

# **Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile**

**Version 1.4**

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## Foreword

This publication, Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile, is issued by the National Security Agency as part of its program to promulgate security standards for information systems.

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# Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile

## **1 PROTECTION PROFILE (PP) INTRODUCTION**

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### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

This section contains document management and overview information necessary to allow a Protection Profile (PP) to be registered through a Protection Profile Registry. The identification provides the labeling and descriptive information necessary to identify, catalogue, register, and cross-reference a PP. The overview summarizes the profile in narrative form and provides sufficient information for a potential user to determine whether the PP is of interest. The overview can also be used as a stand-alone abstract for PP catalogues and registers. The Conventions section provides an explanation of how this document is organized. The Terms section gives a basic definition of terms, which are specific to this PP. Finally, the Related Profiles section identifies profiles directly related to this profile and may be of interest to those interested in this profile.

### **1.2 IDENTIFICATION**

Title: Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile, Version 1.4

Registration: Information Systems Security Organization

Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) – EAL 2

Common Criteria Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1, August 1999

International Standard – ISO/IEC 15408:1999

Keywords: intrusion detection, intrusion detection system, sensor, scanner, analyzer

### **1.3 OVERVIEW**

The Common Criteria (CC) Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile specifies a set of security functional and assurance requirements for Information Technology (IT) products. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitors an IT System for activity that may inappropriately affect the IT System's assets. An IT System may range from a computer system to

a computer network. An IDS System (System) consists of Sensors, Scanners and Analyzers (i.e., IDS components). Sensors and Scanners collect information regarding IT System activity and vulnerabilities, and they forward the collected information to Analyzers. Analyzers perform intrusion analysis and reporting of the collected information.

Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile-conformant products support the ability that monitor (both real-time and statically) an IT System for activity that may inappropriately affect the IT System's assets and react appropriately. Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile-conformant products also provide the ability to protect themselves and their associated data from unauthorized access or modification and ensure accountability for authorized actions.

The IDSSPP provides for a level of protection which is appropriate for IT environments that require detection of malicious and inadvertent attempts to gain inappropriate access to IT resources, where the System can be appropriately protected from hostile attacks. Though products that are Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile-conformant can be used to monitor and analyze a system or network in a hostile environment, they are not designed to resist direct, hostile attacks. The Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile does not fully address the threats posed by malicious administrative or system development personnel. This profile is also not intended to result in products that are foolproof and able to detect intrusion attempts by hostile and well-funded attackers. Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile-conformant products are suitable for use in both commercial and government environments.

The Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile was constructed to provide a target and metric for the development of Systems. This PP identifies security functions and assurances that represent the lowest common set of requirements that should be addressed by a useful IDS System.

The Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile is generally applicable to products regardless of whether they are embedded, stand-alone, centralized, or distributed. However, it addresses only security requirements and not any special considerations of any particular product design.

## **1.4 CONVENTIONS**

The requirements in this document are divided into assurance requirements and two sets of functional requirements. The first set of functional requirements, which were drawn from the Common Criteria, is designed to address the core System requirements for self-protection. The

second set of requirements, which were invented and categorized by the short name, IDS, is designed to address the requirements for the System's primary function, which is IDS collection of data and responses to conclusions based upon that data.

The CC permits four functional component operations—assignment, refinement, selection, and iteration—to be performed on functional requirements. This PP will highlight the four operations in the following manner:

- **assignment**: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Indicated with bold text and italics if further operations are necessary by the Security Target author;
- **refinement**: allows the addition of details. Indicated with bold text and italics if further operations are necessary by the Security Target author;
- **selection**: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Indicated with underlined text; and
- **iteration**: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. Not used in this PP.

In addition, this PP has explicitly stated requirements. These new requirements are indicated in bold text and contain the text (EXP) in the title.

## 1.5 TERMS

This section describes terms that are used throughout the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile and other Protection Profiles in the Intrusion Detection System family. The same terms section is used among all Protection Profiles to maintain consistency. When possible, terms are defined as they exist in the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation* or the *NSA Glossary of Terms Used in Security and Intrusion Detection<sub>2</sub>* provided by the NSA Information Systems Security Organization. The definitions were modified only to provide consistency with the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile. For example, occurrences of *computer system* or *network* were replaced with IT System. The authors of the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile defined all other terms as necessary.

- **Analyzer data** – Data collected by the Analyzer functions.
- **Analyzer functions** – The active part of the Analyzer responsible for performing intrusion analysis of information that may be representative of vulnerabilities in and misuse of IT resources, as well as reporting of conclusions.



- **Assets** - Information or resources to be protected by the countermeasures of a TOE.
- **Attack** - An attempt to bypass security controls on an IT System. The attack may alter, release, or deny data. Whether an attack will succeed depends on the vulnerability of the IT System and the effectiveness of existing countermeasures.
- **Audit** - The independent examination of records and activities to ensure compliance with established controls, policy, and operational procedures, and to recommend indicated changes in controls, policy, or procedures.
- **Audit Trail** - In an IT System, a chronological record of system resource usage. This includes user login, file access, other various activities, and whether any actual or attempted security violations occurred, legitimate and unauthorized.
- **Authentication** - To establish the validity of a claimed user or object.
- **Authorized Administrator** – A subset of authorized users that manage an IDS component.
- **Authorized User** - A user that is allowed to perform IDS functions and access data.
- **Availability** - Assuring information and communications services will be ready for use when expected.
- **Compromise** - An intrusion into an IT System where unauthorized disclosure, modification or destruction of sensitive information may have occurred.
- **Confidentiality** - Assuring information will be kept secret, with access limited to appropriate persons.
- **Evaluation** - Assessment of a PP, a ST or a TOE, against defined criteria.
- **IDS component** - a Sensor, Scanner, or Analyzer.
- **Information Technology (IT) System** - May range from a computer system to a computer network.
- **Integrity** - Assuring information will not be accidentally or maliciously altered or destroyed.
- **Intrusion** - Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource.
- **Intrusion Detection (ID)** - Pertaining to techniques which attempt to detect intrusion into an IT System by observation of actions, security logs, or audit data. Detection of break-ins or attempts either manually or via software expert systems that operate on logs or other information available on the network.
- **Intrusion Detection System (IDS)** - A combination of Sensors, Scanners, and Analyzers that monitor an IT System for activity that may inappropriately affect the IT System's assets and react appropriately.

- **Intrusion Detection System Analyzer (Analyzer)** – The component of an IDS that accepts data from Sensors, Scanners and other IT System resources, and then applies analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future).
- **Intrusion Detection System Scanner (Scanner)** – The component of an IDS that collects static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System.
- **Intrusion Detection System Sensor (Sensor)** - The component of an IDS that collects real-time events that may be indicative of vulnerabilities in or misuse of IT resources.
- **IT Product** - A package of IT software, firmware and/or hardware, providing functionality designed for use or incorporation within a multiplicity of systems.
- **Network** - Two or more machines interconnected for communications.
- **Packet** - A block of data sent over the network transmitting the identities of the sending and receiving stations, error-control information, and message.
- **Packet Sniffer** - A device or program that monitors the data traveling between computers on a network.
- **Protection Profile (PP)** - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
- **Scanner data** – Data collected by the Scanner functions.
- **Scanner functions** – The active part of the Scanner responsible for collecting configuration information that may be representative of vulnerabilities in and misuse of IT resources (i.e., Scanner data)
- **Security** - A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
- **Sensor data** – Data collected by the Sensor functions.
- **Sensor functions** – The active part of the Sensor responsible for collecting information that may be representative of vulnerabilities in and misuse of IT resources (i.e., Sensor data).
- **Security Policy** - The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information.
- **Security Target (ST)** - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
- **System data** – Data collected and produced by the System functions.

