 2: EDR and Host Agent Communications

1.3.2 TOE Platform

The TOE platform, which consists of the OS or Cloud platform on which the EDR software executes, is outside the scope of evaluation. However, the security of the EDR relies upon it.

Any communications with trusted remote file reputation or threat intelligence services is relevant to overall EDR system security but is also outside the scope of evaluation.

1.4 Use Cases

Requirements in this PP-Module are designed to address the security problem for the following use cases. An EDR's functionality may be extended by addons, plugins, threat feeds, or other reputation services. These are out of scope of this PP-Module.

[USE CASE 1] Detection of Potential Unauthorized Activity

The detection of potentially unauthorized activity, software, or users is enabled by the collection of host-based endpoint data to a central EDR where the data is analyzed.

[USE CASE 2] Remediation of Malicious Activity

The ability to initiate remediation commands to attempt a clean up of detected malicious activity is a key use case of EDR.

[USE CASE 3] Discovery

The capability to effectively browse, query, and export aggregated host-based endpoint data enables a SOC analyst to discover adversaries in post-compromise scenarios.

2 Conformance Claims

This PP-Module inherits exact conformance as required from the specified Base-PP and as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:

- PP-Module for Host Agents, Version 1.0.

This PP-Module is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Release 5 [CC].

This PP-Module is TLS Package Version 1.1 conformant.

3 Security Problem Description

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the EDR is expected to address, assumptions about the OE, and any organizational security policies that the EDR is expected to enforce. These extend any threats, assumptions, and organizational security policies defined by the Base-PP.

3.1 Threats

T.MISCONFIGURATION

An attacker is a legitimate privileged user with access to change the configuration of the EDR's security capabilities or is not a legitimate privileged user trying to access without proper authorization.. Attackers may attempt to hide malicious activities from other privileged users.

T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may guess or harvest legitimate credentials from the EDR, endpoints, or insecure network activity.

3.2 Assumptions

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an Operational Environment that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality.

A.CONNECTIVITY

The EDR relies on network connectivity to carry out its management activities. The OE will provide reliable network connectivity for the EDR to operate. The EDR will robustly handle occasional instances when connectivity is unavailable or unreliable.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

This PP-Module defines no additional organizational security policies beyond those defined in the Base-PP.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

O.ACCOUNTABILITY

The TOE must provide logging facilities which record management actions undertaken by identified and authenticated management users.

Addressed by: [FAU_GEN.1/EDR](#), [FIA_AUT_EXT.1](#)

O.EDR_MANAGEMENT

The TOE must facilitate authorized management by the enterprise, providing consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration, maintenance, and operation.

Addressed by: [FAU_ALT_EXT.1](#), [FAU_COL_EXT.1](#), [FIA_AUT_EXT.1](#), [FIA_PWD_EXT.1](#), [FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT](#), [FMT_SMF.1/HOST](#), [FMT_SMR.1](#), [FMT_SRF_EXT.1](#), [FMT_TRM_EXT.1](#) (objective)

O.PROTECTED_TRANSIT

To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant TOE s will use a trusted channel to protect all communications. Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application or to unauthenticated users.

Addressed by: [FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1](#) (from TLS Package), [FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1](#) (from TLS Package), [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1](#) (from Base-PP), [FCS_TLSC_EXT.1](#) (from TLS Package), [FCS_TLSC_EXT.2](#) (from TLS Package), [FCS_TLSS_EXT.1](#) (from TLS Package), [FCS_TLSS_EXT.2](#) (from TLS Package), [FPT_ITT.1](#), [FTP_TRP.1](#)

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The Operational Environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). The security objectives for the Operational Environment consist of a set of statements describing the goals that the Operational Environment should achieve. This section defines the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means. The assumptions identified in Section 3 are incorporated as security objectives for the environment. The following security objectives for the Operational Environment assist the EDR in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT

Wired or wireless network traffic between the EDR and host agents will provide reasonably reliable connectivity.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organization security policies map to the security objectives.

