Mapping Between

Protection Profile Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019

and

NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5

Important Caveats

- Product vs. System. The Common Criteria is designed for the evaluation of products; the Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2, DOD 8510.01) and associated control/control interpretations (NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5, CNSSI № 1253) are used for the assessment and authorization of mission systems. Products cannot satisfy controls outside of the system context. Products may support a system satisfying particular controls, but typically satisfaction also requires the implementation of operational procedures; further, given that systems are typically the product of integration of multiple products configured to meet mission requirements, an overall system assessment is required to determine if the control is satisfied in the overall system context.
- SA-4(7). Perhaps it is needless to say, but satisfaction of any NIAP PP-Module supports system satisfaction of SA-4(7), which is the implementation of CNSSP № 11.
- **SA-28.** Independent of any individual SFRs, the primary purpose of this TOE is to support the enforcement of SA-28 and SA-28(1) by facilitating the cryptographic protection of data at rest.
- System context of supported controls. For a conformant TOE to support these controls in the context of an information system, the selections and assignments completed in the TOE's Security Target must be congruent with those made for the supported controls. For example, the TOE's ability to protect data at rest only supports SC-28(1) to the extent that any sensitive data that is encrypted as per FDP_DAR_EXT.1 is included in the set of "organization-defined information at rest" assigned by that control. The security control assessor must compare the TOE's functional claims to the behavior required for the system to determine the extent to which the applicable controls are supported. In general, the various ancillary security functions that a conformant TOE includes are subordinate to the primary use case of the TOE, which is to ensure that SC-28 and SC-28(1) are enforced to secure data at rest on the organizational asset on which the TOE is deployed.

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR		NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 Control		Comments and Observations
Mandatory Requireme				
FCS_CKM_EXT.2	File Encryption Key (FEK) Generation	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to securely generate or import keys.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to securely destroy keys.
FCS_IV_EXT.1	Initialization Vector Generation	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE's use of IVs as needed ensures that cryptographic keys are generated appropriately.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1	Key Chaining and Key Storage	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	The ability of a conformant TOE to maintain a key chain satisfies the key access portion of this control.
FCS_VAL_EXT.1	<u>Validation</u>	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE will ensure that encrypted data at rest is not decrypted unless a valid authorization factor is provided.
		AC-14	Permitted Actions without Identification or Authorization	A conformant TOE will ensure that data cannot be decrypted without presentation of a valid authorization factor.
FDP_PRT_EXT.1	Protection of Selected User Data	SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	The primary purpose of the TOE is to ensure that data at rest is protected against unauthorized access.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE will encrypt data at rest using AES.
FDP_PRT_EXT.2	Destruction of Plaintext Data	SC-4	Information in Shared System Resources	A conformant TOE ensures that ephemeral storage of decrypted sensitive data cannot be used as a mechanism to disclose that data to an unintended recipient.
FIA_AUT_EXT.1	Subject Authorization	IA-2	Identification and Authentication	A conformant TOE implements or relies on one or more methods of

Common Criteria	a Version 3.x SFR		00-53 Revision 5	Comments and
	T		Control	Observations
			(Organizational	authorizing users based on
			Users)	validation of an
				authorization factor.
FMT_SMF.1(2)	Specification of File	CM-6	Configuration	A conformant TOE may
	<u>Encryption</u>		Settings	satisfy one or more
	<u>Management</u>			optional capabilities
	<u>Functions</u>			defined in this SFR. In
				general, a conformant TOE
				will satisfy this control to
				the extent that the TOE
				provides a method to
				configure its behavior in
				accordance with
				organizational
				requirements. Specific
				additional controls may be
				supported depending on
				the functionality claimed by
EDT IOUR EVT 4	D	10.5		the TOE.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1	Protection of Keys	IA-5	Authenticator	A conformant TOE has the
	and Key Material		Management	ability to protect key data
				that may be used an
				authenticator, satisfying
		60.40		part (g) of the control.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key	A conformant TOE will
			Establishment and	ensure that secret key and
			Management	keying material data are
				not stored in plaintext
				except in specific cases
		66 20(2)	5: .	where appropriate.
		SC-28(3)	Protection of	A conformant TOE will
			Information at	ensure that its
			Rest:	cryptographic keys are
			Cryptographic	protected at rest using an
Ontional Bankinamant			Keys	appropriate method.
Optional Requirements	T	T		
FCS_CKM_EXT.5	File Authentication	SC-12	Cryptographic Key	A conformant TOE will
	Key (FAK) Support		Establishment and	ensure that any FAKs are
			Management	generated and protected in
				an appropriate manner.
		SC-28(3)	Protection of	A conformant TOE will
			Information at	ensure that any FAKs are
			Rest:	protected at rest using an
			Cryptographic	appropriate method.
			Keys	

Common Criteria	a Version 3.x SFR		00-53 Revision 5 Control	Comments and Observations
FCS_COP_EXT.1	FAK Encryption/Decryptio n Support	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE will ensure that FAKs are not stored in plaintext.
		SC-28(3)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Keys	A conformant TOE supports this control by virtue of the fact that the control requires protected storage for cryptographic keys. This
				SFR requires the TOE to implement a cryptographic method to protect the confidentiality of stored keys, or to implement key
				derivation such that keys are not stored at all and this control is satisfied by default.
FDP_AUT_EXT.1	Authentication of Selected User Data	SI-7	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity	A conformant TOE implements a method to verify data integrity through data authentication.
FDP_AUT_EXT.2	Data Authentication Using cryptographic Keyed-Hash Functions	SI-7(6)	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE uses cryptographic mechanisms to validate data integrity through data authentication.
FDP_AUT_EXT.3	Data Authentication Using Asymmetric Signing and Verification	SI-7(6)	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE uses cryptographic mechanisms to validate data integrity through data authentication.
FDP_PM_EXT.1	Protection of Data in Power Managed States	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE will ensure that encrypted data at rest is not decrypted unless a valid authorization factor is provided.
		SC-4	Information in Shared System Resources	A conformant TOE ensures that plaintext sensitive data is destroyed on a power state transition so that this cannot be used as a mechanism to disclose that

Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR		NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 Control		Comments and Observations
				data to an unintended recipient.
		SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	The primary purpose of the TOE is to ensure that data at rest is protected against unauthorized access. This includes ensuring that engaging a power state or lock state transition on the TOE platform cannot be used as a way to prevent the engaging of these protection mechanisms.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE will encrypt data at rest using AES.
FDP_PRT_EXT.3	Protection of Third- Party Data	SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	A conformant TOE will enforce its data at rest protection mechanisms against temporary files.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE will encrypt data at rest using AES.
FIA_FCT_EXT.1	Multi-User Authorization	SC-4	Information in Shared System Resources	A conformant TOE will ensure that user-specific data is protected at the user level so that multiple users on the same system cannot access data that does not belong to them.
		SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE will ensure that user-specific data at rest is protected such that only the authorized user may access it.
		SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	A conformant TOE will protect data at rest using unique keys for individual users.

Common Criteri	a Version 3.x SFR		00-53 Revision 5 Control	Comments and Observations
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE will encrypt data at rest using AES.
		SC-50	Software- Enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement	A conformant TOE will enforce domain separation by ensuring that a multiuser system protects data in such a manner that only the authorized user for that particular data may access it.
FIA_FCT_EXT.2	Authorized Key Sharing	AC-3	Access Enforcement	A conformant TOE has a mechanism that allows a user to grant another user access to their protected data.
Selection-Based Requirements				
FCS_CKM_EXT.3	Key Encrypting Key (KEK) Support	SC-12	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	A conformant TOE has the ability to securely generate or import keys.
FCS_CKM_EXT.6	Cryptographic Password/Passphrase Conditioning	IA-5	Authenticator Management	A conformant TOE requires passwords to meet specific length and composition restrictions, which may address part (h) of the control depending on what the organization's requirements for password complexity rules are.
		SC-13	Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE will condition password data using a NIST-approved method.
		SC-28	Protection of Information at Rest	A conformant TOE uses salts to increase password complexity.
		SC-28(1)	Protection of Information at Rest: Cryptographic Protection	A conformant TOE uses key derivation rather than persistent storage to maintain password data.

FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping) FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping) FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Operivation Function FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Operivation Function Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption Using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Operivation Function Cryptographic A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Operivation Function Cryptographic A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-approved and FIPS-	Common Criteria Version 3.x SFR		NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5		Comments and
Protection Ability to perform key wrapping using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.			Control		Observations
Wrapping Wrapping Wrapping using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) SC-13 Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key transport using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) SC-13 Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function SC-13 Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.	FCS_COP.1(5)	<u>Cryptographic</u>	SC-13	Cryptographic	A conformant TOE has the
FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operivation Function SC-13 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) SC-13 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) SC-13 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA- Operation (Key Encryption) A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-		Operation (Key		Protection	ability to perform key
FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) Cryptographic Key Derivation Function SC-13 Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-		Wrapping)			wrapping using NSA-
FCS_COP.1(6) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key transport using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-					approved and FIPS-
Operation (Key Transport) Protection ability to perform key transport using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.					validated algorithms.
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FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) SC-13 Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-		Operation (Key		Protection	ability to perform key
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FCS_COP.1(7) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) SC-13 Cryptographic Protection Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms. Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-					approved and FIPS-
Protection Ability to perform key encryption using NSA-approved and FIPS-validated algorithms.					validated algorithms.
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FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function Cryptographic Mey Derivation Function Cryptographic Protection approved and FIPS- validated algorithms. A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-		Operation (Key		Protection	ability to perform key
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function Cryptographic SC-13 Protection Validated algorithms. A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-		Encryption)			encryption using NSA-
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function SC-13 Cryptographic Protection A conformant TOE has the ability to perform key derivation using NSA-					approved and FIPS-
Derivation Function Protection ability to perform key derivation using NSA-					validated algorithms.
derivation using NSA-	FCS_KDF_EXT.1	Cryptographic Key	SC-13	Cryptographic	A conformant TOE has the
		Derivation Function		Protection	ability to perform key
approved and FIPS-					_
					approved and FIPS-
validated algorithms.					validated algorithms.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining SC-12 Cryptographic Key A conformant TOE has the	FCS_SMC_EXT.1	Submask Combining	SC-12	Cryptographic Key	A conformant TOE has the
Establishment and ability to perform submask				Establishment and	ability to perform submask
Management combining in support of key				Management	combining in support of key
generation functions.					generation functions.
FCS_VAL_EXT.2 <u>Validation</u> AC-7 Unsuccessful A conformant TOE	FCS_VAL_EXT.2	<u>Validation</u>	AC-7	Unsuccessful	A conformant TOE
Remediation Logon Attempts performs some protective		Remediation		Logon Attempts	performs some protective
action if a user has a					action if a user has a
sufficiently large number of					sufficiently large number of
consecutive failed					consecutive failed
authorization attempts due					authorization attempts due
to presenting an invalid					to presenting an invalid
authorization factor.					authorization factor.

Objective Requirements

This PP-Module has no objective requirements.