- **System functions** – Functions performed by all IDS component (i.e., Analyzer functions, Scanner functions, and Sensor functions).
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE)** - An IT product of system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
- **Threat** - The means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely affect an automated system, facility, or operation can be manifest. A potential violation of security.
- **TOE Security Functions (TSF)** - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
- **TOE Security Policy (TSP)** - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected, and distributed within a TOE.
- **Trojan Horse** - An apparently useful and innocent program containing additional hidden code which allows the unauthorized collection, exploitation, falsification, or destruction of data.
- **TSF data** - Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
- **TSF Scope of Control (TSC)** - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
- **User** – Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
- **Virus** - A program that can "infect" other programs by modifying them to include a, possibly evolved, copy of itself.
- **Vulnerability** - Hardware, firmware, or software flaw that leaves an IT System open for potential exploitation. A weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, that could be exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.

## 1.6 RELATED PROTECTION PROFILES

Intrusion Detection System Analyzer Protection Profile  
Intrusion Detection System Scanner Protection Profile  
Intrusion Detection System Sensor Protection Profile

## **2 TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE) DESCRIPTION**

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This Protection Profile specifies the minimum security requirements for a TOE that is a System. A System is one or more Sensors and/or Scanners, and one or more Analyzers. A System monitors an IT System for activity that may inappropriately affect the IT System's assets, performs analysis on the data it collects, and reacts appropriately. The information collected may be obtained from a variety of sources located on an IT System. Similarly, the response functions may affect one or more targets on the IT System.

Sensors must be able to:

- Collect data about all events as they occur on an IT System. Events may include authentication events; data access events; configuration access events; service requests; network traffic; data introduction; and, start-up and shutdown of audit functions.
- Forward all collected data to an authorised Analyser for data reduction and analysis.

Scanners must be able to:

- Collect static configuration information about an IT System. Configuration information may include detected malicious code, access control configuration, service configuration, authentication configuration, accountability policy configuration, and detected known vulnerabilities.
- Forward all collected configuration information to an authorised Analyser for data reduction and analysis.

Analysers must be able to:

- Receive data from identified Sensors and Scanners.
- Process specified data to make intrusion/vulnerability determinations.
- Respond to identified intrusions/vulnerabilities. Such responses may include report generation, visual signals/alarms, audible signals/alarms, configuration changes, and/or invocation of remote warnings.

All IDS components must be able to:

- Protect themselves and their data from tampering.
- Be configured by an authorised user.
- Produce an audit trail (e.g., configuration changes, component and data accesses).

Any IT System that needs to be aware of vulnerabilities and cyber attacks should deploy an IDS. The IDS monitors itself as well as its target IT System. The IT System must provide adequate protection for the IDS so that the IDS operates in a non-hostile environment. The following diagrams illustrate examples of how an IDS (represented by a star) may be utilised by IT Systems ranging from a computer system to a computer network. Figure-1 illustrates that an IDS may monitor and exist in a computer system that is not necessarily part of a larger network. Figure-2 illustrates that an IDS may monitor and exist within a computer network. The arrows represent the monitoring functionality of the IDS as opposed to the implementation of the computer network.



Figure-1. Computer System




Figure-2. Computer Network

This PP makes a distinction between the System and TOE. The term System is used when the PP is referring to the ID monitoring, analysis, and reaction mechanisms as specified by the IDS security function requirements Class. When the term TOE is used, the PP is referring to the complete IT product that implements all TOE Security Function Requirements necessary to ensure accountability and protection for the ID monitoring, analysis, and reaction capabilities.

### **3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

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#### **3.1 ASSUMPTIONS**

This section contains assumptions regarding the security environment and the intended usage of the TOE.

##### **3.1.1 Intended Usage Assumptions**

A.ACCESS The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.

A.DYNNIC The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes in the IT System the TOE monitors.

A.ASCOPE The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT System the TOE monitors.

##### **3.1.2 Physical Assumptions**

A.PROTCT The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.

A.LOCATE The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.

##### **3.1.3 Personnel Assumptions**

A.MANAGE There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.

A.NOEVIL The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.

A.NOTRST The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users.

## **3.2 THREATS**

The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats is unsophisticated.

### **3.2.1 TOE Threats**

T.COMINT An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the integrity of the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.

T.COMDIS An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.

T.LOSSOF An unauthorized user may attempt to remove or destroy data collected and produced by the TOE.

T.NOHALT An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of the System's collection and analysis functions by halting execution of the TOE.

T.PRIVIL An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit system privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data

T.IMPCON An unauthorized user may inappropriately change the configuration of the TOE causing potential intrusions to go undetected.

T.INFLUX An unauthorized user may cause malfunction of the TOE by creating an influx of data that the TOE cannot handle.

T.FACCNT Unauthorized attempts to access TOE data or security functions may go undetected.

### **3.2.2 IT System Threats**

The following identifies threats to the IT System that may be indicative of vulnerabilities in or misuse of IT resources.

- T.SCNCFG Improper security configuration settings may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors.
- T.SCNMLC Users could execute malicious code on an IT System that the TOE monitors which causes modification of the IT System protected data or undermines the IT System security functions.
- T.SCNVUL Vulnerabilities may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors.
- T.FALACT The TOE may fail to react to identified or suspected vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity.
- T.FALREC The TOE may fail to recognize vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on IDS data received from each data source.
- T.FALASC The TOE may fail to identify vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on association of IDS data received from all data sources.
- T.MISUSE Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.
- T.INADVE Inadvertent activity and access may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.
- T.MISACT Malicious activity, such as introductions of Trojan horses and viruses, may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.

### **3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES**

An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization to address its security needs. This section identifies the organizational security policies applicable to the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile.

- P.DETECT Static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System or events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets must be collected.



P.ANALYZ Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future) must be applied to IDS data and appropriate response actions taken.

P.MANAGE The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.

P.ACCESS All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for authorized purposes.

P.ACCACT Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the IDS.

P.INTGTY Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from modification.

P. PROTCT The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and disruptions of TOE data and functions.

## **4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES**

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This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the security needs.

### **4.1 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) SECURITY OBJECTIVES**

The following are the TOE security objectives:

- O.PROTCT The TOE must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its functions and data.
- O.IDSCAN The Scanner must collect and store static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System.
- O.IDSENS The Sensor must collect and store information about all events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets and the IDS.
- O.IDANLZ The Analyzer must accept data from IDS Sensors or IDS Scanners and then apply analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future).
- O.RESPON The TOE must respond appropriately to analytical conclusions.
- O.EADMIN The TOE must include a set of functions that allow effective management of its functions and data.
- O.ACCESS The TOE must allow authorized users to access only appropriate TOE functions and data.
- O.IDAUTH The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing access to TOE functions and data.
- O.OFLOWS The TOE must appropriately handle potential audit and System data storage overflows.

O.AUDITS The TOE must record audit records for data accesses and use of the System functions.

O.INTEGR The TOE must ensure the integrity of all audit and System data.

O.EXPORT When any IDS component makes its data available to another IDS components, the TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the System data.

## **4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT**

The TOEs operating environment must satisfy the following objectives. These objectives do not levy any IT requirements but are satisfied by procedural or administrative measures.

O.INSTAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a manner which is consistent with IT security.

O. PHYCAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from any physical attack.

O.CREDEN Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access credentials are protected by the users in a manner which is consistent with IT security.

O.PERSON Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully selected and trained for proper operation of the System.

O.INTROP The TOE is interoperable with the IT System it monitors.

## 5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section defines the functional requirements for the TOE. Functional requirements in this PP were drawn from Part 2 of the CC. These requirements are relevant to supporting the secure operation of the TOE. Functional requirements pertaining to the System collection, analysis, and reaction mechanisms were invented and are identified by the short name IDS.

The functional security requirements for the PP consist of the following components, summarized in Table 1 TOE Functional Components.