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.MISCONFIGURATION	O.EDR_MANAGEMENT	The threat T.MISCONFIGURATION is countered by O.EDR_MANAGEMENT as this provides for authorized management of administrative activities.
	O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The threat T.MISCONFIGURATION is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides for identity, authentication, and audit of administrative activities.
T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE	O.PROTECTED_TRANSIT	The threat T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE is countered by O.PROTECTED_TRANSIT as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data.
	O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	The threat T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE is countered by O.PROTECTED_STORAGE (from [AppPP]) as this provides for confidentiality of locally stored credentials.
A.CONNECTIVITY	OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT	The OE objective OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT is realized through A.CONNECTIVITY .

5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough-text~~): is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

5.1 App PP Security Functional Requirements Direction

In a PP-Configuration that includes [AppPP], the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the application as a whole and evaluated against the Base-PP. The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the Base-PP and relevant to the secure operation of the EDR. This section describes any modifications that the ST author must make to the Base-PP SFRs to satisfy the required EDR functionality.

5.1.1 Modified SFRs

This PP-Module does not modify any SFRs defined by the AppPP.

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_ALT_EXT.1 Server Alerts

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.1 The EDR shall alert authorized users on a management dashboard in the event of any of the following:

- a. Change in Host Agent enrollment status,
- b. Detection of potentially unauthorized activity on enrolled endpoints.

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of management dashboard alert capabilities the EDR must be capable of displaying to an authorized user.

Examples of detection of potentially unauthorized activity on enrolled endpoints include; anomalous activity, escalation of privileges, and lateral movement.

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.2 The EDR shall provide a visualization of detected alerts of potentially unauthorized incidents, and shall include:

- a. An initial incident severity and **selection**: *assessment, categorization, score, ranking*,
- b. An incident timeline.

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of incident visualizations the EDR must be capable of displaying to an authorized user. Visualization is broadly defined as the display of incident data to an authorized user on the management dashboard. The visualization is not required to be interactive.

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.3 The EDR shall provide a data export capability for selected alerts with a specified standards-based format of **selection**:

- *Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)*,
- *Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX)*,
- *Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)*,
- *Common Event Format (CEF)*,
- *Log Event Extended Format (LEEF)*

].

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify a selection of standards-based formats the EDR must provide for the export of selected alerts, at least one must be selected.

FAU_COL_EXT.1 Collected Endpoint Data

FAU_COL_EXT.1.1 The EDR shall collect the following minimum set of endpoint data from a Host Agent:

- a. Operating System (OS) version, architecture, and IP Address,

- b. Privileged and unprivileged endpoint account login activity,
- c. Process creation,
- d. Libraries and modules loaded by processes,
- e. Filenames and [assignment: other metadata] of files created and [assignment: other activities performed to files] on persistent storage,
- f. [assignment: Other host data].

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of endpoint data that the EDR must be capable of collecting. The assignments may be empty, a single item, or multiple items.

FAU_GEN.1/EDR Audit Data Generation

FAU_GEN.1.1/EDR **Refinement:** The EDR shall generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. ~~Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;~~
- b. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and

[

- a. EDR management dashboard log in activity;
- b. Remediation commands sent to a Host Agent, affected endpoint, or network devices;
- c. EDR configuration changes;
- d. [assignment: Other auditable events]

].

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of audit records generated about actions on the EDR.

FAU_GEN.1.2/EDR **Refinement:** The EDR shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the event,
- b. Type of event,
- c. Subject identity,
- d. Outcome (success or failure) of the event,
- e. For each audit type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: Other audit relevant information].

Application Note: This requirement outlines the information to be included in audit records. All audits must contain at least the information mentioned in FAU_GEN.1.2/EDR, but may contain more information which can be assigned.

5.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_AUT_EXT.1 Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1 The EDR shall [selection:

- leverage the platform for authentication,
- provide authentication based on username/password and [selection:
 - authentication with external smart card and PIN,
 - no other factors

]

] to support logins to any management dashboard or API.