<b>Functional Components</b>	
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1	Audit review
FAU_SAR.2	Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3	Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1	Selective audit
FAU_STG.2	Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
FPT_ITA.1	Inter-TSF availability within a defined availability metric
FPT_ITC.1	Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
FPT_ITL.1	Inter-TSF detection of modification
FPT_RVM.1	Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1	TSF domain separation
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps
IDS_SDC.1	System Data Collection
IDS_ANL.1	Analyzer analysis
IDS_RCT.1	Analyzer react
IDS_RDR.1	Restricted Data Review
IDS_STG.1	Guarantee of System Data Availability
IDS_STG.2	Prevention of System data loss

**Table 1 TOE Functional Components**

## **5.1 PP APPLICATION NOTE USAGE**

### **5.1.1 Usage**

This PP defines the requirements for an IDS System composed of Sensors, Scanner, and Analyzers. There are component-level PPs for all three of the System components. This PP provides guidance for users in the form of *family application notes* to assist in applying the functional requirements in a System context. Products may be evaluated against the System PP, one or more component PPs, or a combination. If a product has already satisfied one of the component PPs, the family application notes in this PP describe how the results from the previous component evaluation could be reused in a System evaluation.

This PP does not address the traditional issue of how composing multiple evaluated products affects the evaluation status of each product. The evaluation community considers composing evaluated products a research issue and there is no international agreement on a direction in this arena. For these reasons, this PP does not attempt to levy requirements for the traditional composition of IDS components.

### **5.1.2 Composition Philosophy**

This protection profile includes a number of *family application notes* that are intended to provide some insight for incorporating available component information into the system product. These application notes are directed at Security Target (ST) authors and those that would create and/or evaluate evidence for the System TOE. These application notes are only applicable if detailed information (the ST and evaluator work units) from one or more component evaluations can be obtained by those involved with the System evaluation. Furthermore, the application notes are only valid if accepted by the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) oversight body.

The ST author may benefit from existing component evaluations by adapting refinements in the related component STs into composite System ST requirement refinements. While creation of the System ST can be expedited to some degree, it is not clear that any savings can be achieved when it comes to evaluating the System ST.

Those involved with evidence may benefit by either not having to reproduce existing evidence or to reevaluate existing evidence. It is offered that ideally the component evidence (i.e., that which supported the component evaluation) would not have to be reproduced at all, including obtaining it from an OEM in order to support the evaluation of an

integrated System product. It is also intended that the information would not have to be reevaluated, provided that the previous component evaluation conclusions can be demonstrated to be valid. Note that this will require evidence, up to and including all of the information that went into the original evaluation, to perform the necessary analysis and demonstrate the validity. In some instances, it may be the case that validating a previous conclusion would require more work than the initial evaluation. Hence, it is recommended that careful consideration must be involved when making the decision to reuse results rather than reproducing them. The objective here is to provide an alternate means, that may in some cases be more efficient or practical, to achieve the same evaluation goal.

The application notes provide some general guidance, but here are other general guidelines that must be understood in order to apply them appropriately. If any component has not been evaluated, or its information cannot be obtained or validated, then that component must be evaluated entirely in the context of the System. While results from component evaluations may be generally applicable to a System evaluation, it is possible there may be components that have a very significant impact on other components; thereby invalidating any results from one or more of the components involved. In general, the more disjoint the components, the more applicable and valid their results will be.

Note that this protection profile does not attempt to address the issues of NIAP acceptability of evidence and conclusion reuse, nor does it attempt to address the issue of obtaining detailed evaluation work units that may be produced by different organizations.

## **5.2 SECURITY AUDIT (FAU)**

### **5.2.1 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation**

**FAU\_GEN.1.1** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the basic level of audit; and
- c) **Access to the System and access to the TOE and System data.**  
FAU\_GEN.1.1

Application Note: The auditable events for the basic level of auditing are included in Table 2 Auditable Events.

Component	Event	Details
FAU_GEN.1	Start-up and shutdown of audit functions	
FAU_GEN.1	Access to System	
FAU_GEN.1	Access to the TOE and System data	<b>Object IDS, Requested access</b>
FAU_SAR.1	Reading of information from the audit records	
FAU_SAR.2	Unsuccessful attempts to read information from the audit records	
FAU_SEL.1	All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating	
FIA_UAU.1	All use of the authentication mechanism	<b>User identity, location</b>
FIA_UID.1	All use of the user identification mechanism	<b>User identity, location</b>
FMT_MOF.1	All modifications in the behavior of the functions of the TSF	
FMT_MDT.1	All modifications to the values of TSF data	
FMT_SMR.1	Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role	<b>User identity</b>

**Table 2 Auditable Events**

Application Note: The IDS\_SDC and IDS\_ANL requirements in this PP address the recording of results from IDS scanning, sensing, and analysing tasks (i.e., System data).

**FAU\_GEN.1.2** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) **For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, the additional information specified in the Details column of Table 2 Auditable Events.**

FAU\_GEN.1.2

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. All auditable events from each component evaluation will also be auditable events in the System context. Additional analysis is necessary to determine if any interactions among the components are required to be auditable as defined by this requirement.

## 5.2.2 FAU\_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU\_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide *[assignment: authorised users]* with the capability to read *[assignment: list of audit information]* from the audit records. <sup>FAU\_SAR.1.1</sup>

Application Note: This requirement applies to authorised users of the TOE. The requirement is left open for the writers of the ST to define which authorised users may access what audit data.

FAU\_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. <sup>FAU\_SAR.1.2</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. However, for the System PP, all System audit data needs to meet this requirement. Note that it is not required that any given component have access or provide an interface to all audit data. Rather, it would be adequate if each component provided access to only its own audit data. This should not be confused with the events that are the focus of the IDS, which are dealt with in subsequent requirements.

## 5.2.3 FAU\_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

FAU\_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. <sup>FAU\_SAR.2.1</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. It would be acceptable to define the set of authorised users as the set of authorised users from all components. Unless the TOE introduces additional constraints, it is unlikely that the set could be reduced. However, additional authorised users could be added.

## 5.2.4 FAU\_SAR.3 Selectable audit review

FAU\_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform sorting of audit data based on date and time, subject identity, type of event, and success or failure of related event. <sup>FAU\_SAR.3.1</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Any additional audit events that may have been added in a System ST in refining the FAU\_GEN.1 requirement are applicable.

## 5.2.5 FAU\_SEL.1 Selective audit

FAU\_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from the set of audited events based on the following attributes:



- a) event type;
- b) *[assignment: list of additional attributes that audit selectivity is based upon]*.<sup>FAU\_SEL.1.1</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The TOE must address selection for any events that may have been added in addition to the set of components.

## 5.2.6 FAU\_STG.2 Guarantees of audit data availability

- FAU\_STG.2.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion.<sup>FAU\_STG.2.1</sup>
- FAU\_STG.2.2 The TSF shall be able to detect modifications to the audit records.<sup>FAU\_STG.2.2</sup>
- FAU\_STG.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that *[assignment: metric for saving audit records]* audit records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: *[selection: audit storage exhaustion, failure, attack]*.<sup>FAU\_STG.2.3</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The TOE must address availability for any events that may have been added in addition to the set of components.

## 5.2.7 FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

- FAU\_STG.4.1 The TSF shall *[selection: 'prevent auditable events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights', 'overwrite the oldest stored audit records']* and send an alarm if the audit trail is full.<sup>FAU\_STG.4.1</sup>

Application Note: The ST must define what actions the TOE takes if the audit trail becomes full. Anything that causes the System to stop collecting or producing System data may not be the best solution, as this will only affect the System and not the IT System on which it is monitoring (e.g., shutting down).

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The TOE must address audit data loss for any events that may have been added in addition to the set of components.

## 5.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)

### 5.3.1 FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA\_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow *[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]* on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. <sup>FIA\_UAU.1.1</sup>

Application Note: The ST must define any mediated actions that are permitted before a user is authenticated. Actions must be limited to aiding a user in accessing the TOE. An acceptable action before authentication is using the help facility.

FIA\_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. <sup>FIA\_UAU.1.2</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis may be required if any new interfaces or functions have been introduced to any component. Note that the concept of identification and authentication may be localised to individual IDS components. That is, it is not necessary to require a single TOE logon mechanism.