Application Note: The selection specifies if Smartcards are also supported, one selection must be made.

FIA_PWD_EXT.1 Password Authentication

FIA_PWD_EXT.1.1 The EDR shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:

1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [selection: upper and lower case letters, [assignment: a character set of at least 52 characters]], numbers, and special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")"], [assignment: other characters]],
2. Password length up to [assignment: an integer greater than or equal to 64] characters shall be supported.

Application Note: The ST author selects the character set: either the upper and lower case Basic Latin letters or another assigned character set containing at least 52 characters. The assigned character set must be well defined: either according to an international encoding standard (such as Unicode) or defined in the assignment by the ST author. The ST author also selects the special characters that are supported by the TOE; they may optionally list additional special characters supported using the assignment.

5.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT Specification of Management Functions (EDR Management of EDR)

FMT_SMF.1.1/ENDPOINT **Refinement:** The EDR shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
Configure the amount of time to retain data collected by the EDR [assignment: <i>time frame to retain data</i>]	M	O	-
Obtain or display the connectivity status of a Host Agent	M	O	O
Define a configurable denylist of [selection: <i>filenames, folders, file hashes</i> , assignment: <i>other factors</i>]	O	M	-
Configure visual suppression of incident alerts based on a configurable denylist of [selection: <i>filenames, folders, file hashes</i> , assignment: <i>other factors</i>]	O	M	-

Application Note: This requirement captures all the configuration functionality the TSF provides the administrator to configure the EDR.

Chart legend: M = Mandatory, O = Optional, - = N/A

FMT_SMF.1/HOST Specification of Management Functions (EDR Management of Host Agent)

FMT_SMF.1.1/HOST **Refinement:** The EDR shall be capable of performing the following functionsthat control behavior of the Host Agent:

Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
Configure the time frame for sending Host Agent data to the EDR [assignment: <i>list of configurable time frames</i>]	M	O	-
Assign a label or tag to categorize or group individual endpoint systems	M	O	-

Application Note: This requirement captures all the configuration functionality the EDR provides the administrator to configure the EDR Host Agents.

Chart legend: M = Mandatory, O = Optional, - = N/A

FMT_SMR.1 Security Management Roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 **Refinement:** The EDR shall maintain the roles [*administrator, SOC analyst, read-only user*].

FMT_SMR.1.2 **Refinement:** The EDR shall be able to associate users with roles.

Application Note: The EDR will be configured, maintained, and used by different user roles. At a minimum, one administrative role shall be supported, one SOC analyst who can issue remediation commands to host agents, and one read-only user who can only view data.

The user accounts need not be named literally, but they must have the implication of such roles.

CC Part 2 specifies FIA_UID.1 as a dependency of this requirement because theTSF must have some way of identifying users so that they can be associated with management roles. This dependency is implicitly addressed through FIA_AUT_EXT.1, which specifies an alternative method of user identification.

FMT_SRF_EXT.1 Specification of Remediation Functions

FMT_SRF_EXT.1.1 The EDR shall be capable of performing the following remediation functions:

Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
Quarantine an endpoint by [selection: <i>logically quarantining the endpoint from the network unless allowlisted, quarantining the malicious file on the endpoint</i>]	O	M	-
Terminate a running process on an endpoint	O	M	-
Retrieve potentially unauthorized or affected files from an endpoint	O	O	-

Application Note: This requirement captures all the remediation functionality the EDR provides the SOC Analyst and optionally the Administrator.

Logically quarantine from the network refers to restricting communications from the endpoint to the rest of the network, it may include a restricted allowlist.

Chart legend: M = Mandatory, O = Optional, - = N/A

5.2.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT_ITT.1.1

Refinement: The EDR shall [selection:

- **implement** [selection: *TLS as defined in the TLS Package, HTTPS as defined in the Base-PP*],
- **invoke platform-provided functionality for** [selection: *TLS, HTTPS*]

] to protect TSF data from [modification, disclosure] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Application Note: The intent of the above requirement is to use the cryptographic protocols identified in the requirement to establish and maintain a trusted channel between the EDR and the Host Agent, which are considered to be separate parts of the TOE. The TLS Package permits the use of either TLS or DTLS. Only TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS can be used in this trusted channel.