### 5.3.2 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when a **settable, non-zero number** of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **external IT products attempting to authenticate**. <sup>FIA\_AFL.1.1</sup>

FIA\_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall **prevent the offending external IT product from successfully authenticating until an authorised administrator takes some action to make authentication possible for the external IT product in question**. <sup>FIA\_AFL.1.2</sup>

### 5.3.3 FIA\_ATD.1 User attribute definition

FIA\_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:

- a) User identity;

- b) Authentication data;
- c) Authorisations; and
- d) *[assignment: any other security attributes]*.<sup>FIA\_ATD.1.1</sup>

Application Note: At a minimum, there must be sufficient user information for identification and authentication purposes. That information includes maintaining any authorisations a user may possess.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Any additional user attributes added for the TOE must satisfy this requirement. Note that it is not necessary that the attributes be uniformly defined across all components.

### 5.3.4 FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

- FIA\_UID.1.1** The TSF shall allow *[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]* on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.<sup>FIA\_UID.1.1</sup>

Application Note: The ST must define any mediated actions that are permitted before a user is identified. Actions must be limited to aiding a user in accessing the System. An acceptable action before identification is using the help facility.

- FIA\_UID.1.2** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.<sup>FIA\_UID.1.2</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis may be required if any new interfaces or functions have been introduced to any component. Note that the concept of identification and authentication may be localised to individual components. That is, it is not necessary to require a single TOE logon mechanism.

## 5.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)

### 5.4.1 FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour

- FMT\_MOF.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behaviour of the functions of **System data collection, analysis and reaction** to authorised System administrators.<sup>FMT\_MOF.1.1</sup>

Application Note: The TOE may have administrative roles on the operating System that do not have permissions to change the configuration options of the System.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The TOE would need to address any administrative roles added beyond those defined in the components. However, the set of administrative roles need be no more than the set already defined in all of the components.

#### 5.4.2 FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT\_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to query and **add System and audit data, and shall restrict the ability to query and modify all other TOE data to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]**.<sup>FMT\_MTD.1.1</sup>

Application Note: The ST should define which roles are permitted to access the System data and all other TOE data. The ST may define any number of roles to meet this requirement.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The TOE would need to address any applicable roles added beyond those defined in the components. However, the set of roles need be no more than the set already defined in all of the components.

#### 5.4.3 FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the **following roles: authorised administrator, authorised System administrators, and [assignment: other authorised identified roles]**.<sup>FMT\_SMR.1.1</sup>

FMT\_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.<sup>FMT\_SMR.1.2</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The System ST would need include all of the component-defined roles and add any roles added beyond those defined in the components. However, the set of roles need be no more than the set already defined in all of the components.

### 5.5 PROTECTION OF THE TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS (FPT)

#### 5.5.1 FPT\_ITA.1 Inter-TSF availability within a defined availability metric

FPT\_ITA.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the availability of **audit and System data** provided to a remote trusted IT product within *[assignment: a defined availability metric]*

given the following conditions *[assignment: conditions to ensure availability]*.  
FPT\_ITA.1.1

Application Note: The ST should state what the System does to promote availability to the audit and System data.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis and testing may be required to support this requirement since multiple components exist to support the transfer of System and audit data. The System ST should require consistent metrics for the entire TOE when refining this requirement. However, if that is not practical, it may be acceptable to adopt metrics that vary from component to component so long as they do conflict.

### 5.5.2 FPT\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission

FPT\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall protect all TSF data transmitted from the TSF to a remote trusted IT product from unauthorised disclosure during transmission. <sup>FPT\_ITC.1.1</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis and testing may be required to support this requirement since multiple IDS components exist to support the transfer of System and audit data.

### 5.5.3 FPT\_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification

FPT\_ITI.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data during transmission between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product within the following metric: *[assignment: a defined modification metric]*. <sup>FPT\_ITI.1.1</sup>

FPT\_ITI.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data transmitted between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product and perform *[assignment: action to be taken]* if modifications are detected. <sup>FPT\_ITI.1.2</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis and testing may be required to support this requirement since multiple components exist to support the transfer of System and audit data. Note that it is acceptable to require different actions for each of the IDS components and the System as a whole.

### 5.5.4 FPT\_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP

FPT\_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. <sup>FPT\_RVM.1.1</sup>

Application Note: The policies enforced by the System include identification and authentication, roles, and audit access.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis is required to ensure the entire TOE, including the network, meets this requirement. This is especially true where the IDS components intersect.

### **5.5.5      FPT\_SEP.1    TSF domain separation**

**FPT\_SEP.1.1**    The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. <sup>FPT\_SEP.1.1</sup>

**FPT\_SEP.1.2**    The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC. <sup>FPT\_SEP.1.1</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Additional analysis is required to ensure the entire TOE, including the network, meets this requirement. This is especially true where the IDS components intersect.

### **5.5.6      FPT\_STM.1    Reliable time stamps**

**FPT\_STM.1.1**    The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. <sup>FPT\_STM.1.1</sup>

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. The System should address time correlation among components. This could be accomplished either with a technical or procedural mechanism.

## **5.6            IDS COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS (IDS)**

### **5.6.1      IDS\_SDC.1    System Data Collection (EXP)**

**IDS\_SDC.1.1**    The System shall be able to collect the following information from the targeted IT System resource(s):

- a)    [selection: Start-up and shutdown, identification and authentication events, data accesses, service requests, network traffic, security configuration changes, data introduction, detected malicious code, access control configuration, service configuration, authentication configuration., accountability policy configuration, detected known vulnerabilities]; and

**b) [assignment: *other specifically defined events*]. (EXP) <sup>IDS\_SDC.1.1</sup>**

Application Note: The ST will define the components of a System. This requirement indicates that the System must include at least one Sensor or Scanner by requiring a given TOE collect information pertaining to at least one of the selections in bullet **a** above. A Sensor would generally collect information pertaining to the following events in bullet **a**: start-up and shutdown, identification and authentication events, data accesses, service requests, network traffic, security configuration changes, and data introduction. The Scanner would generally collect static configuration information which include the following events in bullet **a**: detected malicious code, access control configuration, service configuration, authentication configuration., accountability policy configuration, and detected known vulnerabilities. Malicious code includes viruses, worms, simple Trojan horses, etc. Access control configuration includes access control lists, search for writeable files and directories, etc. Service configuration includes identification of network services and/or associated network ports, host services, versions of services, protocols acknowledged by services, etc. Authentication configuration includes cracking passwords, configuration settings (e.g., minimum password length, duration between allowed and required password changes), acceptable authentication means (e.g., NTLM, kerberos), defined guest accounts, account authorisations, etc. Accountability policy configuration includes size of audit trails, whether audit is enabled, what to do when the audit trail fills, etc. Known vulnerabilities is fairly open ended, but may include installed patches, checks for common or default configuration errors, etc.

**IDS\_SDC.1.2 At a minimum, the System shall collect and record the following information:**

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and**
- b) The additional information specified in the *Details* column of Table 3 System Events. (EXP) <sup>IDS\_SDC.1.2</sup>**

Component	Event	Details
IDS_SDC.1	Start-up and shutdown	<b>none</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Identification and authentication events	<b>User identity, location, source address, destination address</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Data accesses	<b>Object IDS, requested access, source address, destination address</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Service Requests	<b>Specific service, source address, destination address</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Network traffic	<b>Protocol, source address, destination address</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Security configuration changes	<b>Source address, destination address</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Data introduction	<b>Object IDS, location of object, source address, destination address</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Start-up and shutdown of audit functions	<b>none</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Detected malicious code	<b>Location, identification of code</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Access control configuration	<b>Location, access settings</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Service configuration	<b>Service identification (name or</b>

Component	Event	Details
		<b>port), interface, protocols</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Authentication configuration	<b>Account names for cracked passwords, account policy parameters</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Accountability policy configuration	<b>Accountability policy configuration parameters</b>
IDS_SDC.1	Detected known vulnerabilities	<b>Identification of the known vulnerability</b>

**Table 3 System Events**

Application Note: In the case where a Sensor is collecting host-based events, for the identification and authentication event, the source address could be a subject IDS on a local machine and the destination is defined by default. For the data access and data introduction events, the source address could be filename and the destination address may be target location for the file.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement.