This requirement is to ensure that the transmission of any logs, process lists, system information, etc, when commanded, or at configurable intervals, is properly protected. This internal channel also protects any commands and policies sent by the EDR to the Host Agent. Either the Host Agent or the EDR is able to initiate the connection.

This internal channel protects both the connection between an enrolled Host Agent and the EDR and the connection between an unenrolled Host Agent and the EDR during the enrollment operation. Different protocols can be used for these two connections, and the description in the TSS should make this difference clear.

The internal channel uses a protocol from the TLS Package or HTTPS as the protocol that preserves the confidentiality and integrity of EDR communications. The ST author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the EDR, and then ensures the correct requirements are included in the ST if not already present. Protocol, RBG, certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform-provided services.

5.2.5 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

FTP_TRP.1.1

Refinement: The EDR shall [selection:

- **implement** [selection: *TLS as defined in the TLS Package, HTTPS as defined in the Base-PP*],
- **invoke platform-provided functionality for** [selection: *TLS, HTTPS*]

] to provide a communication path between itself and [remote administrators] that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].

FTP_TRP.1.2

Refinement: The EDR shall [selection: **implement functionality, invoke platform-provided functionality**] to permit [remote administrators] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3

Refinement: The EDR shall [selection: **implement functionality, invoke platform-provided functionality**] to require the use of the trusted path for [all remote administration actions].

Application Note: This requirement ensures that authorized remote administrators initiate all communication with the EDR via a trusted path, and that all communications with the EDR by remote administrators is performed over this path. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the first selection. The ST author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the EDR.

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

OBJECTIVE	ADDRESSED BY	RATIONALE
O.ACCOUNTABILITY	FAU_GEN.1/EDR, FIA_AUT_EXT.1	The PP-Module includes FAU_GEN.1/EDR to ensure that the TOE provides accountability through the generation of audit records for security-relevant events.

		<p>The PP-Module includes FIA_AUT_EXT.1 to provide a mechanism to authenticate management users so that they can be associated with their actions.</p>
O.EDR_MANAGEMENT	<p>FAU_ALT_EXT.1, FAU_COL_EXT.1, FIA_AUT_EXT.1, FIA_PWD_EXT.1, FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT, FMT_SMF.1/HOST, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SRF_EXT.1, FMT_TRM_EXT.1 (objective)</p>	<p>The PP-Module includes FAU_ALT_EXT.1 to facilitate management by providing a function for authorized users to interact with security-relevant data that is provided to the TSF.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FAU_COL_EXT.1 to facilitate management by defining the security-relevant data that is collected by the TSF.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FIA_AUT_EXT.1 to define how management users are authenticated by the TSF to limit the subjects that can execute management functions on the TOE.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FIA_PWD_EXT.1 to define composition requirements for the Password Authentication Factor to ensure that an authorized user cannot access protected management functions without authorization.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT to define the management functions that can be performed to control the behavior of the TSF and the management roles that are authorized to perform those functions.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FMT_SMF.1/HOST to define the management functions that can be performed to control the behavior of Host Agents that are connected to the TOE and the management roles that are authorized to perform those functions.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FMT_SMR.1 to define the management roles that the TSF supports so that its management functions can be separated by role.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FMT_SRF_EXT.1 to define the remediation functions that are available to authorized users to issue corrective actions on a system that has a connected Host Agent.</p> <p>The PP-Module includes FMT_TRM_EXT.1 to provide an optional capability to ensure the integrity of management commands and policies issued to external Host Agents through use of a digital signature</p>
O.PROTECTED_TRANSIT	<p>FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 (from TLS Package), FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 (from TLS Package), FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 (from Base-PP), FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (from TLS Package), FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 (from TLS Package), FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 (from TLS Package), FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 (from TLS Package), FPT_ITT.1, FTP_TRP.1</p>	<p>The PP-Module references FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 from the Base-PP for cases when HTTPS is used as a trusted communications channel.</p> <p>The PP-Module references FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 from the TLS Package for cases when DTLS as a client is used as a trusted communications channel.</p> <p>The PP-Module references</p>

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 from the TLS Package for cases when DTLS as a server is used as a trusted communications channel.

The PP-Module references FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 from the TLS Package for cases when TLS as a client is used as a trusted communications channel.

The PP-Module references FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 from the TLS Package for cases when the TOE uses a TLS client implementation that supports mutual authentication.

The PP-Module references FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 from the TLS Package for cases when TLS as a server is used as a trusted communications channel.

The PP-Module references FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 from the TLS Package for cases when the TOE uses a TLS client implementation that supports mutual authentication.

The PP-Module includes [FPT_ITT.1](#) to define the internal trusted channel that the TSF uses to communicate with connected Host Agents as well as the communications protocols used to establish these trusted channels.

The PP-Module includes [FPT_TRP.1](#) to define the communications protocols used to support secure remote administration of the TSF.

6 Consistency Rationale

6.1 Protection Profile for Application Software

6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

If this PP-Module is used to extend the Application SoftwarePP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a software-based application. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include the EDR functionality that is built into the application so that additional security functionality is claimed within the scope of the TOE.

6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

The threats, assumptions, and OSPs defined by this PP-Module (see section 3.1) supplement those defined in the App PP as follows:

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
T.MISCONFIGURATION	This threat is consistent with the Base-PP because it is a specific example of the T.LOCAL_ATTACK threat defined there. In this case, the local attack is to maliciously alter the behavior of the application itself rather than to use the application as a method to attack the OS platform.
T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE	This threat is a specific example of T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP defined in the Base-PP.
A.CONNECTIVITY	This assumption is consistent with the Base-PP because assuming network availability is consistent with the A.PLATFORM assumption defined by the Base-PP, which expects the TOE to have a trustworthy computing platform.

6.1.3 Consistency of Objectives

The objectives for the TOEs are consistent with the App PP based on the following rationale:

PP-Module TOE Objective	Consistency Rationale
O.ACCOUNTABILITY	This objective relates to the ability of the TOE to identify and authenticate users, and to record the behavior of these users. The Base-PP does not define an authentication mechanism so this objective does not affect the enforcement of the Base-PP's SFRs.
O.EDR_MANAGEMENT	This objective extends the Base-PP's O.EDR_MANAGEMENT objective by supporting the management functions that are specific to the EDR TOE type.
O.PROTECTED_TRANSIT	This objective extends the Base-PP's O.PROTECTED_COMMS objective by ensuring that the communications related to the EDR and enrolled Host Agents are secured in the same manner as other sensitive data.

The objectives for the TOE's Operational Environment are consistent with the AppPP based on the following rationale:

PP-Module Operational Environment Objective	Consistency Rationale
OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT	This objective relates to an external interface that does not exist in the Base-PP and does not affect Base-PP functionality.

6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the App PP that are needed to support Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the App PP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the App PP are as follows:

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SFRs	
This PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the App PP is the base.	
Mandatory SFRs	
FAU_ALT_EXT.1	This SFR defines auditable alerts for the EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FAU_COL_EXT.1	This SFR defines the minimum event data that the EDR collects from a Host Agent. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FAU_GEN.1/EDR	This SFR defines the minimum event data that the EDR server must record about authorized management dashboard activity. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FIA_AUT_EXT.1	This SFR defines authentication mechanisms for the EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP]

	functionality.
FIA_PWD_EXT.1	This SFR defines specific authentication criteria for passwords. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT	This SFR defines a specific set of management functions for an EDR by an EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FMT_SMF.1/HOST	This SFR defines a specific set of management functions for a Host Agent by an EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FMT_SMR.1	This SFR defines a specific set of management roles for an EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FMT_SRF_EXT.1	This SFR defines a specific set of remediation functions for an EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FPT_ITT.1	This SFR defines a specific set of functions for logically distinct secure communication with a Host Agent. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FTP_TRP.1	This SFR defines a specific set of functions for secure remote administration of the EDR. It does not impact [AppPP] functionality.