**5.6.2 IDS\_ANL.1 Analyser analysis (EXP)**

**IDS\_ANL.1.1 The System shall perform the following analysis function(s) on all IDS data received:**

- a) [selection: *statistical, signature, integrity*]; and
- b) [assignment: *other analytical functions*]. (EXP) <sup>IDS\_ANL.1.1</sup>

Application Note: Statistical analysis involves identifying deviations from normal patterns of behavior. For example, it may involve mean frequencies and measures of variability to identify abnormal usage. Signature analysis involves the use of patterns corresponding to known attacks or misuses of a System. For example, patterns of System settings and user activity can be compared against a database of known attacks. Integrity analysis involves comparing System settings or user activity at some point in time with those of another point in time to detect differences.

**IDS\_ANL.1.2 The System shall record within each analytical result at least the following information:**

- a. **Date and time of the result, type of result, identification of data source; and**



- b. **[assignment: *other security relevant information about the result*]. (EXP)** IDS\_ANL.1.2

Application Note: The analytical conclusions drawn by the analyser should both describe the conclusion and identify the information used to reach the conclusion.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement.

### 5.6.3 IDS\_RCT.1 **Analyser react (EXP)**

- IDS\_RCT.1.1 **The System shall send an alarm to [assignment: *alarm destination*] and take [assignment: *appropriate actions*] when an intrusion is detected. (EXP)** IDS\_RCT.1.1

Application Note: There must be an alarm, though the ST should refine the nature of the alarm and define its target (e.g., administrator console, audit log). The Analyser may optionally perform other actions when intrusions are detected; these actions should be defined in the ST. An intrusion in this requirement applies to any conclusions reached by the analyser related to past, present, and future intrusions or intrusion potential.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement.

### 5.6.4 IDS\_RDR.1 **Restricted Data Review (EXP)**

- IDS\_RDR.1.1 **The System shall provide [assignment: *authorised users*] with the capability to read [assignment: *list of System data*] from the System data. (EXP)** IDS\_RDR.1.1

Application Note: This requirement applies to authorised users of the System. The requirement is left open for the writers of the ST to define which authorised users may access what System data.

- IDS\_RDR.1.2 **The System shall provide the System data in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. (EXP)** IDS\_RDR.1.2

- IDS\_RDR.1.3 **The System shall prohibit all users read access to the System data, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. (EXP)** IDS\_RDR.1.3

Application Note: The System needs to define the authorised users that may view the audit records. These authorised users may or may not be the same as those for a IDS component

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Note that the definition of authorised users and System data may vary from IDS component to IDS component.

### 5.6.5 IDS\_STG.1 **Guarantee of System Data Availability (EXP)**

IDS\_STG.1.1 **The System shall protect the stored System data from unauthorised deletion. (EXP)** IDS\_STG.1.1

IDS\_STG.1.2 **The System shall protect the stored System data from modification. (EXP)** IDS\_STG.1.2

Application Note: Authorised deletion of data is not considered a modification of System data in this context. This requirement applies to the actual content of the System data, which should be protected from any modifications.

IDS\_STG.1.3 **The System shall ensure that [assignment: *metric for saving System data*] System data will be maintained when the following conditions occur: [selection: *System data storage exhaustion, failure, attack*]. (EXP)** IDS\_STG.1.3

Application Note: The ST needs to define the amount of System data that could be lost under the identified scenarios.

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Each component must protect its data while it controls the data. Additional analysis would be required to address any new data, beyond that previously defined in individual components.

### 5.6.6 IDS\_STG.2 **Prevention of System data loss (EXP)**

IDS\_STG.2.1 **The System shall [selection: 'ignore System data', 'prevent System data, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights', 'overwrite the oldest stored System data '] and send an alarm if the storage capacity has been reached. (EXP)** IDS\_STG.2.1

Application Note: The ST must define what actions the System takes if the storage capacity has been reached. Anything that causes the System to stop collecting static information may not be the best solution, as this will only affect the System and not the System on which it is collecting data (e.g., shutting down the System).

Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. However, the System must take into account the relationships between components and address how the reaction of any given IDS component may affect any other in the System context.

## 6 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

This chapter defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the CC Part 3 and are EAL2 with no augmentation Table 4 Assurance Components summarizes the components.

	<b>Assurance components</b>
Class ACM: Configuration management	ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items
Class ADO: Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
Class ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
Class AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Class ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis

**Table 4 Assurance Components**

### 6.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (ACM)

Application Note: The CM process for the System must integrate the CM processes for all of the involved components. Multiple CM processes can be used to satisfy these requirements; however, all involved processes must be coordinated at the System level to effectively manage any changes to the System.

#### 6.1.1 Configuration Items (ACM\_CAP.2 )

**ACM\_CAP.2.1D** The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.2.2D** The developer shall use a CM system.

**ACM\_CAP.2.3D** The developer shall provide CM documentation.

**ACM\_CAP.2.1C** The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.2.2C** The TOE shall be labeled with its reference.

**ACM\_CAP.2.3C** The CM documentation shall include a configuration list.

**ACM\_CAP.2.4C** The configuration list shall describe the configuration items that comprise the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.2.5C** The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.

**ACM\_CAP.2.6C** The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.

**ACM\_CAP.2.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all the requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## **6.2 DELIVERY AND OPERATION (ADO)**

Application Note: The Delivery and Operation procedures for the System must integrate the Delivery and Operation procedures for all of the involved components. Multiple Delivery and Operation procedures can be used to satisfy these requirements; however, all involved procedures must be coordinated at the System level to effectively support Delivery and Operation of the complete System.

### **6.2.1 Delivery Procedures (ADO\_DEL.1 )**

**ADO\_DEL.1.1D** The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the user.

**ADO\_DEL.1.2D** The developer shall use the delivery procedures.

**ADO\_DEL.1.1C** The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to a user's site.

**ADO\_DEL.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### **6.2.2 Installation, Generation, and Start-up Procedures (ADO\_IGS.1)**

**ADO\_IGS.1.1D** The developer shall document procedures necessary for the secure installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.

**ADO\_IGS.1.1C** The documentation shall describe the steps necessary for secure installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.

**ADO\_IGS.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADO\_IGS.1.2E** The evaluator shall determine that the installation, generation, and start-up procedures result in a secure configuration.

## **6.3 DEVELOPMENT (ADV)**

Application Note: The Development evidence for the System may include evidence for all of its components. While the approaches taken for providing evidence for each component may vary, it is acceptable provided that the specific development requirements are satisfied. If development evaluation conclusions are to be reused to obviate reanalysis of development evidence, the development evidence must be analyzed to the extent necessary to validate that the previous evaluation conclusions are still valid. In these instances, it is possible that not all of the existing development evidence for an evaluated component need be available for the System evaluation. It is likely that evaluation conclusions would have to be grouped for a given subset of a component in order to remain valid. For example, if an FSP is valid and the HLD is determined not to be valid, the correspondence would need to be reproduced, requiring access to the evidence for the FSP. Hence, it is not clear whether any evaluation savings would result in this case.

### **6.3.1 Informal Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1 )**

**ADV\_FSP.1.1D** The developer shall provide a functional specification.

**ADV\_FSP.1.1C** The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external interfaces using an informal style.

**ADV\_FSP.1.2C** The functional specification shall be internally consistent.

**ADV\_FSP.1.3C** The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use of all external TSF interfaces, providing details of effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.

**ADV\_FSP.1.4C** The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.

**ADV\_FSP.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADV\_FSP.1.2E** The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.

### **6.3.2 Descriptive High-Level Design (ADV\_HLD.1)**

**ADV\_HLD.1.1D** The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF.

**ADV\_HLD.1.1C** The presentation of the high-level design shall be informal.

**ADV\_HLD.1.2C** The high-level design shall be internally consistent.

**ADV\_HLD.1.3C** The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in terms of subsystems.

**ADV\_HLD.1.4C** The high-level design shall describe the security functionality provided by each subsystem of the TSF.

**ADV\_HLD.1.5C** The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware, firmware, and/or software required by the TSF with a presentation of the functions provided by the supporting protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware, firmware, or software.

**ADV\_HLD.1.6C** The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF.

**ADV\_HLD.1.7C** The high-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF are externally visible.

**ADV\_HLD.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADV\_HLD.1.2E** The evaluator shall determine that the high-level design is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.

### **6.3.3 Informal Correspondence Demonstration (ADV\_RCR.1)**

**ADV\_RCR.1.1D** The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent pairs of TSF representations that are provided.

**ADV\_RCR.1.1C** For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the analysis shall demonstrate that all relevant security functionality of the more abstract TSF representation is correctly and completely refined in the less abstract TSF representation.

**ADV\_RCR.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## **6.4 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (AGD)**

Application Note: The guidance documents need to be directed at the System specifically. Reference can be made to component documentation, but a simple collection of component guidance documents would not be satisfactory.

### **6.4.1 Administrator Guidance (AGD\_ADM.1 )**

**AGD\_ADM.1.1D** The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to system administrative personnel.

**AGD\_ADM.1.1C** The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative functions and interfaces available to the administrator of the TOE.

**AGD\_ADM.1.2C** The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer the TOE in a secure manner.

**AGD\_ADM.1.3C** The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment.

**AGD\_ADM.1.4C** The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions regarding user behaviour that are relevant to secure operation of the TOE.

**AGD\_ADM.1.5C** The administrator guidance shall describe all security parameters under the control of the administrator, indicating secure values as appropriate.

**AGD\_ADM.1.6C** The administrator guidance shall describe each type of security-relevant event relative to the administrative functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

**AGD\_ADM.1.7C** The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for evaluation.

**AGD\_ADM.1.8C** The administrator guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT environment that are relevant to the administrator.

**AGD\_ADM.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## **6.4.2 User Guidance (AGD\_USR.1 )**

**AGD\_USR.1.1D** The developer shall provide user guidance.

**AGD\_USR.1.1C** The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to the non-administrative users of the TOE.

**AGD\_USR.1.2C** The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible security functions provided by the TOE.

**AGD\_USR.1.3C** The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment.

**AGD\_USR.1.4C** The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for secure operation of the TOE, including those related to assumptions regarding user behaviour found in the statement of TOE security environment.

**AGD\_USR.1.5C** The user guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for evaluation.

**AGD\_USR.1.6C** The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT environment that are relevant to the user.

**AGD\_USR.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## **6.5 TESTS (ATE)**

Application Note: The Test evidence for the System may include evidence for all of its components. While the approaches taken for testing each component may vary, it is acceptable provided that the specific test requirements are satisfied. If test evaluation conclusions are to be reused to obviate reanalysis of test evidence, the test evidence must be analyzed to the extent necessary to validate that the previous evaluation conclusions are still valid. In these instances, it is possible that not all of the existing test evidence for an evaluated component need be available for the System evaluation. It is likely that evaluation conclusions would have to be grouped for a given subset of a component in order to remain valid. For example, in order for existing tests for a given subsystem to be valid, the FSP must also be valid.

### **6.5.1 Evidence of Coverage (ATE\_COV.1 )**

**ATE\_COV.1.1D** The developer shall provide evidence of the test coverage.

**ATE\_COV.1.1C** The evidence of the test coverage shall show the correspondence between the tests



identified in the test documentation and the TSF as described in the functional specification.

**ATE\_COV.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## **6.5.2 Functional Testing (ATE\_FUN.1)**

**ATE\_FUN.1.1D** The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.

**ATE\_FUN.1.2D** The developer shall provide test documentation.

**ATE\_FUN.1.1C** The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test procedure descriptions, expected test results and actual test results.

**ATE\_FUN.1.2C** The test plans shall identify the security functions to be tested and describe the goal of the tests to be performed.

**ATE\_FUN.1.3C** The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for testing each security function. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.

**ATE\_FUN.1.4C** The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the tests.

**ATE\_FUN.1.5C** The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall demonstrate that each tested security function behaved as specified.

**ATE\_FUN.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## **6.5.3 Independent Testing (ATE\_IND.2)**

**ATE\_IND.2.1D** The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

**ATE\_IND.2.1C** The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

**ATE\_IND.2.2C** The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.

**ATE\_IND.2.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements

for content and presentation of evidence.

**ATE\_IND.2.2E** The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF as appropriate to confirm that the TOE operates as specified.

**ATE\_IND.2.3E** The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test results.

## **6.6 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (AVA)**

Application Note: Component Strength of Function claims will likely remain valid in a System context. Vulnerability Analysis, on the other hand, will have to be performed in the System context. Vulnerability analysis results from components will likely still be valid in the System, but the System may very well introduce new potential vulnerabilities in integrating the components.

### **6.6.1 Strength of TOE Security Function Evaluation (AVA\_SOF.1)**

**AVA\_SOF.1.1D** The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function analysis for each mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE security function claim.

**AVA\_SOF.1.1C** For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the minimum strength level of SOF-basic.

**AVA\_SOF.1.2C** For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the specific strength of function metric of SOF-basic.

Application Note: While this PP does not require a particular SOF for any mechanism, any SOF claims that the ST makes must be at least SOF-basic.

**AVA\_SOF.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**AVA\_SOF.1.2E** The evaluator shall confirm that the strength claims are correct.

### **6.6.2 Developer Vulnerability Analysis (AVA\_VLA.1)**

**AVA\_VLA.1.1D** The developer shall perform and document an analysis of the TOE deliverables searching for obvious ways in which a user can violate the TSP.

**AVA\_VLA.1.2D** The developer shall document the disposition of obvious vulnerabilities.

**AVA\_VLA.1.1C** The documentation shall show, for all identified vulnerabilities, that the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE.

**AVA\_VLA.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**AVA\_VLA.1.2E** The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, building on the developer vulnerability analysis, to ensure obvious vulnerabilities have been addressed.

## 7 RATIONALE

This section provides the rationale for the selection of the IT security requirements, objectives, assumptions, and threats. In particular, it shows that the IT security requirements are suitable to meet the security objectives, which in turn are shown to be suitable to cover all aspects of the TOE security environment.

### 7.1 RATIONALE FOR IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This section provides a rationale for the existence of each assumption, threat, and policy statement that compose the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile. Table 5 Security Environment vs. Objectives demonstrates the mapping between the assumptions, threats, and policies to the security objectives is complete. The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each assumption, threat, and policy.

	O.PROTCT	O.IDSCAN	O.IDSENS	O.IDANLZ	O.RESPON	O.EADMIN	O.ACCESS	O.IDAUTH	O.OFLOWS	O.AUDITS	O.INTEGR	O.EXPORT	O.INSTAL	O.PHYCAL	O.CREDEN	O.PERSON	O.INTROP
A.ACCESS																	X
A.DYNNMIC																X	X
A.ASCOPE																	X
A.PROTCT														X			
A.LOCATE														X			
A.MANAGE																X	
A.NOEVIL													X	X	X		
A.NOTRUST														X	X		
T.COMINT	X						X	X			X						
T.COMDIS	X						X	X				X					
T.LOSSOF	X						X	X			X						
T.NOHALT		X	X	X			X	X									
T.PRIVIL	X						X	X									
T.IMPCON						X	X	X					X				
T.INFLUX									X								
T.FACCNT										X							
T.SCNCFG		X															
T.SCNMLC		X															
T.SCNVUL		X															
T.FALACT					X												
T.FALREC				X													
T.FALASC				X													
T.MISUSE			X														
T.INADVE			X														

	O.PROTCT	O.IDSCAN	O.IDSENS	O.IDANLZ	O.RESPON	O.EADMIN	O.ACCESS	O.IDAUTH	O.OFLOWS	O.AUDITS	O.INTEGR	O.EXPORT	O.INSTAL	O.PHYCAL	O.CREDEN	O.PERSON	O.INTROP
T.MISACT			X														
P.DETECT		X	X							X							
P.ANALYZ				X													
P.MANAGE	X					X	X	X					X		X	X	
P.ACCESS	X						X	X									
P.ACCACT								X		X							
P.INTGTY											X						
P.PROTCT									X					X			

**Table 5 Security Environment vs. Objectives**

**A.ACCESS** The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.

The O.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the needed access.