Optional SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any optional requirements.

Selection-based SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any selection-based requirements.

Objective SFRs

FMT_TRM_EXT.1	This SFR defines protections for the integrity of commands sent to the Host Agent. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
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Appendix A - Optional SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any optional SFRs.

Appendix B - Selection-based SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any selection-based SFRs.

Appendix C - Objective SFRs

This section is reserved for requirements that are not currently prescribed by this PP-Module but are expected to be included in future versions of the PP-Module. Vendors planning on having evaluations performed against future products are encouraged to plan for these objective requirements to be met.

FMT_TRM_EXT.1 Trusted Remediation Functions

FMT_TRM_EXT.1.1 The [selection: *EDR, EDR Platform*] shall digitally sign commands and policies sent to the Host Agent using [selection: *RSA, ECDSA*] signatures that meet FIPS PUB 186-4.

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to cryptographically tie any policy updates or commands sent to the Host Agent as being from the EDR. This is not to protect the policies in transit as they are already protected by [FPT_ITT.1](#). If the TSF implements this function, any signature algorithms used should be consistent with any selections made in FCS_COP.1(3).

Appendix D - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for the extended requirements that are used in the PP-Module including those used in Appendices A through C.

D.1 Background and Scope

This appendix provides a definition for all of the extended components introduced in this PP-Module. These components are identified in the following table:

Functional Class	Functional Components
Security Audit (FAU)	FAU_ALT_EXT Server Alerts FAU_COL_EXT Collected Endpoint Data
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_AUT_EXT Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms FIA_PWD_EXT Password Authentication
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_SRF_EXT Specification of Remediation Functions FMT_TRM_EXT Trusted Remediation Functions

D.2 Extended Component Definitions

FAU_ALT_EXT Server Alerts

Components in this family define requirements for system activity that causes the TSF to generate an alert of the activity and for the contents of these alerts.

Component Leveling

[FAU_ALT_EXT.1](#), Server Alerts, describes alert triggers and the information contained in alerts.

Management: FAU_ALT_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configure visual suppression of alerts.

Audit: FAU_ALT_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FAU_ALT_EXT.1 Server Alerts

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.1

The EDR shall alert authorized users on a management dashboard in the event of any of the following:

- a. Change in Host Agent enrollment status,
- b. Detection of potentially unauthorized activity on enrolled endpoints.

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.2

The EDR shall provide a visualization of detected alerts of potentially unauthorized incidents, and shall include:

- a. An initial incident severity and [selection: assessment, categorization, score, ranking],
- b. An incident timeline.

FAU_ALT_EXT.1.3

The EDR shall provide a data export capability for selected alerts with a specified standards-based format of [assignment: alert format].

FAU_COL_EXT Collected Endpoint Data

Components in this family define requirements for the data that is collected from a Host Agent.

Component Leveling

[FAU_COL_EXT.1](#), Collected Endpoint Data, identifies the specific data collected from a Host Agent.

Management: FAU_COL_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the time period for transmission of collected data.

- Configuration of label or tag information to associate collected data with individual endpoint systems or groups of systems.

Audit: FAU_COL_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FAU_COL_EXT.1 Collected Endpoint Data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

FAU_COL_EXT.1.1

The EDR shall collect the following minimum set of endpoint data from a Host Agent:

- Operating System (OS) version, architecture, and IP Address,
- Privileged and unprivileged endpoint account login activity,
- Process creation,
- Libraries and modules loaded by processes,
- Filenames and [assignment: other metadata] of files created and [assignment: other activities performed to files] on persistent storage,
- [assignment: Other host data].

FIA_AUT_EXT Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

Components in this family define requirements for authentication behavior that is unique to an EDR TOE.

Component Leveling

[FIA_AUT_EXT.1](#), Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms, identifies the only authentication factors that may be used for authentication to a management interface of an EDR.

Management: FIA_AUT_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FIA_AUT_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FIA_AUT_EXT.1 Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1

The EDR shall [selection:

- leverage the platform for authentication,
- provide authentication based on username/password and [selection:
 - authentication with external smart card and PIN,
 - no other factors

]

] to support logins to any management dashboard or API.

FIA_PWD_EXT Password Authentication

Components in this family define requirements for password authentication criteria.

Component Leveling

[FIA_PWD_EXT.1](#), Password Authentication, defines the length and character set requirements for password authentication factors.

Management: FIA_PWD_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FIA_PWD_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FIA_PWD_EXT.1 Password Authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FIA_AUT_EXT.1](#) Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

FIA_PWD_EXT.1.1

The EDR shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:

1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [selection: upper and lower case letters, [assignment: a character set of at least 52 characters]], numbers, and special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "*", " ",

- ("", ")", [assignment: other characters]),
2. Password length up to [assignment: an integer greater than or equal to 64] characters shall be supported.

FMT_SRF_EXT Specification of Remediation Functions

Components in this family define requirements for remediation functions that an EDR can perform to affect the behavior of an endpoint system.

Component Leveling

[FMT_SRF_EXT.1](#), Specification of Remediation Functions, lists the supported remediation functions and identifies the management roles that may perform these functions.

Management: FMT_SRF_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FMT_SRF_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FMT_SRF_EXT.1 Specification of Remediation Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FMT_SMR.1](#) Security Management Roles

FMT_SRF_EXT.1.1

The EDR shall be capable of performing the following remediation functions:

Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
Quarantine an endpoint by [selection: <i>logically quarantining the endpoint from the network unless allowlisted, quarantining the malicious file on the endpoint</i>]	O	M	-
Terminate a running process on an endpoint	O	M	-
Retrieve potentially unauthorized or affected files from an endpoint	O	O	-

FMT_TRM_EXT Trusted Remediation Functions

Components in this family define how the TOE can assert the authenticity of the remediation actions it requests from Host Agents.

Component Leveling

[FMT_TRM_EXT.1](#), Trusted Remediation Functions, requires all management activities bound for a Host Agent to be digitally signed.

Management: FMT_TRM_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

Audit: FMT_TRM_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FMT_TRM_EXT.1 Trusted Remediation Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

FMT_TRM_EXT.1.1

The [selection: *EDR, EDR Platform*] shall digitally sign commands and policies sent to the Host Agent using [selection: *RSA, ECDSA*] signatures that meet FIPS PUB 186-4.

Appendix E - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this Protection Profile. However, these requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [\[CC\]](#) Part 1, **8.2 Dependencies between components**.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the Protection Profile provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

Requirement	Rationale for Satisfaction
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FIA_UID.1 - Timing of Identification	CC Part 2 specifies FIA_UID.1 as a dependency of FMT_SMR.1 because the TSF must have some way of identifying users so that they can be associated with management roles. This dependency is implicitly addressed through FIA_AUT_EXT.1 , which specifies an alternative method of user identification.
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable Time Stamps	CC Part 2 specifies FPT_STM.1 as a dependency of FAU_GEN.1 because the audit records require a reliable timestamp to satisfy FAU_GEN.1.2. This dependency is implicitly addressed through the A.PLATFORM assumption of the Base-PP because a "trustworthy computing platform" is assumed to include a reliable system clock.

Appendix F - Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[AppPP]	Protection Profile for Application Software , Version 1.3, March 1, 2019
[Host Agent]	PP-Module for Host Agent , Version 1.0, October 23rd 2020

Appendix G - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
API	Application Programming Interface
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEF	Common Event Format
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CyboX	Cyber Observable eXpression
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IODEF	Incident Object Description Exchange Format
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
LEEF	Log Event Extended Format
OE	Operational Environment
OS	Operating System
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
RBG	Random Bit Generator
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
STIX	Structured Threat Information eXpression
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSS	TOE Summary Specification