**A.DYNMIC** The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes in the IT System the TOE monitors.

The O.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the proper access to the IT System. The O.PERSON objective ensures that the TOE will managed appropriately.

**A.ASCOPE** The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT System the TOE monitors.

The O.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the necessary interactions with the IT System it monitors.

**A.PROTCT** The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.

The O.PHYCAL provides for the physical protection of the TOE hardware and software.

**A.LOCATE** The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.

The O.PHYCAL provides for the physical protection of the TOE.

**A.MANAGE** There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.

The O.PERSON objective ensures all authorized administrators are qualified and trained to manage the TOE.

**A.NOEVIL** The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.

The O.INSTAL objective ensures that the TOE is properly installed and operated and the O.PHYCAL objective provides for physical protection of the TOE by authorized administrators. The O.CREDEN objective supports this assumption by requiring protection of all authentication data.

**A.NOTRST** The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users.

The O.PHYCAL objective provides for physical protection of the TOE to protect against unauthorized access. The O.CREDEN objective supports this assumption by requiring protection of all authentication data.

**T.COMINT** An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the integrity of the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.

The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE data access. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE data. The O.INTEGR objective ensures no TOE data will be modified. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by providing TOE self-protection.

**T.COMDIS** An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.

The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE data access. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE data. The O.EXPORT objective ensures that confidentiality of TOE data will be maintained. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by providing TOE self-protection.

**T.LOSSOF** An unauthorized user may attempt to remove or destroy data collected and produced by the TOE.

The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE data access. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE data. The O.INTEGR objective ensures no TOE data will be deleted. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by providing TOE self-protection.

**T.NOHALT** An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of the System's collection and analysis functions by halting execution of the TOE.

The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.IDSCAN, O.IDSENS, and O.IDANLZ objectives address this threat by requiring the TOE to collect and analyze System data, which includes attempts to halt the TOE.

**T.PRIVIL** An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit system privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data.

The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by providing TOE self-protection.

**T.IMPCON** An unauthorized user may inappropriately change the configuration of the TOE causing potential intrusions to go undetected.

The O.INSTAL objective states the authorized administrators will configure the TOE properly. The O.EADMIN objective ensures the TOE has all the necessary administrator functions to manage the product. The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE functions.

**T.INFLUX** An unauthorized user may cause malfunction of the TOE by creating an influx of data that the TOE cannot handle.

The O.OFLOWS objective counters this threat by requiring the TOE handle data storage overflows.

**T.FACCNT** Unauthorized attempts to access TOE data or security functions may go undetected.

The O.AUDITS objective counters this threat by requiring the TOE to audit attempts for data accesses and use of TOE functions.

**T.SCNCFG** Improper security configuration settings may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors.

The O.IDSCAN objective counters this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a Scanner, collect and store static configuration information that

might be indicative of a configuration setting change. The ST will state whether this threat must be addressed by a Scanner.

**T.SCNMLC** Users could execute malicious code on an IT System that the TOE monitors which causes modification of the IT System protected data or undermines the IT System security functions.

The O.IDSCAN objective counters this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a Scanner, collect and store static configuration information that might be indicative of malicious code. The ST will state whether this threat must be addressed by a Scanner.

**T.SCNVUL** Vulnerabilities may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors.

The O.IDSCAN objective counters this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a Scanner, collect and store static configuration information that might be indicative of a vulnerability. The ST will state whether this threat must be addressed by a Scanner.

**T.FALACT** The TOE may fail to react to identified or suspected vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity.

The O.RESPON objective ensures the TOE reacts to analytical conclusions about suspected vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity.

**T.FALREC** The TOE may fail to recognize vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on IDS data received from each data source.

The O.IDANLZ objective provides the function that the TOE will recognize vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity from a data source.

**T.FALASC** The TOE may fail to identify vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on association of IDS data received from all data sources.

The O.IDANLZ objective provides the function that the TOE will recognize vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity from multiple data sources.

**T.MISUSE** Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.

The O.AUDITS and O.IDSENS objectives address this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a Sensor, collect audit and Sensor data.

**T.INADVE** Inadvertent activity and access may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.



The O.AUDITS and O.IDSENS objectives address this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a Sensor, collect audit and Sensor data.

**T.MISACT** Malicious activity, such as introductions of Trojan horses and viruses, may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.

The O.AUDITS and O.IDSENS objectives address this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a Sensor, collect audit and Sensor data.

**P.DETECT** Static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System or events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets must be collected.

The O.AUDITS, O.IDSENS, and O.IDSCAN objectives address this policy by requiring collection of audit, Sensor, and Scanner data.

**P.ANALYZ** Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future) must be applied to IDS data and appropriate response actions taken.

The O.IDANLZ objective requires analytical processes be applied to data collected from Sensors and Scanners.

**P.MANAGE** The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.

The O.PERSON objective ensures competent administrators will manage the TOE and the O.EADMIN objective ensures there is a set of functions for administrators to use. The O.INSTAL objective supports the O.PERSON objective by ensuring administrator follow all provided documentation and maintain the security policy. The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.CREDEN objective requires administrators to protect all authentication data. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this policy by providing TOE self-protection.

**P.ACCESS** All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for authorized purposes.

The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this policy by providing TOE self-protection.

**P.ACCACT** Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the IDS.

The O.AUDITS objective implements this policy by requiring auditing of all data accesses and use of TOE functions. The O.IDAUTH objective supports this objective by ensuring each user is uniquely identified and authenticated.

**P.INTGTY** Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from modification.

The O.INTEGR objective ensures the protection of data from modification.

**P. PROTCT** The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and disruptions of TOE data and functions.

The O.OFLOWS objective counters this policy by requiring the TOE handle disruptions. The O.PHYCAL objective protects the TOE from unauthorized physical modifications.

## 7.2 RATIONALE FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

The purpose for the environmental objectives is to provide protection for the TOE that cannot be addressed through IT measures. The defined objectives provide for physical protection of the TOE, proper management of the TOE, and interoperability requirements on the TOE. Together with the IT security objectives, these environmental objectives provide a complete description of the responsibilities of TOE in meeting security needs.

## 7.3 RATIONALE FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section demonstrates that the functional components selected for the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile provide complete coverage of the defined security objectives. The mapping of components to security objectives is depicted in the following table.

	O.PROTCT	O.IDSCAN	O.IDSENS	O.IDANLZ	O.RESPON	O.EADMIN	O.ACCESS	O.IDAUTH	O.OFLOWS	O.AUDITS	O.INTEGR	O.EXPORT
FAU_GEN.1										X		
FAU_SAR.1						X						
FAU_SAR.2							X	X				
FAU_SAR.3						X						
FAU_SEL.1						X				X		
FAU_STG.2	X						X	X	X		X	

	O.PROTCT	O.IDSCAN	O.IDSENS	O.IDANLZ	O.RESPON	O.EADMIN	O.ACCESS	O.IDAUTH	O.OFLOWS	O.AUDITS	O.INTEGR	O.EXPORT
FAU_STG.4									X	X		
FIA_UAU.1							X	X				
FIA_ATD.1								X				
FIA_UID.1							X	X				
FMT_MOF.1	X						X	X				
FMT_MTD.1	X						X	X			X	
FMT_SMR.1								X				
FPT_ITA.1												X
FPT_ITC.1											X	X
FPT_ITL.1											X	X
FPT_RVM.1	X					X		X		X	X	
FPT_SEP.1	X					X		X		X	X	
FPT_STM.1										X		
IDS_SDC.1		X	X									
IDS_ANL.1				X								
IDS_RCT.1					X							
IDS_RDR.1						X	X	X				
IDS_STG.1	X						X	X	X		X	
IDS_STG.2									X			

**Table 6 Requirements vs. Objectives Mapping**

The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.

**O.PROTCT** The TOE must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its functions and data.

The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [FAU\_STG.2]. The System is required to protect the System data from any modification and unauthorized deletion, as well as guarantee the availability of the data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [IDS\_STG.1]. The TOE is required to provide the ability to restrict managing the behavior of functions of the TOE to authorized users of the TOE [FMT\_MOF.1]. Only authorized administrators of the System may query and add System and audit data, and authorized administrators of the TOE may query and modify all other TOE data [FMT\_MTD.1]. The TOE must ensure that all functions are invoked and succeed before each function may proceed [FPT\_RVM.1].

The TSF must be protected from interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [FPT\_SEP.1].

- O.IDSCAN** The Scanner must collect and store static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System.

A System containing a Scanner is required to collect and store static configuration information of an IT System. The type of configuration information collected must be defined in the ST [IDS\_SDC.1].

- O.IDSENS** The Sensor must collect and store information about all events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets and the IDS.

A System containing a Sensor is required to collect events indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets of an IT System. These events must be defined in the ST [IDS\_SDC.1].

- O.IDANLZ** The Analyzer must accept data from IDS Sensors or IDS Scanners and then apply analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions (past, present, or future).

The Analyzer is required to perform intrusion analysis and generate conclusions [IDS\_ANL.1].

- O.RESPON** The TOE must respond appropriately to analytical conclusions.

The TOE is required to respond accordingly in the event an intrusion is detected [IDS\_RCT.1].

- O.EADMIN** The TOE must include a set of functions that allow effective management of its functions and data.

The TOE must provide the ability to review and manage the audit trail of the System [FAU\_SAR.1, FAU\_SAR.3, FAU\_SEL.1]. The System must provide the ability for authorized administrators to view all System data collected and produced [IDS\_RDR.1]. The TOE must ensure that all functions are invoked and succeed before each function may proceed [FPT\_RVM.1]. The TSF must be protected from interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [FPT\_SEP.1].

- O.ACCESS** The TOE must allow authorized users to access only appropriate TOE functions and data.

The TOE is required to restrict the review of audit data to those granted with explicit read-access [FAU\_SAR.2]. The System is required to restrict the review of System data to those granted with explicit read-access [IDS\_RDR.1]. The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [FAU\_STG.2]. The System is required to protect the System data from any modification and unauthorized deletion [IDS\_STG.1]. Users authorized to access the TOE are defined using an identification and authentication process [FIA\_UID.1, FIA\_UAU.1]. The TOE is required to provide the ability to restrict managing the behavior of functions of the TOE to authorized users of the TOE [FMT\_MOF.1]. Only authorized administrators of the System may query and add System and audit data, and authorized administrators of the TOE may query and modify all other TOE data [FMT\_MTD.1].

**O.IDAUTH** The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing access to TOE functions and data.

The TOE is required to restrict the review of audit data to those granted with explicit read-access [FAU\_SAR.2]. The System is required to restrict the review of System data to those granted with explicit read-access [IDS\_RDR.1]. The TOE is required to protect the stored audit records from unauthorized deletion [FAU\_STG.2]. The System is required to protect the System data from any modification and unauthorized deletion, as well as guarantee the availability of the data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [IDS\_STG.1]. Security attributes of subjects use to enforce the authentication policy of the TOE must be defined [FIA\_ATD.1]. Users authorized to access the TOE are defined using an identification and authentication process [FIA\_UID.1, FIA\_UAU.1]. The TOE is required to provide the ability to restrict managing the behavior of functions of the TOE to authorized users of the TOE [FMT\_MOF.1]. Only authorized administrators of the System may query and add System and audit data, and authorized administrators of the TOE may query and modify all other TOE data [FMT\_MTD.1]. The TOE must be able to recognize the different administrative and user roles that exist for the TOE [FMT\_SMR.1]. The TOE must ensure that all functions are invoked and succeed before each function may proceed [FPT\_RVM.1]. The TSF must be protected from interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [FPT\_SEP.1].

**O.OFLOWS** The TOE must appropriately handle potential audit and System data storage overflows.

The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [FAU\_STG.2]. The TOE must prevent the loss of audit data in the event the its audit trail is full [FAU\_STG.4]. The

System is required to protect the System data from any modification and unauthorized deletion, as well as guarantee the availability of the data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [IDS\_STG.1]. The System must prevent the loss of audit data in the event the its audit trail is full [IDS\_STG.2].

**O.AUDITS** The TOE must record audit records for data accesses and use of the System functions.

Security-relevant events must be defined and auditable for the TOE [FAU\_GEN.1]. The TOE must provide the capability to select which security-relevant events to audit [FAU\_SEL.1]. The TOE must prevent the loss of collected data in the event the its audit trail is full [FAU\_STG.4]. The TOE must ensure that all functions are invoked and succeed before each function may proceed [FPT\_RVM.1]. The TSF must be protected form interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [FPT\_SEP.1]. Time stamps associated with an audit record must be reliable [FPT\_STM.1].

**O.INTEGR** The TOE must ensure the integrity of all audit and System data.

The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [FAU\_STG.2]. The System is required to protect the System data from any modification and unauthorized deletion [IDS\_STG.1]. Only authorized administrators of the System may query or add audit and System data [FMT\_MTD.1]. The System must protect the collected data from modification and ensure its integrity when the data is transmitted to another IT product [FPT\_ITC.1, FPT\_ITI.1]. The TOE must ensure that all functions to protect the data are not bypassed [FPT\_RVM.1]. The TSF must be protected form interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [FPT\_SEP.1].

**O.EXPORT** When any IDS component makes its data available to another IDS components, the TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the System data.

The TOE must make the collected data available to other IT products [FPT\_ITA.1]. The TOE must protect all data from modification and ensure its integrity when the data is transmitted to another IT product [FPT\_ITC.1, FPT\_ITI.1].

## **7.4 RATIONALE FOR ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS**

EAL2 was chosen to provide a low to moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial practices. As such minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows reasonable software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation

for design and testing efforts. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. While the System may monitor a hostile environment, it is expected to be in a non-hostile position and embedded in or protected by other products designed to address threats that correspond with the intended environment. At EAL2, the System will have incurred a search for obvious flaws to support its introduction into the non-hostile environment.

## 7.5 RATIONALE FOR EXPLICITLY STATED REQUIREMENTS

A family of IDS requirements was created to specifically address the data collected and analysed by an IDS. The audit family of the CC (FAU) was used as a model for creating these requirements. The purpose of this family of requirements is to address the unique nature of IDS data and provide for requirements about collecting, reviewing and managing the data. These requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the necessary security functions.

## 7.6 RATIONALE FOR STRENGTH OF FUNCTION

The TOE minimum strength of function is SOF-basic. The evaluated TOE is intended to operate in commercial and DoD low robustness environments processing unclassified information. This security function is in turn consistent with the security objectives described in section 4.

## 7.7 RATIONALE FOR SATISFYING ALL DEPENDENCIES

The Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria. Table 7 Requirement Dependencies lists each requirement from the Intrusion Detection System System Protection Profile with a dependency and indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all dependencies have been met.

Functional Component	Dependency	Included
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	YES
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	YES
FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.1	YES
FAU_SAR.3	FAU_SAR.1	YES
FAU_SEL.1	FAU_GEN.1 and FMT_MTD.1	YES
FAU_STG.2	FAU_GEN.1	YES
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.2	YES
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	YES
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMR.1	YES
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMR.1	YES
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	YES

**Table 7 Requirement Dependencies**

## References

- [1] *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation*, CCIMB-99-031, Version 2.1, August 1999.
- [2] *NSA Glossary of Terms Used in Security and Intrusion Detection*, Greg Stocksdale, NSA Information Systems Security Organization, April 1998.



## **Acronyms**

CC	Common Criteria
CM	Configuration Management
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IT	Information Technology
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
PP	Protection Profile
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions