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ASSURANCE ACTIVITY REPORT FOR CISCO SECURE CLIENT ANYCONNECT 5.0 FOR IOS 16

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1. INTRODUCTION

This document presents evaluations results of the Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v5.0 for iOS 16 ASPP14/VPNC24 evaluation. This document contains a description of the assurance activities and associated results as performed by the evaluators.

1.1 REFERENCES

The following evidence was used to complete the Assurance Activities:

The ST:

Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.0 for iOS 16 Security Target, Version 0.3, August 7, 2023.

The Admin Guide:

Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.0 for iOS 16 CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.2, July 27, 2023.

1.2 TOE CAVP CERTIFICATES

All algorithms were tested on their tested and claimed operational environments – version 5.0 was tested on Apple iPhone 11 on a A13 Bionic processor.

For platform provided functions (FCS_CKM.1/VPN), the evaluated Apple iPhone 11 provides the necessary algorithms.

The following table shows TOE CAVP certificates for each algorithm:

SFR	Selection	Algorithm	Certificate Number
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK	P-256 P-384	ECDSA KeyGen and KeyVer	A1420 (Cisco)
FCS_CKM.2.1	P-256 P-384	ECC Key Establishment (KAS-ECC Component)	A1420 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1/SKC	128-bit 256-bit	AES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt AES-GCM Encrypt/Decrypt	A1420 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1/Hash	SHA-256 SHA-384	SHS	A1420 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1/Sig	RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit	RSA SigGen and SigVer	A1420 (Cisco)
	ECDSA schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384	ECDSA SigGen and SigVer	
FCS_COP.1/ KeyedHash	HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-384	HMAC	A1420 (Cisco)

Table 1 - TOE CAVP Algorithms

SFR	Selection	Algorithm	Certificate Number
FCS_CKM.1/VPN	P-256 P-384	ECDSA KeyGen and KeyVer	A3428 (Apple)



SFR	Selection	Algorithm	Certificate Number
	2048 3072 4096	RSA KeyGen	A3428 (Apple)

Table 2 - TOE Platform CAVP Algorithms



2. PROTECTION PROFILE SFR ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES

This section of the AAR identifies each of the assurance activities included in the claimed Protection Profiles and describes the findings in each case.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS)

2.1.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASYMMETRIC KEY GENERATION - PER TD0717 (ASPP14/VPNC24:FCS_CKM.1/AK)

2.1.1.1 ASPP14:FCS_CKM.1.1/AK

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS identifies the key sizes supported by the TOE. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme.

If the application 'invokes platform-provided functionality for asymmetric key generation', then the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the key generation functionality is invoked.

Section 6 (FCS_CKM.1/AK) of the [ST] states key generation for asymmetric keys used by IPsec is provided by the TOE and is implemented using ECDSA with NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 according to FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4. The ECDSA keys generated are used for key establishment.

The TOE Platform provides a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys for IKE authentication. The key sizes are 2048-bit for RSA scheme and NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 when ECDSA is used.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key generation scheme(s) and key size(s) for all uses defined in this PP.

Section "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" of the [Admin Guide] allows operators to select the key exchange (or key establishment) schemes for use. The configuration is done on the VPN gateway, and the DH groups that can be selected for support with the TOE are groups 19 and 20, which are Elliptic curve schemes using curves P-256 and P-384, respectively.



Section "Configure Certificate Use" of the [Admin Guide] instructs the user on generating/importing RSA or ECDSA certificates for Apple iOS devices for use in IPsec.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: If the application 'implements asymmetric key generation,' then the following test activities shall be carried out. Evaluation Activity Note: The following tests may require the developer to provide access to a developer environment that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically available to end-users of the application. Key Generation for FIPS PUB 186-4 RSA Schemes The evaluator shall verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the TOE using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the key components including the public verification exponent e , the private prime factors p and q , the public modulus n and the calculation of the private signature exponent d . Key Pair generation specifies 5 ways (or methods) to generate the primes p and q . These include:

1. Random Primes:

Provable primes

Probable primes

2. Primes with Conditions:

Primes p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, p and q shall all be provable primes

Primes $p_1, p_2, q_1,$ and q_2 shall be provable primes and p and q shall be probable primes

Primes p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, p and q shall all be probable primes

To test the key generation method for the Random Provable primes method and for all the Primes with Conditions methods, the evaluator must seed the TSF key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair. This includes the random seed(s), the public exponent of the RSA key, and the desired key length. For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation. If possible, the Random Probable primes method should also be verified against a known good implementation as described above. Otherwise, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 10 key pairs for each supported key length $nlen$ and verify:

$$n = p * q,$$

p and q are probably prime according to Miller-Rabin tests,

$$\text{GCD}(p-1, e) = 1,$$

$$\text{GCD}(q-1, e) = 1,$$

$$2^{16} \leq e \leq 2^{256} \text{ and } e \text{ is an odd integer,}$$



$$|p-q| > 2^{(nlen/2 - 100)},$$

$$p \geq 2^{(nlen/2 - 1/2)},$$

$$q \geq 2^{(nlen/2 - 1/2)},$$

$$2^{(nlen/2)} < d < \text{LCM}(p-1, q-1),$$

$$e*d = 1 \text{ mod } \text{LCM}(p-1, q-1).$$

Key Generation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

FIPS 186-4 ECC Key Generation Test For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator shall require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated using an approved random bit generator (RBG). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation. FIPS 186-4

Public Key Verification (PKV) Test For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator shall generate 10 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify five of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving five values unchanged (i.e., correct). The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

Key Generation for Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC) The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the TOE using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the field prime p , the cryptographic prime q (dividing $p-1$), the cryptographic group generator g , and the calculation of the private key x and public key y . The Parameter generation specifies 2 ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime q and the field prime p :

Cryptographic and Field Primes:

Primes q and p shall both be provable primes

Primes q and field prime p shall both be probable primes

and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator g :

Cryptographic Group Generator:

Generator g constructed through a verifiable process

Generator g constructed through an unverifiable process.

The Key generation specifies 2 ways to generate the private key x : Private Key:

$\text{len}(q)$ bit output of RBG where $1 \leq x < q-1$

$\text{len}(q) + 64$ bit output of RBG, followed by a mod $q-1$ operation where $1 \leq x < q-1$.



The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set. To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method and/or the group generator g for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the TSF parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set. For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation. Verification must also confirm

$g \neq 0, 1$

q divides $p-1$

$g^q \bmod p = 1$

$g^x \bmod p = y$

for each FFC parameter set and key pair.

Diffie-Hellman Group 14 and FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups

Testing for FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 and/or safe-prime groups is done as part of testing in CKM.2.1.

The TOE has been CAVP tested. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in the "TOE CAVP Certificates" table in Section 1.2.

2.1.2 VPN CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION (IKE) (VPNC24:FCS_CKM.1/VPN)

2.1.2.1 VPNC24:FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the key generation functionality is invoked.

Section 6 (FCS_CKM.1/VPN) of the [ST] states the TOE Platform provides a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys for IKE authentication. The key sizes are 2048-bit for RSA scheme and NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 when ECDSA is used. The key generation function is invoked by the TOE platform Administrator using a MDM product.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.



Component Testing Assurance Activities: If this functionality is implemented by the TSF, refer to the following EAs, depending on the TOE's claimed Base-PP:

- GPOS PP: FCS_CKM.1
- MDF PP: FCS_CKM.1
- App PP: FCS_CKM.1/AK
- MDM PP: FCS_CKM.1

Please refer to the evaluation activities in ASPP14:FCS_CKM.1.1_AK.

2.1.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT (ASPP14/VPNC24:FCS_CKM.2)

2.1.3.1 ASPP14:FCS_CKM.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the supported key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in FCS_CKM.1.1/AK. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme. (TD0717 applied)

Section 6 (FCS_CKM.2) of the [ST] states that the TOE supports SP 800-56A elliptic curve-based key establishment.

Section 6 (FCS_CKM_EXT.1) of the [ST] states key generation for asymmetric keys used by IPsec for key establishment is provided by the TOE and is implemented using ECDSA with NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 according to FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key establishment scheme(s).

The "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" section of the [Admin Guide] allows operators to select the key exchange (or key establishment) schemes for use. The configuration is done on the VPN gateway, and the DH groups that can be selected for support with the TOE are groups 19 and 20, which are Elliptic curve schemes using curves P-256 and P-384, respectively.



Component Testing Assurance Activities: Evaluation Activity Note: The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the key establishment schemes supported by the TOE using the applicable tests below.

SP800-56A Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify a TOE's implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a TOE has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the Recommendation. These components include the calculation of the DLC primitives (the shared secret value Z) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator shall also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MACdata and the calculation of MACtag.

Function Test

The Function test verifies the ability of the TOE to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role- key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of one set of domain parameter values (FFC) or the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the DKM, the corresponding TOE's public keys (static and/or ephemeral), the MAC tag(s), and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information (OtherInfo) and TOE id fields.

If the TOE does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator shall obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the TSF shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

Validity Test

The Validity test verifies the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator shall obtain a list of the supporting



cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the TOE should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 24 (FFC) or 30 (ECC) test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the TOE's public/private key pairs, MACTag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the OtherInfo and TOE id fields.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the TOE recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the OtherInfo field, the data to be MACed, or the generated MACTag. If the TOE contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, the evaluator will also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the TOE's static private key to assure the TOE detects errors in the public key validation function and/or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The TOE shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the TOE's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the TOE detects these errors.

SP800-56B Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes whether the TOE acts as a sender, a recipient, or both for RSA-based key establishment schemes.

If the TOE acts as a sender, the following evaluation activity shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every TOE supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA public key, the plaintext keying material, any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacKey and MacTag if key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform a key establishment encryption operation on the TOE with the same inputs (in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the test shall use the MacKey from the test vector instead of the randomly generated MacKey used in normal operation) and ensure that the outputted ciphertext is equivalent to the ciphertext in the test vector.

If the TOE acts as a receiver, the following evaluation activities shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every TOE supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA private key, the plaintext keying material (KeyData),



any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacTag in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform the key establishment decryption operation on the TOE and ensure that the outputted plaintext keying material (KeyData) is equivalent to the plaintext keying material in the test vector. In cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the evaluator shall perform the key confirmation steps and ensure that the outputted MacTag is equivalent to the MacTag in the test vector.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE handles decryption errors. In accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-56B, the TOE must not reveal the particular error that occurred, either through the contents of any outputted or logged error message or through timing variations. If KTS-OAEP is supported, the evaluator shall create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.2.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each. If KTS-KEM-KWS is supported, the evaluator shall create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.3.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each.

RSA-based key establishment

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAESPKCS1-v1_5 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_DIT_EXT.1 that uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.

Diffie-Hellman Group 14

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of Diffie-Hellman group 14 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_DIT_EXT.1 that uses Diffie-Hellman group 14.

FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of safe-prime groups by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_DIT_EXT.1 that uses safe-prime groups. This test must be performed for each safe-prime group that each protocol uses.

The TOE has been CAVP tested. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in the "TOE CAVP Certificates" table in Section 1.2.

2.1.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION SERVICES (ASPP14:FCS_CKM_EXT.1)

2.1.4.1 ASPP14:FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined



Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall inspect the application and its developer documentation to determine if the application needs asymmetric key generation services. If not, the evaluator shall verify the generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys selection is present in the ST. Otherwise, the evaluation activities shall be performed as stated in the selection-based requirements.

Section 6 (FCS_CKM_EXT.1) of the [ST] states key generation for asymmetric keys used by IPsec is provided by the TOE and is implemented using ECDSA with NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 according to FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4. The ECDSA keys generated are used for key establishment.

The TOE Platform provides a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys for IKE authentication. The key sizes are 2048-bit for RSA scheme and NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 when ECDSA is used.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY STORAGE (VPNC24:FCS_CKM_EXT.2)

2.1.5.1 VPNC24:FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: Regardless of whether this requirement is met by the TOE or the TOE platform, the evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists each persistent secret (credential, secret key) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and how it is stored. The evaluator then performs the following actions:

Persistent secrets and private keys manipulated by the platform:

For each platform listed in the ST, the evaluator shall examine the ST of the platform to ensure that the persistent secrets and private keys listed as being stored by the platform in the VPN client ST are identified as being protected in that platform's ST.

Persistent secrets and private keys manipulated by the TOE:



The evaluator reviews the TSS for to determine that it makes a case that, for each item listed as being manipulated by the TOE, it is not written unencrypted to persistent memory, and that the item is stored by the platform.

Section 6 (FCS_CKM_EXT.2) in the [ST] states the TOE platform stores RSA and ECDSA private keys used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication. Private Keys are stored in the iOS Keychain. The TOE does not use pre-shared keys for IPsec.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DESTRUCTION (VPNC24:FCS_CKM_EXT.4)

2.1.6.1 VPNC24:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs (whether manipulated by the TOE or exclusively by the platform) are identified in the VPN Client ST's TSS, and that they are accounted for by the EAs in this section.

Requirement met by the platform:

The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS describes each of the secret keys (keys used for symmetric encryption), private keys, and CSPs used to generate key that are not otherwise covered by the FCS_CKM_EXT.4 requirement levied on the TOE.

For each platform listed in the ST, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the ST of the platform to ensure that each of the secret keys, private keys, and CSPs used to generate key listed above are covered.

Requirement met by the TOE:

The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS describes when each of the plaintext keys are cleared (e.g., system power off, disconnection of an IPsec connection, when no longer needed by the VPN channel per the protocol); and the type of clearing procedure that is performed (cryptographic erase, overwrite with zeros, overwrite three or more times by a different alternating pattern, overwrite with random pattern, or block erase). If different types of memory are used to store the materials to be protected, the evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes the clearing procedure in terms of the memory in which the data are stored (for example, 'secret keys



stored on flash are cleared by overwriting once with zeros, while secret keys stored on the internal persistent storage device are cleared by overwriting three times with a random pattern that is changed before each write').

The TOE only stores plaintext keys in volatile memory. Section 6 (FCS_CKM_EXT.4) of the [ST] lists several keys stored in volatile memory that are zeroized by the TOE. These are keys used for IPsec communication, and they are the SK_ei, SK_er, SK_ai, SK_ar, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, SK_d, Initiator encryption and integrity key, and Responder encryption and integrity key. The TOE overwrites each of these keys with zeros when they are no longer needed by the IPsec communications channel. The TOE platform handles the asymmetric RSA and ECDSA private keys and will overwrite the private keys with zeroes.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: For each key clearing situation described in the TSS, the evaluator shall repeat the following test.

Test 1: The evaluator shall utilize appropriate combinations of specialized operational environment and development tools (debuggers, simulators, etc.) for the TOE and instrumented TOE builds to test that keys are cleared correctly, including all intermediate copies of the key that may have been created internally by the TOE during normal cryptographic processing with that key.

Cryptographic TOE implementations in software shall be loaded and exercised under a debugger to perform such tests. The evaluator shall perform the following test for each key subject to clearing, including intermediate copies of keys that are persisted encrypted by the TOE:

1. Load the instrumented TOE build in a debugger.
2. Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
3. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from #1.
4. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
5. Cause the TOE to stop the execution but not exit.
6. Cause the TOE to dump the entire memory footprint of the TOE into a binary file.
7. Search the content of the binary file created in #4 for instances of the known key value from #1.

The test succeeds if no copies of the key from #1 are found in step #7 above and fails otherwise.

The evaluator shall perform this test on all keys, including those persisted in encrypted form, to ensure intermediate copies are cleared.

The nature of the iOS platform and its app sandboxing model strictly limits access to iOS internals. The iOS platform does not have the capability to dump its memory, nor does it provide tools to perform memory dumping



operations on a physical iOS device. Additionally, it's not possible to conduct the key zeroization test on an iOS simulator since the simulator lacks a crucial API framework for creating the VPN session.

In order to fulfill this test requirement, Gossamer tested the iOS application using an extensibility plugin on the Mac OS X platform (with NIAP's permission). The vendor cross compiled the Cisco AnyConnect iOS app so that it is able to run in Mac OS X. The vendor also compiled the AnyConnect application as a plug-in to the Mac OS X environment, thereby resolving the limitations of an iOS simulator while supporting the platform's memory dumping tools. This just means that the OS X system executes the AnyConnect VPN code as opposed to the native Mac OS X VPN code. The Mac OS X VPN settings is used to connect the AnyConnect VPN to the VPN server. The AnyConnect v5.0 for iOS 16 app (the TOE) is not modified in any way before it is installed on Mac OS X.

The evaluator set this up on an Apple OS X device in the lab. The debug version of the TOE dumps sensitive key values to the iOS log stream. The evaluator connected the TOE to the VPN gateway, collected the key values, and then disconnected the VPN session. The evaluator used an OS X extension (called kmem) in order to dump the platform's memory. The evaluator searched the memory for the key values and successfully verified that the keys have been cleared from the memory after the VPN disconnect.

2.1.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION - HASHING (ASPP14:FCS_COP.1/HASH)

2.1.7.1 ASPP14:FCS_COP.1.1/HASH

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the association of the hash function with other application cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS.

Section 6 (FCS_COP.1/Hash) of the [ST] states the TOE provides cryptographic hashing services in support of HMAC in IKEv2 and IPsec using SHA-256 and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 "Secure Hash Standard".

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The TSF hashing functions can be implemented in one of two modes. The first mode is the byte-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF hashes only messages that are an integral number of bytes in length; i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8. The second mode is the bit-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF hashes messages of arbitrary length. As there are different tests for each mode, an indication is given in the following sections for the bit-oriented vs. the byte-oriented testmacs. The



evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.

Test 1: Short Messages Test - Bit oriented Mode The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m+1$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to m bits. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Test 2: Short Messages Test - Byte oriented Mode The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m/8+1$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to $m/8$ bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Test 3: Selected Long Messages Test - Bit oriented Mode The evaluators devise an input set consisting of m messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the i th message is $512 + 99*i$, where $1 \leq i \leq m$. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Test 4: Selected Long Messages Test - Byte oriented Mode The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m/8$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the i th message is $512 + 8*99*i$, where $1 \leq i \leq m/8$. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Test 5: Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test This test is for byte-oriented implementations only. The evaluators randomly generate a seed that is n bits long, where n is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluators then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of [SHAVS]. The evaluators then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

The TOE has been CAVP tested. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in the “TOE CAVP Certificates” table in Section 1.2.

2.1.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION - KEYED-HASH MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION - PER TD0717 (ASPP14:FCS_COP.1/KEYEDHASH)

2.1.8.1 ASPP14:FCS_COP.1.1/KEYEDHASH



TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST.

For each of the supported parameter sets, the evaluator shall compose 15 sets of test data. Each set shall consist of a key and message data. The evaluator shall have the TSF generate HMAC tags for these sets of test data. The resulting MAC tags shall be compared to the result of generating HMAC tags with the same key and IV using a known-good implementation.

The TOE has been CAVP tested. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in the “TOE CAVP Certificates” table in Section 1.2.

2.1.9 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION - SIGNING - PER TD0717 (ASPP14:FCS_COP.1/Sig)

2.1.9.1 ASPP14:FCS_COP.1.1/Sig

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.

ECDSA Algorithm Tests



Test 1: ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator shall generate 10 1024-bit long messages and obtain for each message a public key and the resulting signature values R and S. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall use the signature verification function of a known good implementation.

Test 2: ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator shall generate a set of 10 1024-bit message, public key and signature tuples and modify one of the values (message, public key or signature) in five of the 10 tuples. The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

RSA Signature Algorithm Tests

Test 1: Signature Generation Test. The evaluator shall verify the implementation of RSA Signature Generation by the TOE using the Signature Generation Test. To conduct this test the evaluator must generate or obtain 10 messages from a trusted reference implementation for each modulus size/SHA combination supported by the TSF. The evaluator shall have the TOE use their private key and modulus value to sign these messages. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's signature using a known good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

Test 2: Signature Verification Test. The evaluator shall perform the Signature Verification test to verify the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator shall inject errors into the test vectors produced during the Signature Verification Test by introducing errors in some of the public keys, e, messages, IR format, and/or signatures. The TOE attempts to verify the signatures and returns success or failure.

The TOE has been CAVP tested. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in the "TOE CAVP Certificates" table in Section 1.2.

2.1.10 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (ASPP14/VPNC24:FCS_COP.1/SKC)

2.1.10.1 VPNC24:FCS_COP.1.1/SKC

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: If the TSF implements AES cryptography in support of both credential encryption (per FCS_STO_EXT.1) and IPsec, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it clearly identifies the modes and key sizes that are supported for each usage of AES.

The TOE does not implement AES cryptography for both credential encryption (per FCS_STO_EXT.1) and IPsec as the TOE platform is leveraged for storage of X509 certificates to satisfy FCS_STO_EXT.1.



Component Guidance Assurance Activities: There are no operational beyond what is required by the EA for FCS_COP.1/SKC in the App PP (included below).

The evaluator checks the AGD documents to determine that any configuration that is required to be done to configure the functionality for the required modes and key sizes is present.

The "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" section of the [Admin Guide] states the procedures for changing the key size of the encryption algorithm for IKE as well as IPsec. The VPN gateway allows configuration of AES CBC and AES-GCM, both with either 128 or 256 bit key sizes.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: There are no test EAs beyond what is required by the EA for FCS_COP.1/SKC in the App PP (included below).

The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each algorithm implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP:

AES-CBC Known Answer Tests

There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs), described below. In all KATs, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

KAT-1. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. Five plaintext values shall be encrypted with a 128-bit all-zeros key, and the other five shall be encrypted with a 256-bit all-zeros key. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using 10 ciphertext values as input and AES-CBC decryption.

KAT-2. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Five of the keys shall be 128-bit keys, and the other five shall be 256-bit keys. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all-zero ciphertext value as input and AES-CBC decryption.

KAT-3. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. The first set of keys shall have 128 128-bit keys, and the second set shall have 256 256-bit keys. Key i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $N-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1,N]$. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros. The first set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 128 128-bit key/ciphertext pairs, and the second set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit key/ciphertext pairs. Key i in each set shall have



the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $N-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1,N]$. The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all-zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.

KAT-4. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a 128-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros and using a 256-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros, respectively. Plaintext value i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $128-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1,128]$.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input and AES-CBC decryption.

AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an i -block message where $1 < i \leq 10$. The evaluator shall choose a key, an IV and plaintext message of length i blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. The evaluator shall also test the decrypt functionality for each mode by decrypting an i -block message where $1 < i \leq 10$. The evaluator shall choose a key, an IV and a ciphertext message of length i blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. AES-CBC Monte Carlo Tests The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using a set of 200 plaintext, IV, and key 3- tuples. 100 of these shall use 128 bit keys, and 100 shall use 256 bit keys. The plaintext and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each 3-tuple, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

Input: PT, IV, Key

for $i = 1$ to 1000:

if $i == 1$:

CT[1] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, IV, PT)

PT = IV

else:

CT[i] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, PT)

PT = CT[$i-1$]

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration (i.e., CT[1000]) is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation. The



evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using the same test as for encrypt, exchanging CT and PT and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.

AES-GCM Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator shall test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

128 bit and 256 bit keys

Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.

Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.

Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

The TOE has been CAVP tested. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in the “TOE CAVP Certificates” table in Section 1.2.

2.1.11 IPSEC - PER TD0662 (VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1)

2.1.11.1 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS and determine that it describes how the IPsec capabilities are implemented.

If the TOE is a standalone software application, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS asserts that all IPsec functionality is implemented by the TSF. The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS identifies what platform



functionality the TSF relies upon to support its IPsec implementation, if any (e.g. does it invoke cryptographic primitive functions from the platform's cryptographic library, enforcement of packet routing decisions by lowlevel network drivers).

If the TOE is part of a general-purpose desktop or mobile OS, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes at a high level the architectural relationship between the VPN client portion of the TOE and the rest of the TOE (e.g. is the VPN client an integrated part of the OS or is it a standalone executable that is bundled into the OS package). If the SPD is implemented by the underlying platform in this case, then the TSS describes how the client interacts with the platform to establish and populate the SPD, including the identification of the platform's interfaces that are used by the client.

In all cases, the evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS describes how the client interacts with the network stack of the platforms on which it can run (e.g., does the client insert itself within the stack via kernel mods, does the client simply invoke APIs to gain access to network services).

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the SPD is implemented and the rules for processing both inbound and outbound packets in terms of the IPsec policy. The TSS describes the rules that are available and the resulting actions available after matching a rule. The TSS describes how the available rules and actions form the SPD using terms defined in RFC 4301 such as BYPASS (e.g., no encryption), DISCARD (e.g., drop the packet), and PROTECT (e.g., encrypt the packet) actions defined in RFC 4301. As noted in section 4.4.1 of RFC 4301, the processing of entries in the SPD is non-trivial and the evaluator shall determine that the description in the TSS is sufficient to determine which rules will be applied given the rule structure implemented by the TOE. For example, if the TOE allows specification of ranges, conditional rules, etc., the evaluator shall determine that the description of rule processing (for both inbound and outbound packets) is sufficient to determine the action that will be applied, especially in the case where two different rules may apply. This description shall cover both the initial packets (that is, no SA is established on the interface or for that particular packet) as well as packets that are part of an established SA.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] describes how remote access policies on the ASA VPN Gateway provide an interface for the administrator to create ACL(s), defining network segment(s) requiring IPsec protection. The default behavior of the remote access policy is for the TOE to protect all traffic with IPsec.

If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the ASA VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the organization's network(s) but bypass protection for other traffic.

The TOE invokes APIs via the Apple Network Extension framework and informs the OS what network routes to include or exclude. The OS calls the TOE with packets that are intended to be tunneled which the TOE encrypts and sends to the VPN Gateway via the platform's network interface. Packets received from the Gateway are decrypted and sent to the OS stack via APIs.

The TOE relies on the TOE Platform's SPD table and the TOE interacts with the SPD by using the process described above. The TOE only injects SPD rules into the table based on rules to protect all traffic or to protect specific traffic.



Effectively, this allows the TOE to be configured in either Protect and Drop or Protect and Bypass mode. When the VPN is connected, one of the two mentioned configurations for packet processing is enforced, and the TOE will always protect traffic first before determining whether or not traffic should be discarded or bypassed. The TOE allows configuring packet processing from one of three options:

1. Tunnel All Networks - Explicitly disable split-tunneling, protects all network traffic (default action).
2. Tunnel Network List Below - Protect only specified networks specified in the Network List.
3. Exclude Network List Below - Bypass networks specified in Network List, and protect all other traffic.

The Tunnel All Networks configuration will protect all network traffic. The tunnel will always force traffic through the tunnel. Any network that cannot be reached on the other end of the IPsec tunnel is ultimately dropped.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify it describes how the SPD is created and configured. If there is an administrative interface to the client, then the guidance describes how the administrator specifies rules for processing a packet. The description includes all three cases - a rule that ensures packets are encrypted/decrypted, dropped, and allowing a packet to flow in plaintext. The evaluator shall determine that the description in the operational guidance is consistent with the description in the TSS, and that the level of detail in the operational guidance is sufficient to allow the administrator to set up the SPD in an unambiguous fashion. This includes a discussion of how ordering of rules impacts the processing of an IP packet.

If the client is configured by an external application, such as the VPN gateway, then the operational guidance should indicate this and provide a description of how the client is configured by the external application. The description should contain information as to how the SPD is established and set up in an unambiguous fashion. The description should also include what is configurable via the external application, how ordering of entries may be expressed, as well as the impacts that ordering of entries may have on the packet processing.

In either case, the evaluator ensures the description provided in the TSS is consistent with the capabilities and description provided in the operational guidance.

The "Establish a VPN Connection" section of the [Admin Guide] describes how to establish a VPN connection including how to configure rules for DISCARD, BYPASS and PROTECT. The "PROTECT" section states that entries for PROTECT are configured through remote access group policy on the ASA using ASDM. For PROTECT entries, the traffic flows through the IPsec VPN tunnel provided by the TOE. No configuration is required for the TOE to tunnel all traffic. The administrator optionally could explicitly set this behavior with the command in their Group Policy: `split-tunnel-policy tunnelall`.

The "BYPASS" section of the [Admin Guide] describes how the TOE supports BYPASS operations when split tunneling is explicitly permitted by Remote Access Policy. When split tunneling is enabled, the ASA VPN Gateway pushes a list of network segments to the TOE to PROTECT. All other traffic travels unprotected without involving the TOE thus bypassing IPsec protection. Split tunneling is configured in a Network (Client) Access group policy. This section also refers the reader to the "Configure Split-Tunneling for AnyConnect Traffic" section in the VPN ASDM configuration guide.



Note that the mobile devices do not offer an interface (ie. firewall) in order to create deny rules that would insert DISCARD entries into the platform's SPD. For inbound traffic the administrator does not need to define a final catchall rule which will discard a network packet when no other rules in the SPD apply because the platform will discard the packet.

Testing Assurance Activities: Depending on the implementation, the evaluator may be required to use a VPN gateway or some form of application to configure the client. For Test 2, the evaluator is required to choose an application that allows for the configuration of the full set of capabilities of the VPN client (in conjunction with the platform). For example, if the client provides a robust interface that allows for specification of wildcards, subnets, etc., it is unacceptable for the evaluator to choose a VPN Gateway that only allows for specifying a single fully qualified IP addresses in the rule.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure an SPD on the client that is capable of the following: dropping a packet, encrypting a packet, and allowing a packet to flow in plaintext. The selectors used in the construction of the rule shall be different such that the evaluator can generate a packet and send packets to the client with the appropriate fields (fields that are used by the rule - e.g., the IP addresses, TCP/UDP ports) in the packet header. The evaluator performs both positive and negative test cases for each type of rule. The evaluator observes via the audit trail, and packet captures that the TOE exhibited the expected behavior: appropriate packets were dropped, allowed through without modification, was encrypted by the IPsec implementation.

Test 2: The evaluator shall devise several tests that cover a variety of scenarios for packet processing. These scenarios must exercise the range of possibilities for SPD entries and processing modes as outlined in the TSS and operational guidance. Potential areas to cover include rules with overlapping ranges and conflicting entries, inbound and outbound packets, and packets that establish SAs as well as packets that belong to established SAs. The evaluator shall verify, via the audit trail and packet captures, for each scenario that the expected behavior is exhibited, and is consistent with both the TSS and the operational guidance.

Test 1: The evaluator confirmed the split functionality implementation through establishing a VPN tunnel with the TOE and inspecting the corresponding Wireshark scan results. In each case the evaluator verified that encrypted packets were sent as ESP and unencrypted packets were sent in clear. After the tunnel was established, the evaluator attempted to send a packet to an IP address which was not encrypted by the tunnel. The evaluator confirmed that the request was dropped or bypassed depending on the configuration.

Test 2: The TOE relies on the TOE Platform's SPD table, which processes packets in a very specific order. The TOE only injects SPD rules into the table based on rules to protect all traffic or to protect specific traffic. Effectively, this allows the TOE to be configured in either Protect and Drop or Protect and Bypass mode. When the VPN is connected, one of the two mentioned configurations for packet processing is enforced, and the TOE will always protect traffic first before determining whether or not traffic should be discarded or bypassed. No further ordering or specificity applies and no specific additional tests have been performed in that regard. Test 1 demonstrates the enforcement of these rules.



2.1.11.2 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure it states that the VPN can be established to operate in tunnel mode, transport mode, or either mode (as selected).

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states by default, ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is required by the user or administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions on how to configure the connection in each mode selected.

If both transport mode and tunnel mode are implemented, the evaluator shall review the operational guidance to determine how the use of a given mode is specified.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states by default, ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is required by the user or administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode. As such there is no configuration guidance provided in the [Admin Guide].

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test(s) based on the selections chosen:

Test 1 [conditional]: If tunnel mode is selected, the evaluator uses the operational guidance to configure the TOE to operate in tunnel mode and also configures a VPN gateway to operate in tunnel mode. The evaluator configures the TOE and the VPN gateway to use any of the allowable cryptographic algorithms, authentication methods, etc. to ensure an allowable SA can be negotiated. The evaluator shall then initiate a connection from the client to connect to the VPN GW peer. The evaluator observes (for example, in the audit trail and the captured packets) that a successful connection was established using the tunnel mode.

Test 2 [conditional]: If transport mode is selected, the evaluator uses the operational guidance to configure the TOE to operate in transport mode and also configures an IPsec peer to accept IPsec connections using transport mode. The evaluator configures the TOE and the endpoint device to use any of the allowed cryptographic algorithms, authentication methods, etc. to ensure an allowable SA can be negotiated. The evaluator then initiates a connection from the TOE to connect to the remote endpoint. The evaluator observes (for example, in the audit trail and the captured packets) that a successful connection was established using the transport mode.

Test 3 [conditional]: If both tunnel mode and transport mode are selected, the evaluator shall perform both Test 1 and Test 2 above, demonstrating that the TOE can be configured to support both modes.

Test 4 [conditional]: If both tunnel mode and transport mode are selected, the evaluator shall modify the testing for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 to include the supported mode for SPD PROTECT entries to show that they only apply to traffic that is transmitted or received using the indicated mode.



Test 1: The TOE supports only tunnel mode. The evaluator configured a VPN gateway to require tunnel mode. The TOE successfully connected to the VPN gateway and the evaluator observed via the VPN gateway's audit trail and packet captures that a successful connection was made using tunnel mode.

Test 2: Not Applicable as the TOE does not support transport mode.

Test 3: Not Applicable as only tunnel mode is selected.

Test 4: Not Applicable as only tunnel mode is selected.

2.1.11.3 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the TSS provides a description of how a packet is processed against the SPD and that if no 'rules' are found to match, that a final rule exists, either implicitly or explicitly, that causes the network packet to be discarded.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] describes how remote access policies on the ASA VPN Gateway provide an interface for the administrator to create ACL(s), defining network segment(s) requiring IPsec protection. The default behavior of the remote access policy is for the TOE to protect all traffic with IPsec.

If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the ASA VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the organization's network(s) but bypass protection for other traffic.

The TOE invokes APIs via the Apple Network Extension framework and informs the OS what network routes to include or exclude. The OS calls the TOE with packets that are intended to be tunneled which the TOE encrypts and sends to the VPN Gateway via the platform's network interface. Packets received from the Gateway are decrypted and sent to the OS stack via APIs.

The TOE relies on the TOE Platform's SPD table and the TOE interacts with the SPD by using the process described above. The TOE only injects SPD rules into the table based on rules to protect all traffic or to protect specific traffic. Effectively, this allows the TOE to be configured in either Protect and Drop or Protect and Bypass mode. When the VPN is connected, one of the two mentioned configurations for packet processing is enforced, and the TOE will always protect traffic first before determining whether or not traffic should be discarded or bypassed. The TOE allows configuring packet processing from one of three options:

1. Tunnel All Networks - Explicitly disable split-tunneling, protects all network traffic (default action).
2. Tunnel Network List Below - Protect only specified networks specified in the Network List.
3. Exclude Network List Below - Bypass networks specified in Network List, and protect all other traffic.

The Tunnel All Networks configuration will protect all network traffic. The tunnel will always force traffic through the tunnel. Any network that cannot be reached on the other end of the IPsec tunnel is ultimately dropped.



Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to construct or acquire the SPD and uses the guidance to configure the TOE for the following test.

The "Establish a VPN Connection" section of the [Admin Guide] describes how to establish a VPN connection including how to configure rules for DISCARD, BYPASS and PROTECT. The "PROTECT" section states that entries for PROTECT are configured through remote access group policy on the ASA using ASDM. For PROTECT entries, the traffic flows through the IPsec VPN tunnel provided by the TOE. No configuration is required for the TOE to tunnel all traffic. The administrator optionally could explicitly set this behavior with the command in their Group Policy: split-tunnel-policy tunnelall.

The "BYPASS" section of the [Admin Guide] describes how the TOE supports BYPASS operations when split tunneling is explicitly permitted by Remote Access Policy. When split tunneling is enabled, the ASA VPN Gateway pushes a list of network segments to the TOE to PROTECT. All other traffic travels unprotected without involving the TOE thus bypassing IPsec protection. Split tunneling is configured in a Network (Client) Access group policy. This section also refers the reader to the "Configure Split-Tunneling for AnyConnect Traffic" section in the VPN ASDM configuration guide.

Note that the mobile devices do not offer an interface (ie. firewall) in order to create deny rules that would insert DISCARD entries into the platform's SPD. For inbound traffic the administrator does not need to define a final catchall rule which will discard a network packet when no other rules in the SPD apply because the platform will discard the packet.

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test:

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the SPD such that it has entries that contain operations that DISCARD, PROTECT, and (if applicable) BYPASS network packets. The evaluator may use the SPD that was created for verification of FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1. The evaluator shall construct a network packet that matches a BYPASS entry and send that packet. The evaluator should observe that the network packet is passed to the proper destination interface with no modification. The evaluator shall then modify a field in the packet header; such that it no longer matches the evaluator-created entries (there may be a 'TOE created' final entry that discards packets that do not match any previous entries). The evaluator sends the packet, and observes that the packet was not permitted to flow to any of the TOE's interfaces.

The TOE is limited and cannot manipulate SPDs. VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 test 1 above explains that the TOE allows one of three configurations for packet processing rules. The TOE's ability to discard packets that do not match a configured policy, is demonstrated in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 test 1.

2.1.11.4 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4



TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the algorithms AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 are implemented. If the ST author has selected either AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256 in the requirement, then the evaluator verifies the TSS describes these as well. In addition, the evaluator ensures that the SHA-based HMAC algorithm conforms to the algorithms specified in the relevant iteration of FCS_COP.1 from the Base-PP that applies to keyed-hash message authentication.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE performs IKEv2 payload and bulk IPsec encryption using AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, or AES-CBC-256 algorithms. The VPN Gateway allows the administrator to configure AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms.

Section 6, (FCS_COP.1/Hash) [ST] section states the TOE provides cryptographic hashing services in support of HMAC in IKEv2 and IPsec using SHA-256 and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 "Secure Hash Standard." These algorithms conform to the selections specified in FCS_COP.1/Hash.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator checks the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE is configured to use the algorithms selected in this component and whether this is performed through direct configuration, defined during initial installation, or defined by acquiring configuration settings from an environmental component.

The "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" section in the [Admin Guide] provides the procedures for changing the key size of the encryption algorithm for IKE as well as IPsec (ESP). The VPN gateway allows configuration of AES CBC and AES-GCM, both with either 128 or 256 bit key sizes.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the TOE as indicated in the operational guidance configuring the TOE to using each of the AES-GCM-128, and AES-GCM-256 algorithms, and attempt to establish a connection using ESP. If the ST Author has selected either AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256, the TOE is configured to use those algorithms and the evaluator attempts to establish a connection using ESP for those algorithms selected.

Test 1: The evaluator made an IPsec connection to a VPN gateway using each of the claimed IPsec ESP ciphersuites (AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256, AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256). The evaluator was able to confirm via the gateway and TOE logs that each connection was established using the configured ciphersuite.

2.1.11.5 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 are implemented. If IKEv1 is implemented, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS indicates whether or not XAUTH is supported, and that aggressive mode is not used for IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges (i.e. only main mode is used). It may be that these are configurable options.



Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure it instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 (as selected), and uses the guidance to configure the TOE to perform NAT traversal for the test below. If XAUTH is implemented, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how it is enabled or disabled.

If the TOE supports IKEv1, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance either asserts that only main mode is used for Phase 1 exchanges, or provides instructions for disabling aggressive mode.

In the "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" section of the [Admin Guide], step 5 under "Install and Configure a VPN Gateway" provides steps for enabling NAT-T. It also describes how to configure IPsec using IKEv2. IKEv1 is not supported.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1:

a. The evaluator shall configure the TOE so that it will perform NAT traversal processing as described in the TSS and RFC 7296, section 2.23. The evaluator shall initiate an IPsec connection and determine that the NAT is successfully traversed.

b. If the TOE supports IKEv1 with or without XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that this test can be successfully repeated with XAUTH enabled and disabled in the manner specified by the operational guidance. If the TOE only supports IKEv1 with XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that connections not using XAUTH are unsuccessful. If the TOE only supports IKEv1 without XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that connections using XAUTH are unsuccessful.

In the case that the VPN gateway enforces the TOE's configuration, the following steps shall be performed to meet the objective of Test 1:

1. Configure the TOE client and VPN gateway to have XAUTH enabled.
2. Attempt the connection and observe that the connection succeeds and that XAUTH is used.
3. Configure the TOE and gateway to have XAUTH disabled.
4. Attempt the connection and observe that the connection succeeds and that XAUTH is not present.
5. Attempt to configure a mismatch between the TOE and gateway (i.e. modify a local configuration setting on the client system)
6. Verify that no IPsec connection is attempted until the gateway corrects the configuration settings



Test 2: [conditional]: If the TOE supports IKEv1, the evaluator shall perform any applicable operational guidance steps to disable the use of aggressive mode and then attempt to establish a connection using an IKEv1 Phase 1 connection in aggressive mode. This attempt should fail. The evaluator shall show that the TOE will reject a VPN gateway from initiating an IKEv1 Phase 1 connection in aggressive mode. The evaluator should then show that main mode exchanges are supported.

In the case that the VPN gateway enforces the TOE's configuration, the following steps should be performed to meet the objective of Test 2:

1. Configure the gateway and TOE client in the appropriate manner per the guidance documentation. (Gateway rejects Aggressive mode, Client rejects aggressive mode)
2. Connect the TOE client to the gateway to obtain the configuration settings.
3. Observe the main mode connection is successful.
4. Disconnect the TOE from the gateway.
5. Attempt to modify the setting for main mode locally on the TOE to force the client to attempt to use aggressive mode.
6. Observe that when the initial connection attempt to the gateway is made, the gateway detects the configuration difference and reapplies the main mode setting before the TOE can attempt an IPsec connection.
7. Configure a peer to have equivalent settings to the VPN gateway (Same ciphers/Authentication/Hash/KEX settings)
8. Tell the TOE that there is a VPN gateway at the location of the peer.
9. Observe that the TOE cannot establish a connection with the peer.

(TD0662 applied)

The VPN gateway enforces the TOE's configuration for IKEv2. IKEv1 is not supported.

Test 1: The evaluator put a router between the VPN gateway and the TOE. The router is a NAT device and will forward packets between two different subnets. The evaluator then connected the TOE to the VPN gateway. The packet capture of the traffic demonstrates that the connection with the pass through device was working as the TOE and the VPN gateway have different IP addresses.

2.1.11.6 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6



TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure the TSS identifies the algorithms used for encrypting the IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 payload, and that the algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 are specified, and if others are chosen in the selection of the requirement, those are included in the TSS discussion.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE performs IKEv2 payload and bulk IPsec encryption using AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, or AES-CBC-256 algorithms. The VPN Gateway allows the administrator to configure AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator checks the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE is configured to use the algorithms selected in this component and whether this is performed through direct configuration, defined during initial installation, or defined by acquiring configuration settings from an environmental component.

The " Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" section of the [Admin Guide] states the procedures for changing the key size of the encryption algorithm for IKE as well as IPsec. The VPN gateway allows configuration of AES CBC and AES-GCM, both with either 128 or 256 bit key sizes.

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the TOE (or to configure the Operational Environment to have the TOE receive configuration) to perform the following test for each ciphersuite selected:

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the TOE to use the ciphersuite under test to encrypt the IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 payload and establish a connection with a peer device, which is configured to only accept the payload encrypted using the indicated ciphersuite. The evaluator will confirm the algorithm was that used in the negotiation. The evaluator will confirm that the connection is successful by confirming that data can be passed through the connection once it is established. For example, the evaluator may connect to a webpage on the remote network and verify that it can be reached.

Test 1: The evaluator made an IPsec connection to a VPN gateway using each of the claimed IKE ciphersuites used for the IKEv2 payload encryption. The evaluator was able to capture each ciphersuite using a packet capture.

2.1.11.7 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE configures the values for SA lifetimes. In addition, the evaluator shall check that the guidance has the option for either the Administrator or VPN Gateway to configure Phase 1 SAs if time-based limits are supported. Currently there are no values mandated for the number of packets or number of bytes, the evaluator shall simply check the operational guidance to ensure that this can be configured if selected in the requirement.



The "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment" section of the [Admin Guide] shows that the lifetime for IKEv2 can be changed in the VPN gateway. The default is 86400 seconds (or 24 hours).

Testing Assurance Activities: When testing this functionality, the evaluator needs to ensure that both sides are configured appropriately. From the RFC 'A difference between IKEv1 and IKEv2 is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes were negotiated. In IKEv2, each end of the SA is responsible for enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and rekeying the SA when necessary. If the two ends have different lifetime policies, the end with the shorter lifetime will end up always being the one to request the rekeying. If the two ends have the same lifetime policies, it is possible that both will initiate a rekeying at the same time (which will result in redundant SAs). To reduce the probability of this happening, the timing of rekeying requests SHOULD be jittered.'

Each of the following tests shall be performed for each version of IKE selected in the FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 protocol selection:

Test 1 [conditional]: The evaluator shall configure a maximum lifetime in terms of the # of packets (or bytes) allowed following the operational guidance. The evaluator shall establish an SA and determine that once the allowed # of packets (or bytes) through this SA is exceeded, the connection is closed.

Test 2 [conditional]: The evaluator shall construct a test where a Phase 1 SA is established and attempted to be maintained for more than 24 hours before it is renegotiated. The evaluator shall observe that this SA is closed or renegotiated in 24 hours or less. If such an action requires that the TOE be configured in a specific way, the evaluator shall implement tests demonstrating that the configuration capability of the TOE works as documented in the operational guidance.

Test 3 [conditional]: The evaluator shall perform a test similar to Test 2 for Phase 2 SAs, except that the lifetime will be 8 hours or less instead of 24 hours or less.

Test 4 [conditional]: If a fixed limit for IKEv1 SAs is supported, the evaluator shall establish an SA and observe that the connection is closed after the fixed traffic and/or time value is reached.

Test 1: Not applicable as the TOE does not support enforcement of lifetime based on bytes.

Test 2: The evaluator configured a Phase 1 SA lifetime timeout of 24 hours on the VPN gateway. The evaluator then established a connection with the VPN. The IPsec SA timed just under the 24 hour time period and the connection reset.

Test 3: The evaluator configured a Phase 2 SA lifetime timeout of 8 hours on the VPN gateway. The evaluator then established a connection with the VPN. The IPsec SA timed out just under the 8 hour time period and the connection reset.

Test 4: Not applicable as the TOE does not support IKEv1.



2.1.11.8 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure that the DH groups specified in the requirement are listed as being supported in the TSS. If there is more than one DH group supported, the evaluator checks to ensure the TSS describes how a particular DH group is specified/negotiated with a peer.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 19 (256-bit Random ECP) and 20 (384-bit Random ECP). The administrator is instructed in the "Install and Configure a VPN Gateway" section of the [Admin Guide] to select one of these groups.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test:

Test 1: For each supported DH group, the evaluator shall test to ensure that all supported IKE protocols can be successfully completed using that particular DH group.

Test 1: The evaluator made an IPsec connection to a VPN gateway using each of the claimed DH key exchange groups used for the IKEv2 payload encryption. The evaluator was able to capture each key exchange ciphersuite using a packet capture.

2.1.11.9 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure that, for each DH group supported, the TSS describes the process for generating 'x' (as defined in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9) and each nonce. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS indicates that the random number generated that meets the requirements in this EP is used, and that the length of 'x' and the nonces meet the stipulations in the requirement.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that for each DH group, the TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange ('x' in $g^x \text{ mod } p$) using its DH private key, the IPsec peer's public key and a nonce. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^{256} . The nonce is likewise generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1. The nonce is generated using the DRBG in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined



2.1.11.10 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10

TSS Assurance Activities: Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9.

Please see the Assurance Activities for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.11.11 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS whether peer authentication is performed using RSA, ECDSA, or both.

If any selection with pre-shared keys is chosen in the selection, the evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes how those selections work in conjunction with authentication of IPsec connections.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE compares the peer's presented identifier to the reference identifier. This description shall include whether the certificate presented identifier is compared to the ID payload presented identifier, which fields of the certificate are used as the presented identifier (DN, Common Name, or SAN) and, if multiple fields are supported, the logical order comparison. If the ST author assigned an additional identifier type, the TSS description shall also include a description of that type and the method by which that type is compared to the peer's presented certificate.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE authenticates the remote VPN gateway using RSA or ECDSA X.509v3 certificates.

Pre-shared keys are not supported.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states The TOE compares its reference identifier to the identifier presented by the VPN Gateway peer. The TOE supports reference identifiers as configured by the Administrator to be either FQDN or IP address and compares it to the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or the Common Name (CN) fields in the certificate of the peer. The order of comparison is SAN followed by CN. If the TOE successfully matches the reference identifier to the presented identifier, IKE Phase 1 authentication will succeed. Otherwise, it will fail if it does not match.

Guidance Assurance Activities: If any selection with 'Pre-shared Keys' is selected, the evaluator shall check that the operational guidance describes any configuration necessary to enable any selected authentication mechanisms.



If any method other than no other method is selected, the evaluator shall check that the operational guidance describes any configuration necessary to enable any selected authentication mechanisms.

The evaluator ensures the operational guidance describes how to set up the TOE to use the cryptographic algorithms RSA, ECDSA, or either, depending which is claimed in the ST.

In order to construct the environment and configure the TOE for the following tests, the evaluator will ensure that the operational guidance also describes how to configure the TOE to connect to a trusted CA, and ensure a valid certificate for that CA is loaded into the TOE as a trusted CA.

The evaluator shall also ensure that the operational guidance includes the configuration of the reference identifiers for the peer.

The " Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment " section of the [Admin Guide] explains how to install and configure a Certificate Authority, as well as how to create valid certificates with the right key usages.

The section also provides procedures on how to configure the ASA VPN gateway to import and use an RSA or ECDSA certificate.

The "Configure Certificate Use" section of the [Admin Guide] provides a reference to details on how to import a certificate into the TOE for use in IPsec authentication.

The "Configure Reference Identifier" section of the [Admin Guide] provides details on how to set the reference identifier of the peer.

Testing Assurance Activities: For efficiency's sake, the testing that is performed here has been combined with the testing for FIA_X509_EXT.2 and FIA_X509_EXT.3 (for IPsec connections and depending on the Base-PP), FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12, and FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13. The following tests shall be repeated for each peer authentication protocol selected in the FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 selection above:

Test 1: The evaluator shall have the TOE generate a public-private key pair, and submit a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA (trusted by both the TOE and the peer VPN used to establish a connection) for its signature. The values for the DN (Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, and Country) will also be passed in the request. Alternatively, the evaluator may import to the TOE a previously generated private key and corresponding certificate.

Test 2: The evaluator shall configure the TOE to use a private key and associated certificate signed by a trusted CA and shall establish an IPsec connection with the peer.

Test 3: The evaluator shall test that the TOE can properly handle revoked certificates - conditional on whether CRL or OCSP is selected; if both are selected, and then a test is performed for each method. For this current version of the PP-Module, the evaluator has to only test one up in the trust chain (future drafts may require to ensure the validation is done up the entire chain). The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the SA is established. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that will be revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the TOE will not establish an SA.



Test 4 [conditional]: For each selection made, the evaluator shall verify factors are required, as indicated in the operational guidance, to establish an IPsec connection with the server.

For each supported identifier type (excluding DNs), the evaluator shall repeat the following tests:

Test 5: For each field of the certificate supported for comparison, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the field in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds.

Test 6: For each field of the certificate support for comparison, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to not match the field in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication fails.

The following tests are conditional:

Test 7 [conditional]: If, according to the TSS, the TOE supports both Common Name and SAN certificate fields and uses the preferred logic outlined in the Application Note, the tests above with the Common Name field shall be performed using peer certificates with no SAN extension. Additionally, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE to not match the SAN in the peer's presented certificate but to match the Common Name in the peer's presented certificate, and verify that the IKE authentication fails.

Test 8 [conditional]: If the TOE supports DN identifier types, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the subject DN in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds. To demonstrate a bit-wise comparison of the DN, the evaluator shall change a single bit in the DN (preferably, in an Object Identifier (OID) in the DN) and verify that the IKE authentication fails. To demonstrate a comparison of DN values, the evaluator shall change any one of the four DN values and verify that the IKE authentication fails.

Test 9 [conditional]: If the TOE supports both IPv4 and IPv6 and supports IP address identifier types, the evaluator must repeat test 1 and 2 with both IPv4 address identifiers and IPv6 identifiers. Additionally, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE verifies that the IP header matches the identifiers by setting the presented identifiers and the reference identifier with the same IP address that differs from the actual IP address of the peer in the IP headers and verifying that the IKE authentication fails.

Test 10 [conditional]: If, according to the TSS, the TOE performs comparisons between the peer's ID payload and the peer's certificate, the evaluator shall repeat the following test for each combination of supported identifier types and supported certificate fields (as above). The evaluator shall configure the peer to present a different ID payload than the field in the peer's presented certificate and verify that the TOE fails to authenticate the IKE peer.

Test 1: The TOE doesn't generate certificate requests, but rather requires certificates to be loaded through the device UI or via an MDM. The certificates for this set of tests were generated outside the TOE and loaded into the TOE.



Test 2: The evaluator configured the server to require RSA certificates for authentication for VPN connections. The evaluator then attempted to make a connection using a RSA client certificate. The connection succeeded.

Test 3: The evaluator revoked the VPN gateway's certificate and then attempted to make a connection to the VPN gateway. The connection failed because the gateway's certificate was not valid.

Test 4: This test is Not Applicable as the TOE does not support pre-shared keys.

Test 5: The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to the VPN gateway using either an FQDN or IP address. In each case, the evaluator configured the VPN gateway's certificates with either FQDN or IP address in the DN. The TOE successfully connects to the VPN gateway after matching the FQDN or IP address with the respective value in the VPN gateway's certificate.

Test 6: The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to the VPN gateway using either an FQDN or IP address. In each case, the evaluator configured the VPN gateway's certificates with the wrong FQDN or IP address in the DN. The TOE successfully rejects connection attempts to the VPN gateway after comparing the FQDN or IP address with the respective value in the VPN gateway's certificate and verifying that they do not match.

Test 7: The evaluator configured certificates loaded onto the VPN gateway with an FQDN or IP address based on the rules outlined in the AA. The results are that the TOE successfully connects if the configured FQDN or IP address matches with the respective values in the VPN gateway's certs, and the TOE successfully rejects connections if comparison of those reference identifiers do not match.

Test 8: Not Applicable as the TOE does not support DN identifier types.

Test 9: The evaluator configured the VPN gateway's certificates with both correct and incorrect IPv6 addresses according to the rules in the AA. The TOE connects to the VPN gateway when the IPv6 addresses match and rejects connections when the IPv6 addresses do not match.

Test 10: Not Applicable as the TOE does not perform comparisons between the peer's ID payload and the peer's certificate.

2.1.11.12 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12

TSS Assurance Activities: Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11.

Please see Section VPNC23:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 for the result of this AA.



Guidance Assurance Activities: Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11.

Please see Section VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 for the result of this AA.

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.11.13 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13

TSS Assurance Activities: Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11.

Please see section VPNC23:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 for the result of this AA.

Guidance Assurance Activities: Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11.

Please see Section VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 for the result of this AA.

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.11.14 VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes the potential strengths (in terms of the number of bits in the symmetric key) of the algorithms that are allowed for the IKE and ESP exchanges. The TSS shall also describe the checks that are done when negotiating IKEv1 Phase 2 and/or IKEv2 CHILD_SA suites to ensure that the strength (in terms of the number of bits of key in the symmetric algorithm) of the negotiated algorithm is less than or equal to that of the IKE SA this is protecting the negotiation.

Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states the resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security depending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers. The VPN Gateway ensures by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator follows the guidance to configure the TOE to perform the following tests:

Test 1: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall successfully negotiate an IPsec connection using each of the supported algorithms and hash functions identified in the requirements.

Test 2 [conditional]: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SA for ESP that selects an encryption algorithm with more strength than that being used for the IKE SA (i.e., symmetric algorithm with a key size larger than that being used for the IKE SA). Such attempts should fail.

Test 3: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an IKE SA using an algorithm that is not one of the supported algorithms and hash functions identified in the requirements. Such an attempt should fail.

Test 4: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SA for ESP (assumes the proper parameters where used to establish the IKE SA) that selects an encryption algorithm that is not identified in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4. Such an attempt should fail.

Test 1: All of the encryption algorithms were already tested in VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6. The evaluator focused on the hashes for this test and configured the VPN gateway to request each hash (one at a time). The evaluator then connected the device using each claimed hash successfully.

Test 2: This property is not enforced by the TOE but rather must be enforced by the VPN gateway since it determines the applicable cipher strengths. The evaluator attempted to connect the TOE to the VPN gateway using an IKE cipher that is weaker than the ESP algorithm. The result is that the VPN gateway rejects the attempt.

Test 3: The evaluator configured the VPN gateway to use an unallowed cipher. The evaluator then attempted to connect the device with the VPN gateway. The connection was refused because the unallowed cipher is not supported.

Test 4: The evaluator configured the VPN gateway to use the unallowed cipher to establish an SA for ESP. The evaluator then attempted to connect the device with the VPN gateway. The connection was refused because the unallowed cipher is not supported to establish an SA for ESP.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: In addition to the TSS EAs for the individual FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 elements below, the evaluator shall perform the following:

If the TOE boundary includes a general-purpose operating system or mobile device, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes whether the VPN client capability is architecturally integrated with the platform itself or whether it is a separate executable that is bundled with the platform.



The TOE boundary does not include a general-purpose operating system or mobile device. The TOE is an iOS application that executes on an Apple iOS 16 device.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: In addition to the Operational Guidance EAs for the individual FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 elements below, the evaluator shall perform the following:

If the configuration of the IPsec behavior is from an environmental source, most notably a VPN gateway (e.g. through receipt of required connection parameters from a VPN gateway), the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains any appropriate information for ensuring that this configuration can be properly applied.

Note in this case that the implementation of the IPsec protocol must be enforced entirely within the TOE boundary; i.e. it is not permissible for a software application TOE to be a graphical front-end for IPsec functionality implemented totally or in part by the underlying OS platform. The behavior referenced here is for the possibility that the configuration of the IPsec connection is initiated from outside the TOE, which is permissible so long as the TSF is solely responsible for enforcing the configured behavior. However, it is allowable for the TSF to rely on low-level platform-provided networking functions to implement the SPD from the client (e.g., enforcement of packet routing decisions).


The "Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment " section of the [Admin Guide] includes the procedures for configuring the ASA VPN gateway with settings that allow an IPsec connection between the VPN gateway and the TOE. The ASA VPN gateway only configures the settings to allow an IPsec connection from the TOE. The TOE implements the IPsec protocol and is only able to connect to the ASA VPN gateway.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: As a prerequisite for performing the Test EAs for the individual FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 elements below, the evaluator shall do the following:

The evaluator shall minimally create a test environment equivalent to the test environment illustrated below. It is expected that the traffic generator is used to construct network packets and will provide the evaluator with the ability manipulate fields in the ICMP, IPv4, IPv6, UDP, and TCP packet headers. The evaluator shall provide justification for any differences in the test environment.

Note that the evaluator shall perform all tests using the VPN client and a representative sample of platforms listed in the ST (for TOEs that claim to support multiple platforms).

The evaluator created a test environment similar to the diagram in the VPNC24 PP-module document. The evaluator used the following test setup:



The TOE is an iOS application that executes on an Apple iOS 16 iPhone. The TOE was tested on an iPhone 11 running iOS 16. The iPhones are connected to a wireless router, and the router has a connection that leads to the ASA 5525 VPN gateway. The wireless router allows the TOE to communicate with the ASA VPN gateway. There is a Windows 10 test machine placed in between the router and the ASA VPN gateway, which is used to capture traffic. The evaluator used an app on the iOS device to generate traffic.

2.1.12 RANDOM BIT GENERATION SERVICES (ASPP14:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

2.1.12.1 ASPP14:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: If 'use no DRBG functionality' is selected, the evaluator shall inspect the application and its developer documentation and verify that the application needs no random bit generation services.

If 'implement DRBG functionality' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that additional FCS_RBG_EXT.2 elements are included in the ST.

If 'invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality' is selected, the evaluator performs the following activities.



The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that it identifies all functions (as described by the SFRs included in the ST) that obtain random numbers from the platform RBG. The evaluator shall determine that for each of these functions, the TSS states which platform interface (API) is used to obtain the random numbers. The evaluator shall confirm that each of these interfaces corresponds to the acceptable interfaces listed for each platform below.

It should be noted that there is no expectation that the evaluators attempt to confirm that the APIs are being used correctly for the functions identified in the TSS; the activity is to list the used APIs and then do an existence check via decompilation.

The TOE selects “invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality”.

Section 6 (FCS_RBG_EXT.1) of the [ST] states The TOE invokes /dev/random on the platform when needed to generate a cryptographic key. This applies to the following SFRs:

FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 – IPsec Protocol

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: If 'invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality' is selected, the following tests shall be performed:

The evaluator shall decompile the application binary using a decompiler suitable for the application (TOE). The evaluator shall search the output of the decompiler to determine that, for each API listed in the TSS, that API appears in the output. If the representation of the API does not correspond directly to the strings in the following list, the evaluator shall provide a mapping from the decompiled text to its corresponding API, with a description of why the API text does not directly correspond to the decompiled text and justification that the decompiled text corresponds to the associated API.

The following are the per-platform list of acceptable APIs:

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall verify that the application uses at least one of javax.crypto.KeyGenerator class or the java.security.SecureRandom class or /dev/random or /dev/urandom.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

The evaluator shall verify that rand_s, RtlGenRandom, BCryptGenRandom, or CryptGenRandom API is used for classic desktop applications. The evaluator shall verify the application uses the RNGCryptoServiceProvider class or derives a class from System.Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator API for Windows Universal Applications. It is only required that the API is called/invoked, there is no requirement that the API be used directly. In future versions of this document, CryptGenRandom may be removed as an option as it is no longer the preferred API per vendor documentation.



Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall verify that the application invokes either SecRandomCopyBytes, CCRandomGenerateBytes or CCRandomCopyBytes, or uses /dev/random directly to acquire random.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall verify that the application collects random from /dev/random or /dev/urandom.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall verify that the application invokes either CCRandomGenerateBytes or CCRandomCopyBytes, or collects random from /dev/random.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall verify that the application invokes either CCRandomGenerateBytes or CCRandomCopyBytes, or collects random from /dev/random.

If invocation of platform-provided functionality is achieved in another way, the evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes how this is carried out, and how it is equivalent to the methods listed here (e.g. higher-level API invokes identical low-level API).

The evaluator performed a static analysis to ensure that the TOE directly calls /dev/random to generate random numbers. The TOE's binary iOS application package (IPA) contains the use of only /dev/random. According to <https://support.apple.com/guide/security/random-number-generation-sec0c73a75b/web>, an application is able to access /dev/random directly through the iOS kernel CPRNG. Note that there is an instance of /dev/urandom used, but this is for a DES encryption function. The TOE does not support the use of DES.

2.1.13 STORAGE OF CREDENTIALS (ASPP14:FCS_STO_EXT.1)

2.1.13.1 ASPP14:FCS_STO_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it lists all persistent credentials (secret keys, PKI private keys, or passwords) needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator shall confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and how it is stored.



Section 6 (FCS_STO_EXT.1) of the [ST] states the Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE leverages the platform to store X.509v3 certificates used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication. Certificates are stored in the iOS Keychain.

Section 6 (FCS_CKM_EXT.4) of the [ST] mentions that the TOE platform stores RSA and ECDSA private keys, which are part of the X.509 IKE authentication certificates.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: For all credentials for which the application implements functionality, the evaluator shall verify credentials are encrypted according to FCS_COP.1/SKC or conditioned according to FCS_CKM.1.1/AK and FCS_CKM_EXT.1/PBKDF. For all credentials for which the application invokes platform-provided functionality, the evaluator shall perform the following actions which vary per platform.

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall verify that the application uses the Android KeyStore or the Android KeyChain to store certificates.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

The evaluator shall verify that all certificates are stored in the Windows Certificate Store. The evaluator shall verify that other credentials, like passwords, are stored in the Windows Credential Manager or stored using the Data Protection API (DPAPI). For Windows Universal Applications, the evaluator shall verify that the application is using the ProtectData class and storing credentials in IsolatedStorage.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall verify that all credentials are stored within a Keychain.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall verify that all keys are stored using Linux keyrings.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall verify that all keys are stored using Solaris Key Management Framework (KMF).

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall verify that all credentials are stored within Keychain

The evaluator performed a static analysis of the TOE application IPA file and found several instances of the iOS Keychain API call being used.



2.2 USER DATA PROTECTION (FDP)

2.2.1 ENCRYPTION OF SENSITIVE APPLICATION DATA (ASPP14:FDP_DAR_EXT.1)

2.2.1.1 ASPP14:FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes the sensitive data processed by the application. The evaluator shall then ensure that the following activities cover all of the sensitive data identified in the TSS. If not store any sensitive data is selected, the evaluator shall inspect the TSS to ensure that it describes how sensitive data cannot be written to non-volatile memory. The evaluator shall also ensure that this is consistent with the filesystem test below.

Section 6 (FDP_DAR_EXT.1) of the [ST] states sensitive data in the TOE is defined as the private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer authentication, which is protected in accordance with FCS_STO.EXT.1

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: Evaluation activities (after the identification of the sensitive data) are to be performed on all sensitive data listed that are not covered by FCS_STO_EXT.1. The evaluator shall inventory the filesystem locations where the application may write data. The evaluator shall run the application and attempt to store sensitive data. The evaluator shall then inspect those areas of the filesystem to note where data was stored (if any), and determine whether it has been encrypted.

If 'leverage platform-provided functionality' is selected, the evaluation activities will be performed as stated in the following requirements, which vary on a per-platform basis.

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall inspect the TSS and verify that it describes how files containing sensitive data are stored with the MODE_PRIVATE flag set.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....



The Windows platform currently does not provide data-at-rest encryption services which depend upon invocation by application developers. The evaluator shall verify that the Operational User Guidance makes the need to activate platform encryption, such as BitLocker or Encrypting File System (EFS), clear to the end user.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall inspect the TSS and ensure that it describes how the application uses the Complete Protection, Protected Unless Open, or Protected Until First User Authentication Data Protection Class for each data file stored locally.

Platforms: Linux....

The Linux platform currently does not provide data-at-rest encryption services which depend upon invocation by application developers. The evaluator shall verify that the Operational User Guidance makes the need to activate platform encryption clear to the end user.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The Solaris platform currently does not provide data-at-rest encryption services which depend upon invocation by application developers. The evaluator shall verify that the Operational User Guidance makes the need to activate platform encryption clear to the end user.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The macOS platform currently does not provide data-at-rest encryption services which depend upon invocation by application developers. The evaluator shall verify that the Operational User Guidance makes the need to activate platform encryption clear to the end user.

The evaluator verified that the TOE protects sensitive data (X.509 certificates) by relying on the platform provided certificate storage. Section 6 (FDP_DAR_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the sensitive data is protected in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1. The evaluator ensured that the results of the evaluation test activities cover all of the sensitive data identified.

2.2.2 ACCESS TO PLATFORM RESOURCES (ASPP14:FDP_DEC_EXT.1)

2.2.2.1 ASPP14:FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the platform-specific actions below and inspect user documentation to determine the application's access to hardware resources. The evaluator shall ensure that this is



consistent with the selections indicated. The evaluator shall review documentation provided by the application developer and for each resource which it accesses, identify the justification as to why access is required.

The "Operational Environment" section of the [Admin Guide] states the TOE uses network hardware resources on the mobile OS platform to send and receive encrypted packets.

Testing Assurance Activities: Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall verify that each uses-permission entry in the AndroidManifest.xml file for access to a hardware resource is reflected in the selection.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

For Windows Universal Applications the evaluator shall check the WMAppManifest.xml file for a list of required hardware capabilities. The evaluator shall verify that the user is made aware of the required hardware capabilities when the application is first installed. This includes permissions such as ID_CAP_ISV_CAMERA, ID_CAP_LOCATION, ID_CAP_NETWORKING, ID_CAP_MICROPHONE, ID_CAP_PROXIMITY and so on. A complete list of Windows App permissions can be found at:

<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/windows/apps/jj206936.aspx>

For Windows Desktop Applications the evaluator shall identify in either the application software or its documentation the list of the required hardware resources.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application or the documentation provides a list of the hardware resources it accesses.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of the hardware resources it accesses.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of the hardware resources it accesses.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of the hardware resources it accesses.

The evaluator verified from exercising the TOE and reviewing the [ST] that the TOE only accesses network resources for connectivity to a VPN gateway for IPsec connections.



2.2.2.2 ASPP14:FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the platform-specific actions below and inspect user documentation to determine the application's access to sensitive information repositories. The evaluator shall ensure that this is consistent with the selections indicated. The evaluator shall review documentation provided by the application developer and for each sensitive information repository which it accesses, identify the justification as to why access is required.

Section "Operational Environment" in the [Admin Guide] states that the TOE accesses no sensitive information repository.

Testing Assurance Activities: Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall verify that each uses-permission entry in the AndroidManifest.xml file for access to a sensitive information repository is reflected in the selection.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

For Windows Universal Applications the evaluator shall check the WManifest.xml file for a list of required capabilities. The evaluator shall identify the required information repositories when the application is first installed. This includes permissions such as ID_CAP_CONTACTS, ID_CAP_APPOINTMENTS, ID_CAP_MEDIALIB and so on. A complete list of Windows App permissions can be found at:

<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/windows/apps/jj206936.aspx>

For Windows Desktop Applications the evaluator shall identify in either the application software or its documentation the list of sensitive information repositories it accesses.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of the sensitive information repositories it accesses.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of sensitive information repositories it accesses.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....



The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of sensitive information repositories it accesses.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall verify that either the application software or its documentation provides a list of sensitive information repositories it accesses.

This test is Not Applicable as the TOE does not access any sensitive information repositories.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.2.3 NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS (ASPP14:FDP_NET_EXT.1)

2.2.3.1 ASPP14:FDP_NET_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator shall run the application. While the application is running, the evaluator shall sniff network traffic ignoring all non-application associated traffic and verify that any network communications witnessed are documented in the TSS or are user-initiated.

Test 2: The evaluator shall run the application. After the application initializes, the evaluator shall run network port scans to verify that any ports opened by the application have been captured in the ST for the third selection and its assignment. This includes connection-based protocols (e.g. TCP, DCCP) as well as connectionless protocols (e.g. UDP).

Platforms: Android....



If 'no network communication' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the application's AndroidManifest.xml file does not contain a <uses-permission> or <uses-permission-sdk-23> tag containing android:name='android.permission.INTERNET'. In this case, it is not necessary to perform the above Tests 1 and 2, as the platform will not allow the application to perform any network communication.

Test 1: The evaluator used the TOE to connect to a VPN gateway to show that the TOE is the initiator. The evaluator used packet captures to prove that the TOE sent the IKE_SA_INIT packet to begin a VPN session with the gateway.

Test 2: This test is Not Applicable as the TOE does not claim the third selection in the ST.

2.2.4 FULL RESIDUAL INFORMATION PROTECTION (VPNC24:FDP_RIP.2)

2.2.4.1 VPNC24:FDP_RIP.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: Requirement met by the platform

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) the extent to which the client processes network packets and addresses the FDP_RIP.2 requirement.

Requirement met by the TOE

'Resources' in the context of this requirement are network packets being sent through (as opposed to 'to', as is the case when a security administrator connects to the TOE) the TOE. The concern is that once a network packet is sent, the buffer or memory area used by the packet still contains data from that packet, and that if that buffer is re-used, those data might remain and make their way into a new packet. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes packet processing to the extent that they can determine that no data will be reused when processing network packets. The evaluator shall ensure that this description at a minimum describes how the previous data are zeroized/overwritten, and at what point in the buffer processing this occurs.

Section 6 (FDP_RIP.2) of the [ST] states that the TOE platform processes network packets. The TOE platform transmits packets over Wi-Fi or cellular radio and therefore is responsible for clearing residual information.



Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)

2.3.1 X.509 CERTIFICATE VALIDATION - PER TD0669 (ASPP14:FIA_X509_EXT.1)

2.3.1.1 ASPP14:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

Section 6 (FIA_X509_EXT.1) of the [ST] states the Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE implements functionality and invokes functionality provided by the TOE platform to validate X.509 certificates used for IPsec connections.

The X.509 certificates are validated using the certificate path validation algorithm defined in RFC 5280, which can be summarized as follows:

- the public key algorithm and parameters are checked
- the current date/time is checked against the validity period
- revocation status is checked using OCSP
- issuer name of X matches the subject name of X+1
- extensions are processed

The certificate validity check is performed when the TOE receives the certificate during an IPsec connection to the ASA VPN Gateway.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. If the application supports chains of length four or greater, the evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA. If the application supports a maximum trust depth of two, then a chain with no Intermediate CA should instead be created.



Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing, for each of the following reasons, in turn:

- by establishing a certificate path in which one of the issuing certificates is not a CA certificate,
- by omitting the basicConstraints field in one of the issuing certificates,
- by setting the basicConstraints field in an issuing certificate to have CA=False,
- by omitting the CA signing bit of the key usage field in an issuing certificate, and
- by setting the path length field of a valid CA field to a value strictly less than the certificate path.

The evaluator shall then establish a valid certificate path consisting of valid CA certificates, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then remove trust in one of the CA certificates, and show that the function fails.

Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.

Test 3: The evaluator shall test that the TOE can properly handle revoked certificates “ conditional on whether CRL, OCSP, OCSP Stapling, or OCSP Multi-stapling is selected; if multiple methods are selected, then the following tests shall be performed for each method:

The evaluator shall test revocation of the node certificate.

The evaluator shall also test revocation of an intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA), if intermediate CA certificates are supported. If OCSP stapling per RFC6066 is the only supported revocation method, this test is omitted.

The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.

Test 4: If any OCSP option is selected, the evaluator shall ensure the TSF has no other source of revocation information available and configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the middle tool to present an OCSP response signed by a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and which is the only source of revocation status information advertised by the CA issuing the certificate being validated. The evaluator shall verify that validation of the OCSP response fails and that the TOE treats the certificate being checked as invalid and rejects the connection. If CRL is selected, the evaluator shall likewise configure the CA to be the only source of revocation status information, and sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set. The evaluator shall verify that validation of the CRL fails and that the TOE treats the certificate being checked as invalid and rejects the connection.

Note: The intent of this test is to ensure a TSF does not trust invalid revocation status information. A TSF receiving invalid revocation status information from the only advertised certificate status provider should treat the



certificate whose status is being checked as invalid. This should generally be treated differently from the case where the TSF is not able to establish a connection to check revocation status information, but it is acceptable that the TSF ignore any invalid information and attempt to find another source of revocation status (another advertised provider, a locally configured provider, or cached information) and treat this situation as not having a connection to a valid certificate status provider.

Test 5: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)

Test 6: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

Test 7: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

Test 8: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1/Sig). The evaluator shall establish a valid, trusted certificate chain consisting of an EC leaf certificate, an EC Intermediate CA certificate not designated as a trust anchor, and an EC certificate designated as a trusted anchor, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain.

Test 9: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1/Sig). The evaluator shall replace the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain for Test 8 with a modified certificate, where the modified intermediate CA has a public key information field where the EC parameters uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in the public key information field of the intermediate CA certificate from Test 8, and the modified Intermediate CA certificate is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator shall confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid.

Test 1: The evaluator connected to VPN Gateway using IPsec. A successful connection was made.

The evaluator then configured the VPN Gateway to present the following invalid certificates. With each certificate, the TOE successfully identified the certificate as invalid and refused the connection attempt.

- a certificate path in which one of the issuing certificates is not a CA certificate
- missing basicConstraints field in one of the issuing certificates
- basicConstraints field in an issuing certificate to have CA=False
- CA signing bit of the key usage field in an issuing certificate is missing
- a certificate with a path length field of a valid CA field set to a value strictly less than the certificate path

Test 2: The evaluator configured a VPN Gateway to use IPsec. The VPN Gateway and TOE device were configured with expired certificates. When the TOE attempted to connect, the connection was refused.



Test 3: The evaluator configured a VPN Gateway to use IPsec. The VPN Gateway and TOE device were configured with valid certificates allowing the TOE devices to connect to the VPN Gateway. A successful connection was made. The VPN Gateway and TOE device were then configured with an OCSP revoked certificate. A revoked certificate error message was received.

Test 4: The evaluator configured a VPN gateway to use IPsec. The VPN gateway was configured with a certificate chain such that the subca's OCSP response was signed by a certificate that lacks the OCSPSigning purpose. The TOE correctly detects the invalid OCSP responder's certificate and immediately rejects the connection attempt.

Test 5: The evaluator used a special build of the TOE to connect it to Gossamer's VPN peer. The VPN peer sends a modified certificate with a corrupted ASN.1 header. The TOE recognized that the certificate was invalid and rejected the connection attempt.

Test 6: The evaluator used a special build of the TOE to connect it to Gossamer's VPN peer. The VPN peer sends a modified certificate with a corrupted signature. The TOE recognized that the certificate was invalid and rejected the connection attempt.

Test 7: The evaluator used a special build of the TOE to connect it to Gossamer's VPN peer. The VPN peer sends a modified certificate with a corrupted public key. The TOE recognized that the certificate was invalid and rejected the connection attempt.

Test 8: The evaluator executed a control test case with a valid ECDSA certificate chain and verified that the connection was successful.

Test 9: The evaluator then replaced an intermediate CA from test 8 with one that has explicit curves defined. The TOE successfully rejected the invalid certificate chain.

2.3.1.2 ASPP14:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1. If the application supports chains of length four or greater, the evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA. If the application supports a maximum trust depth of two, then a chain with no Intermediate CA should instead be created.

Test 1: The evaluator shall ensure that the certificate of at least one of the CAs does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The evaluator shall confirm that validation of the certificate path fails (i) as part of the validation of the peer certificate belonging to this chain; and/or (ii) when attempting to add the CA certificate without the basicConstraints extension to the TOE's trust store.



Test 2: The evaluator shall ensure that the certificate of at least one of the CAs in the chain has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set (or set to FALSE). The evaluator shall confirm that validation of the certificate path fails (i) as part of the validation of the peer certificate belonging to this chain; and/or (ii) when attempting to add the CA certificate with the CA flag not set (or set to FALSE) in the basicConstraints extension to the TOE's trust store.

Test 1: This test is covered under ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 test 1, where the VPN Gateway presents a certificate chain in which an intermediate CA certificate is missing the basicConstraints.

Test 2: This test is covered under ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 test 1, where the VPN Gateway presents a certificate chain in which an intermediate CA certificate's basicConstraints is set to CA=False.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.2 X.509 CERTIFICATE AUTHENTICATION (ASPP14:FIA_X509_EXT.2)

2.3.2.1 ASPP14:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.2.2 ASPP14:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes how the TOE chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions in the administrative guidance for configuring the operating environment so that the TOE can use the certificates. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that it describes the behavior of the TOE when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a



certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. The evaluator shall verify that any distinctions between trusted channels are described. If the requirement that the administrator is able to specify the default action, then the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on how this configuration action is performed.

Section 6 (FIA_X509_EXT.2) of the [ST] states during TOE installation the user imports a new certificate to the certificate store. The user can also select the certificate used by tapping 'Import' and then 'Device Credential Storage'.

At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the CC Configuration Guide instructs the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing the connection.

In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE will not establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.

IPsec is the only protocol claimed to provide a trusted channel by FTP_DIT_EXT.1.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test for each trusted channel:

Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that using a valid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity. The evaluator shall then manipulate the environment so that the TOE is unable to verify the validity of the certificate, and observe that the action selected in FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 is performed. If the selected action is administrator-configurable, then the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to determine that all supported administrator-configurable options behave in their documented manner.

Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that an invalid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity cannot be accepted.

Test 1: The evaluator configured the TOE to attempt validation of certificates from the VPN gateway that contain a correct URL to a revocation server. The TOE succeeds in connecting to the VPN gateway. The evaluator then configured the TOE to attempt validation of certificates from the VPN gateway that contain a non-existent revocation server. The connection was unsuccessful.

Test 2: The evaluator configured the TOE to attempt validation of an invalid certificate. The evaluator concluded that the TOE is able to validate the revocation status of the invalid certificate, and the rejection of the VPN tunnel was based on the fact that an invalid certificate was received.

2.3.3 X.509 CERTIFICATE AUTHENTICATION (VPNC24:FIA_X509_EXT.2)



2.3.3.1 VPNC24:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.3.2 VPNC24:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes how the TOE chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions in the administrative guidance for configuring the operating environment so that the TOE can use the certificates.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that it describes the behavior of the TOE when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. The evaluator shall verify that any distinctions between trusted channels are described.

Section 6 (FIA_X509_EXT.2) of the [ST] states During TOE installation the user imports a new certificate to the certificate store. The user can also select the certificate used by tapping 'Import' and then 'Device Credential Storage'.

At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the CC Configuration Guide instructs the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing the connection.

In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE will not establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.

IPsec is the only protocol claimed to provide a trusted channel by FTP_DIT_EXT.1.

The "Configure Certificate Use" section of the [Admin Guide] redirects the user to a Cisco webpage that describes how to import and configure certificates for use in the TOE.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: If the requirement that the administrator is able to specify the default action, then the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on how this configuration action is performed.



Section “Strict Certificate Trust Mode” of the [Admin Guide] describes the setting on the TOE to disallow the certificate of the head-end VPN Gateway that it cannot verify automatically.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test for each trusted channel:

Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that using a valid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity. The evaluator shall then manipulate the environment so that the TOE is unable to verify the validity of the certificate, and observe that the action selected in FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 is performed. If the selected action is administrator-configurable, then the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to determine that all supported administrator-configurable options behave in their documented manner.

Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that an invalid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity cannot be accepted.

Test 1: The evaluator configured the TOE to attempt validation of certificates from the VPN gateway that contain a correct URL to a revocation server. The TOE succeeds in connecting to the VPN gateway. The evaluator then configured the TOE to attempt validation of certificates from the VPN gateway that contain a non-existent revocation server. The connection was unsuccessful.

Test 2: The evaluator configured the TOE to attempt validation of an invalid certificate. The evaluator concluded that the TOE is able to validate the revocation status of the invalid certificate, and the rejection of the VPN tunnel was based on the fact that an invalid certificate was received.

2.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)

2.4.1 SECURE BY DEFAULT CONFIGURATION (ASPP14:FMT_CFG_EXT.1)

2.4.1.1 ASPP14:FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to determine if the application requires any type of credentials and if the application installs with default credentials.

Section 6 (FMT_CFG_EXT.1) of the [ST] states the TOE requires client credentials to be used for connection but is not installed with any preset default credentials. In context of the TOE, client credentials are a X.509 certificate which is used to authenticate the ASA VPN Gateway during establishment of an IPsec session.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined



Testing Assurance Activities: If the application uses any default credentials the evaluator shall run the following tests.

Test 1: The evaluator shall install and run the application without generating or loading new credentials and verify that only the minimal application functionality required to set new credentials is available.

Test 2: The evaluator shall attempt to clear all credentials and verify that only the minimal application functionality required to set new credentials is available.

Test 3: The evaluator shall run the application, establish new credentials and verify that the original default credentials no longer provide access to the application.

Test 1: The evaluator installed the TOE application and verified that the application only provides functionality to set credential information for new connections.

Test 2: The evaluator cleared each connection and verified that after clearing, the operator must set credentials for new connection.

Test 3: Not Applicable as the TOE is not installed with any default credentials.

2.4.1.2 ASPP14:FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall install and run the application. The evaluator shall inspect the filesystem of the platform (to the extent possible) for any files created by the application and ensure that their permissions are adequate to protect them. The method of doing so varies per platform.

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall run the command `find -L . -perm /002` inside the application's data directories to ensure that all files are not world-writable. The command should not print any files.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

The evaluator shall run the SysInternals tools, Process Monitor and Access Check (or tools of equivalent capability, like icacls.exe) for Classic Desktop applications to verify that files written to disk during an application's installation have the correct file permissions, such that a standard user cannot modify the application or its data files. For Windows Universal Applications the evaluator shall consider the requirement met because of the AppContainer sandbox.

Platforms: Apple iOS....



The evaluator shall determine whether the application leverages the appropriate Data Protection Class for each data file stored locally.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall run the command `find -L. -perm /002` inside the application's data directories to ensure that all files are not world-writable. The command should not print any files.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall run the command `find . -perm -002` inside the application's data directories to ensure that all files are not world-writable. The command should not print any files.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall run the command `find . -perm +002` inside the application's data directories to ensure that all files are not world-writable. The command should not print any files.

The TOE lets the platform decide the protection class for the data, and the TOE platform assigns the default data protection level. The default protection is "Complete until first user authentication", where the file is inaccessible until the first time the user unlocks the device.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.4.2 SUPPORTED CONFIGURATION MECHANISM - PER TD0624 (ASPP14:FMT_MEC_EXT.1)

2.4.2.1 ASPP14:FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall review the TSS to identify the application's configuration options (e.g. settings) and determine whether these are stored and set using the mechanisms supported by the platform or implemented by the application in accordance with the PP-Module for File Encryption. At a minimum



the TSS shall list settings related to any SFRs and any settings that are mandated in the operational guidance in response to an SFR.

Conditional: If 'implement functionality to encrypt and store configuration options as defined by FDP_PRT_EXT.1 in the PP-Module for File Encryption' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS identifies those options, as well as indicates where the encrypted representation of these options is stored.

Section 6 (FMT_MEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states all IPsec configuration for the Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE is stored remotely on the Cisco ASA VPN Gateway.

As described in guidance the user controls the following settings which must be enabled:

"Block Untrusted Servers"

"Set VPN FIPS Mode"

"Strict Certificate Trust Mode"

"OCSP Revocation"

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: If 'invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting configuration options' is chosen, the method of testing varies per platform as follows:

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall run the application and make security-related changes to its configuration. The evaluator shall check that at least one file exists at location /data/data/package/shared_prefs/ (for SharedPreferences) and/or /data/data/package/files/datastore (for DataStore), where the package is the Java package of the application. For SharedPreferences the evaluator shall examine the XML file to make sure it reflects the changes made to the configuration to verify that the application used SharedPreferences and/or PreferenceActivity to store the configuration data. For DataStore the evaluator shall use a protocol buffer analyzer to examine the file to make sure it reflects the changes made to the configuration to verify that the application used DataStore to store the configuration data.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

The evaluator shall determine and verify that Windows Universal Applications use either the Windows.Storage namespace, Windows.UI.ApplicationSettings namespace or the IsolatedStorageSettings namespace for storing application specific settings. For .NET applications, the evaluator shall determine and verify that the application uses one of the locations listed in <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/> for storing application specific settings. For Classic Desktop applications, the evaluator shall run the application while



monitoring it with the SysInternals tool ProcMon and make changes to its configuration. The evaluator shall verify that ProcMon logs show corresponding changes to the Windows Registry or C:directory.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall verify that the app uses the user defaults system or key-value store for storing all settings.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall run the application while monitoring it with the utility strace. The evaluator shall make security-related changes to its configuration. The evaluator shall verify that strace logs corresponding changes to configuration files that reside in /etc (for system-specific configuration), in the user's home directory (for user-specific configuration), or /var/lib/ (for configurations controlled by UI and not intended to be directly modified by an administrator).

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall run the application while monitoring it with the utility dtrace. The evaluator shall make security-related changes to its configuration. The evaluator shall verify that dtrace logs corresponding changes to configuration files that reside in /etc (for system-specific configuration) or in the user's home directory (for user-specific configuration).

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall verify that the application stores and retrieves settings using the UserDefaults class.

If 'implement functionality to encrypt and store configuration options as defined by FDP_PRT_EXT.1 in the PP-Module for File Encryption' is selected, for all configuration options listed in the TSS as being stored and protected using encryption, the evaluator shall examine the contents of the configuration option storage (identified in the TSS) to determine that the options have been encrypted.

The evaluator performed a static analysis of the TOE application and verified that the TOE uses the UserDefaults system for storing settings.

2.4.3 SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (ASPP14:FMT_SMF.1)

2.4.3.1 ASPP14:FMT_SMF.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined



Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that every management function mandated by the PP is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with the management function.

The [ST] claims no management functions for this SFR.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall test the application's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the application and testing each option selected from above. The evaluator is expected to test these functions in all the ways in which the ST and guidance documentation state the configuration can be managed.

Not Applicable as the application does not claim any management functions for this SFR.

2.4.4 SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (VPN) (VPNC24:FMT_SMF.1/VPN)

2.4.4.1 VPNC24:FMT_SMF.1.1/VPN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS describes the client credentials and how they are used by the TOE.

Section 6 (FMT_SMF.1/VPN) of the [ST] describes the client credentials as X.509 certificates used to authenticate the ASA VPN gateway when authenticating an IPsec session.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to make sure that every management function mandated in the ST for this requirement is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with each management function.

The "Configure Reference Identifier" section of the [Admin Guide] explains how to specify the VPN gateway to use for the connection simultaneously configuring the reference identifier of the peer. The "Configure Certificate Use"



section of the [Admin Guide] states that the TOE can specify credentials in order to authenticate remote VPN users to an authentication server.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the TOE according to the operational guidance and testing each management activity listed in the ST.

The evaluator shall ensure that all management functions claimed in the ST can be performed by completing activities described in the AGD. Note that this may be performed in the course of completing other testing.

Management is tested by using the operational guidance to configure the TOE for testing. VPN gateways, reference identifiers, and authentication credentials are specified when setting up connections many times through the test effort. The rest of the settings come from the platform or VPN gateway as empirically demonstrated throughout the IPsec and other tests.

2.5 PRIVACY (FPR)

2.5.1 USER CONSENT FOR TRANSMISSION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE (ASPP14:FPR_ANO_EXT.1)

2.5.1.1 ASPP14:FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall inspect the TSS documentation to identify functionality in the application where PII can be transmitted.

Section 6 (FPR_ANO_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE does not transmit PII.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: If require user approval before executing is selected, the evaluator shall run the application and exercise the functionality responsibly for transmitting PII and verify that user approval is required before transmission of the PII.



This test is Not Applicable as the TOE does not transmit PII.

2.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT)

2.6.1 ANTI-EXPLOITATION CAPABILITIES (ASPP14:FPT_AEX_EXT.1)

2.6.1.1 ASPP14:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the compiler flags used to enable ASLR when the application is compiled.

Section 6 (FPT_AEX_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the Cisco AnyConnect TOE enables ASLR and stack protection by fPIE -pie and the -fstack-protector-all flags.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform either a static or dynamic analysis to determine that no memory mappings are placed at an explicit and consistent address. The method of doing so varies per platform. For those platforms requiring the same application running on two different systems, the evaluator may alternatively use the same device. After collecting the first instance of mappings, the evaluator must uninstall the application, reboot the device, and reinstall the application to collect the second instance of mappings.

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall run the same application on two different Android systems. Both devices do not need to be evaluated, as the second device is acting only as a tool. Connect via ADB and inspect /proc/PID/maps. Ensure the two different instances share no memory mappings made by the application at the same location.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

The evaluator shall run the same application on two different Windows systems and run a tool that will list all memory mapped addresses for the application. The evaluator shall then verify the two different instances share no mapping locations. The Microsoft SysInternals tool, VMMap, could be used to view memory addresses of a running application. The evaluator shall use a tool such as Microsoft's BinScope Binary Analyzer to confirm that the application has ASLR enabled.

Platforms: Apple iOS....



The evaluator shall perform a static analysis to search for any mmap calls (or API calls that call mmap), and ensure that no arguments are provided that request a mapping at a fixed address.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall run the same application on two different Linux systems. The evaluator shall then compare their memory maps using pmap -x PID to ensure the two different instances share no mapping locations.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall run the same application on two different Solaris systems. The evaluator shall then compare their memory maps using pmap -x PID to ensure the two different instances share no mapping locations.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall run the same application on two different Mac systems. The evaluator shall then compare their memory maps using vmmap PID to ensure the two different instances share no mapping locations.

The evaluator performed a static analysis on a decrypted IPA file provided by the vendor. The evaluator searched for calls to mmap and found that existing calls to mmap show that there is no evidence that these mmap calls request a static position in memory. Furthermore, the mmap calls are part of the symbols directory which are used to symbolicate (resolve backtrace addresses to source code method or function names) crash logs and are likely relating to the packages themselves.

2.6.1.2 ASPP14:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that no memory mapping requests are made with write and execute permissions. The method of doing so varies per platform.

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall perform static analysis on the application to verify that

- o mmap is never invoked with both the PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC permissions, and
- o mprotect is never invoked.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....



The evaluator shall use a tool such as Microsoft's BinScope Binary Analyzer to confirm that the application passes the NXCheck. The evaluator may also ensure that the /NXCOMPAT flag was used during compilation to verify that DEP protections are enabled for the application.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall perform static analysis on the application to verify that mprotect is never invoked with the PROT_EXEC permission.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall perform static analysis on the application to verify that both

- o mmap is never be invoked with both the PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC permissions, and
- o mprotect is never invoked with the PROT_EXEC permission.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall perform static analysis on the application to verify that both

- o mmap is never be invoked with both the PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC permissions, and
- o mprotect is never invoked with the PROT_EXEC permission.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall perform static analysis on the application to verify that mprotect is never invoked with the PROT_EXEC permission.

The evaluator performed a static analysis of the TOE application and successfully determined that the TOE does not use the mprotect function.

2.6.1.3 ASPP14:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall configure the platform in the ascribed manner and carry out one of the prescribed tests:

Platforms: Android....

Applications running on Android cannot disable Android security features, therefore this requirement is met and no evaluation activity is required.



Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

If the OS platform supports Windows Defender Exploit Guard (Windows 10 version 1709 or later), then the evaluator shall ensure that the application can run successfully with Windows Defender Exploit Guard Exploit Protection configured with the following minimum mitigations enabled; Control Flow Guard (CFG), Randomize memory allocations (Bottom-Up ASLR), Export address filtering (EAF), Import address filtering (IAF), and Data Execution Prevention (DEP). The following link describes how to enable Exploit Protection, <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threatprotection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/customize-exploit-protection>.

If the OS platform supports the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) which can be installed on Windows 10 version 1703 and earlier, then the evaluator shall ensure that the application can run successfully with EMET configured with the following minimum mitigations enabled; Memory Protection Check, Randomize memory allocations (Bottom-Up ASLR), Export address filtering (EAF), and Data Execution Prevention (DEP).

Platforms: Apple iOS....

Applications running on iOS cannot disable security features, therefore this requirement is met and no evaluation activity is required.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application can successfully run on a system with either SELinux or AppArmor enabled and in enforce mode.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application can run with Solaris Trusted Extensions enabled and enforcing.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application can successfully run on macOS without disabling any security features.

This requirement is met as applications running on iOS cannot disable security features.

2.6.1.4 ASPP14:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall run the application and determine where it writes its files. For files where the user does not choose the destination, the evaluator shall check whether the destination directory contains executable files. This varies per platform:



Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall run the program, mimicking normal usage, and note where all user-modifiable files are written. The evaluator shall ensure that there are no executable files stored under /data/data/package/ where package is the Java package of the application.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

For Windows Universal Applications the evaluator shall consider the requirement met because the platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox). For Windows Desktop Applications the evaluator shall run the program, mimicking normal usage, and note where all user-modifiable files are written. The evaluator shall ensure that there are no executable files stored in the same directories to which the application wrote user-modifiable files.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall consider the requirement met because the platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall run the program, mimicking normal usage, and note where all user-modifiable files are written. The evaluator shall ensure that there are no executable files stored in the same directories to which the application wrote user-modifiable files.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall run the program, mimicking normal usage, and note where all user-modifiable files are written. The evaluator shall ensure that there are no executable files stored in the same directories to which the application wrote user-modifiable files.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall run the program, mimicking normal usage, and note where all user-modifiable files are written. The evaluator shall ensure that there are no executable files stored in the same directories to which the application wrote user-modifiable files.

This requirement is met because the iOS platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).

2.6.1.5 ASPP14:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator will inspect every native executable included in the TOE to ensure that stack-based buffer overflow protection is present.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....

Applications that run as Managed Code in the .NET Framework do not require these stack protections. Applications developed in Object Pascal using the Delphi IDE compiled with RangeChecking enabled comply with this element. For other code, the evaluator shall review the TSS and verify that the /GS flag was used during compilation. The evaluator shall run a tool like, BinScope, that can verify the correct usage of /GS.

For PE , the evaluator will disassemble each and ensure the following sequence appears:

```
mov rcx, QWORD PTR [rsp+(...)]
```

```
xor rcx, (..)
```

```
call (...)
```

For ELF executables, the evaluator will ensure that each contains references to the symbol `__stack_chk_fail`.

Tools such as Canary Detector may help automate these activities.

The evaluator performed a static analysis of the TOE application package and determined that the TOE contains references to the `__stack_chk_fail` symbol.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.6.2 USE OF SUPPORTED SERVICES AND APIs (ASPP14:FPT_API_EXT.1)

2.6.2.1 ASPP14:FPT_API_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined



Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the TSS lists the platform APIs used in the application.

Section 6 (FPT_API_EXT.1) of the [ST] states the TOE uses the following platform APIs:

- LocalAuthentication
- UIKit
- SystemConfiguration
- Security
- NetworkExtension
- CoreFoundation
- CFNetwork
- UserNotifications
- Foundation
- libresolv
- libxml2
- libz
- libobjc
- libc++
- libSystem

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall then compare the list with the supported APIs (available through e.g. developer accounts, platform developer groups) and ensure that all APIs listed in the TSS are supported.

The evaluator verified that the vendor provided list of platform APIs used can be found at the Apple iOS Developer API reference (located at <https://developer.apple.com/documentation>) as well as part of the Xcode developer SDK.

2.6.3 SOFTWARE IDENTIFICATION AND VERSIONS (ASPP 14:FPT_IDV_EXT.1)



2.6.3.1 ASPP14:FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: If 'other version information' is selected the evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains an explanation of the versioning methodology.

Section 6 (FPT_IDV_EXT.1) states The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE uses a sequence-based versioning control system. The application uses the major.minor.build format for versioning control. For example: 5.0.00247

- Major (5 in the example above) designates a release where significant new features are added.
- Minor (0 in the example above) designates a release where minor new features are added.
- Build (00247 in the example above) designates a software build number.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall install the application, then check for the / existence of version information. If SWID tags is selected the evaluator shall check for a .swidtag file. The evaluator shall open the file and verify that is contains at least a SoftwareIdentity element and an Entity element.

The evaluator verified that the TOE has versioning information printed in the TOE application's "About" screen.

2.6.4 USE OF THIRD PARTY LIBRARIES (ASPP14:FPT_LIB_EXT.1)

2.6.4.1 ASPP14:FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined



Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall install the application and survey its installation directory for dynamic libraries. The evaluator shall verify that libraries found to be packaged with or employed by the application are limited to those in the assignment.

The evaluator was unable to view the iOS platform's installation directory. The iOS system is locked down and does not allow users to peek inside the installation directories. Instead, the evaluator performed a static analysis of the TOE binary to check that the claimed libraries are used in the TOE. The TOE statically compiles the libraries into its binary. The evaluator searched for API function calls to ensure that the claimed libraries are used.

2.6.5 TSF SELF-TEST (VPNC24:FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN)

2.6.5.1 VPNC24:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/VPN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.6.5.2 VPNC24:FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/VPN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: Except for where it is explicitly noted, the evaluator is expected to check the following information regardless of whether the functionality is implemented by the TOE or by the TOE platform.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the TSF on start-up; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than saying 'memory is tested', a description similar to 'memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written' shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly. If some of the tests are performed by the TOE platform, the evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that those tests are identified, and that the ST for each platform contains a description of those tests. Note that the tests that are required by this component are those that support security functionality in the VPN Client PP-Module, which may not correspond to the set of all self-tests contained in the platform STs.



The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how the integrity of stored TSF executable code is cryptographically verified when it is loaded for execution. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the integrity of stored TSF executable code has not been compromised. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the cryptographic requirements listed are consistent with the description of the integrity verification process.

The evaluator also ensures that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases. For checks implemented entirely by the platform, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance for the TOE references or includes the platform-specific guidance for each platform listed in the ST.

Section 6 (FPT_TST_EXT.1) of the [ST] explains that the TOE utilizes a FIPS cryptographic library that executes a suite of FIPS cryptographic self-tests upon powering-up. The tests are as follows:

- AES Known Answer Test - For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt operation is working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is working correctly.
- RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) - This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly.
- ECDSA Signature Test - This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly.
- HMAC Known Answer Test - For each of the hash values (256 and 384), the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to verify that the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly.
- SHA Known Answer Test - For each of the values (256 and 384), the SHA implementation is fed known data and key. These values are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match and the hash operations are operating correctly.
- Software Integrity Test - The Software Integrity Test is run automatically whenever the module is loaded and confirms the image has maintained its integrity.

If any self-test fails subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls is prevented. If all components of the power-up self-test are successful then the product is in FIPS mode.



Integrity verification is performed each time the Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect app is loaded and it will wait for the integrity verification to complete. Cryptographic services provided by the TOE platform are invoked to verify the digital signature of the TOE's executable files. If the integrity verification fails to successfully complete, the GUI will not load, rendering the app unusable. If the integrity verification is successful, the app GUI will load and operate normally. These tests are sufficient to verify that the TOE software is operating correctly as well as the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: Except for where it is explicitly noted, the evaluator is expected to check the following information regardless of whether the functionality is implemented by the TOE or by the TOE platform.

If not present in the TSS, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases. For checks implemented entirely by the platform, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance for the TOE references or includes the platform-specific guidance for each platform listed in the ST.

See the TSS assurance activity above.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: Except for where it is explicitly noted, the evaluator is expected to check the following information regardless of whether the functionality is implemented by the TOE or by the TOE platform.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator performs the integrity check on a known good TSF executable and verifies that the check is successful.

Test 2: The evaluator modifies the TSF executable, performs the integrity check on the modified TSF executable and verifies that the check fails.

Test 1: The evaluator verified that the TOE performs an integrity check by booting up the TOE and observing that the TOE boots to the normal screen.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to load a vendor-provided modified binary and verified that the TOE does not boot up because of a failed integrity check.

2.6.6 INTEGRITY FOR INSTALLATION AND UPDATE (ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

2.6.6.1 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined



Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure the guidance includes a description of how updates are performed.

The "Trusted Updates" section of the [Admin Guide] contains steps to check for an update using the Apple App store.

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check for an update using procedures described in either the application documentation or the platform documentation and verify that the application does not issue an error. If it is updated or if it reports that no update is available this requirement is considered to be met.

The evaluator followed the "Trusted Updates" section of the [Admin Guide] to check for an application update using the Apple App Store. The evaluator noted that the Apple Store page for the TOE did not display an update button since the devices are running the latest version.

2.6.6.2 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify guidance includes a description of how to query the current version of the application.

The "Trusted Updates" section of the [Admin Guide] states the steps for verifying the current running version of the TOE.

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall query the application for the current version of the software according to the operational user guidance. The evaluator shall then verify that the current version matches that of the documented and installed version.

The evaluator was able to successfully query the current version of the TOE, which matches the current and documented version.

2.6.6.3 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the application's executable files are not changed by the application.



Platforms: Apple iOS: The evaluator shall consider the requirement met because the platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).

For all other platforms, the evaluator shall perform the following test:

Test 1: The evaluator shall install the application and then locate all of its executable files. The evaluator shall then, for each file, save off either a hash of the file or a copy of the file itself. The evaluator shall then run the application and exercise all features of the application as described in the ST. The evaluator shall then compare each executable file with the either the saved hash or the saved copy of the files. The evaluator shall verify that these are identical.

As the TOE is an iOS application, this requirement is met because the iOS platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).

2.6.6.4 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies how updates to the application are signed by an authorized source. The definition of an authorized source must be contained in the TSS. The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes how candidate updates are obtained.

Section 6 (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the installation binary for the TOE is digitally signed by “Cisco Systems, Inc.”, which is the authorized source for the update. The "Integrity Verification" section of the [Admin Guide] states that the iOS platform verifies the digital signature of the TOE software. The digital signature verification check occurs each time the TOE loads to ensure that the TOE binary has not been modified.

The "Trusted Updates" section of the [Admin Guide] states that updates are obtained through the Apple App Store. Section 6 (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that customers can also subscribe to the Cisco Notification Service, which notifies users of product updates and news. An alternative form of the TOE updates can come in the form of email notifications if the user subscribes to the Cisco Notification Service. Once an operator has received a notice of an update, the operator must navigate to <https://software.cisco.com> to download and install the update.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.6.6.5 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies how the application is distributed.



Section 6 (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) of the [ST] states that the TOE is distributed as a separate software package. Therefore, FPT_TUD_EXT.2 is claimed and met.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: If 'with the platform' is selected the evaluated shall perform a clean installation or factory reset to confirm that TOE software is included as part of the platform OS. If 'as an additional package' is selected the evaluator shall perform the tests in FPT_TUD_EXT.2.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.6.7 INTEGRITY FOR INSTALLATION AND UPDATE - PER TD0628 (ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.2)

2.6.7.1 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1: If a container image is claimed the evaluator shall verify that application updates are distributed as container images.

If the format of the platform-supported package manager is claimed, the evaluator shall verify that application updates are distributed in the correct format. This varies per platform:

Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application is packaged in the Android application package (APK) format.

Platforms: Microsoft Windows....



The evaluator shall ensure that the application is packaged in the standard Windows Installer (.MSI) format, the Windows Application Software (.EXE) format signed using the Microsoft Authenticode process, or the Windows Universal Application package (.APPX) format. See [https://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/ms537364\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/ms537364(v=vs.85).aspx) for details regarding Authenticode signing.

Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application is packaged in the IPA format.

Platforms: Linux....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application is packaged in the format of the package management infrastructure of the chosen distribution. For example, applications running on Red Hat and Red Hat derivatives shall be packaged in RPM format. Applications running on Debian and Debian derivatives shall be packaged in DEB format.

Platforms: Oracle Solaris....

The evaluator shall ensure that the application is packaged in the PKG format.

Platforms: Apple macOS....

The evaluator shall ensure that application is packaged in the DMG format, the PKG format, or the MPKG format.

The application is installed through the iOS AppStore, which ensures the file is in a .ipa package. The evaluator verified that the installation file is an iOS .ipa file by viewing the app file provided by the vendor, which can be sideloaded into an iOS platform through other means.

2.6.7.2 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: Platforms: Android....

The evaluator shall consider the requirement met because the platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).



Platforms: Apple iOS....

The evaluator shall consider the requirement met because the platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).

All Other Platforms...

The evaluator shall record the path of every file on the entire filesystem prior to installation of the application, and then install and run the application. Afterwards, the evaluator shall then uninstall the application, and compare the resulting filesystem to the initial record to verify that no files, other than configuration, output, and audit/log files, have been added to the filesystem. (TD0664 applied)

As the TOE is an iOS application, the requirement is met because the iOS platform forces applications to write all data within the application working directory (sandbox).

2.6.7.3 ASPP14:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies how the application installation package is signed by an authorized source. The definition of an authorized source must be contained in the TSS.

Section 6 (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) of the [ST] states A TOE update is not a patch applied to the existing TOE, it is a new version of the TOE. When TOE updates are made available by Cisco, an administrator can obtain and install the update. Upon installation of a TOE update, a digital signature verification check will automatically be performed to ensure it has not been modified since distribution. The authorized source for the digitally signed updates is "Cisco Systems, Inc."

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP)

2.7.1 PROTECTION OF DATA IN TRANSIT - PER TD0743 (ASPP14:FTP_DIT_EXT.1)



2.7.1.1 ASPP14:FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: For platform-provided functionality, the evaluator shall verify the TSS contains the calls to the platform that TOE is leveraging to invoke the functionality.

The TOE does not leverage platform-provided functionality for protection of data in transit.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests.

Test 1: The evaluator shall exercise the application (attempting to transmit data; for example by connecting to remote systems or websites) while capturing packets from the application. The evaluator shall verify from the packet capture that the traffic is encrypted with HTTPS, TLS, DTLS, SSH, or IPsec in accordance with the selection in the ST.

Test 2: The evaluator shall exercise the application (attempting to transmit data; for example by connecting to remote systems or websites) while capturing packets from the application. The evaluator shall review the packet capture and verify that no sensitive data is transmitted in the clear.

Test 3: The evaluator shall inspect the TSS to determine if user credentials are transmitted. If credentials are transmitted the evaluator shall set the credential to a known value. The evaluator shall capture packets from the application while causing credentials to be transmitted as described in the TSS. The evaluator shall perform a string search of the captured network packets and verify that the plaintext credential previously set by the evaluator is not found.

Platforms: Android....

If 'not transmit any data' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the application's AndroidManifest.xml file does not contain a uses-permission or uses-permission-sdk-23 tag containing android:name='android.permission.INTERNET'. In this case, it is not necessary to perform the above Tests 1, 2, or 3, as the platform will not allow the application to perform any network communication.

Platforms: Apple iOS....



If 'encrypt all transmitted data' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the application's Info.plist file does not contain the NSAllowsArbitraryLoads or NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads keys, as these keys disable iOS's Application Transport Security feature.

This is covered under VPNC24:FTP_DIT_EXT.1, Protection of Data in Transit.

2.7.2 PROTECTION OF DATA IN TRANSIT (VPNC24:FTP_DIT_EXT.1)

2.7.2.1 VPNC24:FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: For IPsec, refer to the EA for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1. If other protocols are selected for FTP_DIT_EXT.1, refer to the EA for FTP_DIT_EXT.1 in the App PP (included below).

For platform-provided functionality, the evaluator shall verify the TSS contains the calls to the platform that TOE is leveraging to invoke the functionality.

VPNC24: For IPsec, refer to the EA for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1. If other protocols are selected for FTP_DIT_EXT.1, refer to the EA for FTP_DIT_EXT.1 in the App PP (included below).

For platform-provided functionality, the evaluator shall verify the TSS contains the calls to the platform that TOE is leveraging to invoke the functionality.

All TSS activities for IPsec are addressed in section VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 of this AAR. The TOE does not support any other protocols outside of IPsec.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: For IPsec, refer to the EA for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.

VPNC24: For IPsec, refer to the EA for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.

All guidance activities for IPsec are addressed in section VPNC24:FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 of this AAR.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: For IPsec, refer to the EA for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1. If other protocols are selected for FTP_DIT_EXT.1, refer to the EA for FTP_DIT_EXT.1 in the App PP (included below).

The evaluator shall perform the following tests.

Test 1: The evaluator shall exercise the application (attempting to transmit data; for example by connecting to remote systems or websites) while capturing packets from the application. The evaluator shall verify from the



packet capture that the traffic is encrypted with HTTPS, TLS, DTLS, SSH, or IPsec in accordance with the selection in the ST.

Test 2: The evaluator shall exercise the application (attempting to transmit data; for example by connecting to remote systems or websites) while capturing packets from the application. The evaluator shall review the packet capture and verify that no sensitive data is transmitted in the clear.

Test 3: The evaluator shall inspect the TSS to determine if user credentials are transmitted. If credentials are transmitted the evaluator shall set the credential to a known value. The evaluator shall capture packets from the application while causing credentials to be transmitted as described in the TSS. The evaluator shall perform a string search of the captured network packets and verify that the plaintext credential previously set by the evaluator is not found.

Platforms:Android...

If 'not transmit any data' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the application's AndroidManifest.xml file does not contain a uses-permission or uses-permission-sdk-23 tag containing android:name='android.permission.INTERNET'. In this case, it is not necessary to perform the above Tests 1, 2, or 3, as the platform will not allow the application to perform any network communication.

Platforms:Apple iOS...

If 'encrypt all transmitted data' is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the application's Info.plist file does not contain the NSAllowsArbitraryLoads or NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads keys, as these keys disable iOS's Application Transport Security feature.

Test 1: The evaluator took a packet capture of the data in transit during an IPsec negotiation between the TOE and the VPN gateway. The evaluator verified that the data is encrypted.

Test 2: The evaluator verified that the TOE does not send any traffic in cleartext, as shown in the packet capture for test 1.

Test 3: The evaluator noted that the TOE sends and receives authentication certificates as credentials. The evaluator verified that the exchange of the certificates during the authentication phase of IKE is encrypted. The evaluator searched a packet capture for any text or indication that a certificate was passed, and the evaluator found no evidence of the authentication certificates in the packet capture

Encrypt all transmitted data is not selected.



3. PROTECTION PROFILE SAR ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES

The following sections address assurance activities specifically defined in the claimed Protection Profile that correspond with Security Assurance Requirements.

3.1 DEVELOPMENT (ADV)

3.1.1 BASIC FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION (ADV_FSP.1)

Assurance Activities: There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in Section 5.1, and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.

3.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (AGD)

3.2.1 OPERATIONAL USER GUIDANCE (AGD_OPE.1)

Assurance Activities: Some of the contents of the operational guidance will be verified by the assurance activities in Section 5.1 and evaluation of the TOE according to the [CEM]. The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the TOE, the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the TOE. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the TOE. The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the TOE by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the TOE or the underlying platform. The evaluator shall verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the TOE (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The TOE will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.

Section “Set VPN FIPS Mode” in the [Admin Guide] describes the configuration of FIPS mode, which will execute an image integrity test and power-on self-tests for the TOE’s cryptographic algorithms. FIPS mode is required and Non-FIPS mode of operation is excluded as detailed in section “Excluded Functionality” of the [Admin Guide].

Section “Trusted Updates” of the [Admin Guide] describes the process for trusted updates and verifying TOE version. To check for updates, click on the Apple App Store and check for updates to Cisco AnyConnect. If updates are made available by Cisco, the user can obtain an updated version of the TOE. The same section details the



process for installation. When there is an update for Cisco AnyConnect, the process to update is the same as a new installation.

Section “Integrity Verification” of the [Admin Guide] describes when the TOE checks its software integrity. Integrity verification is performed each time the AnyConnect app is loaded and it will wait for the integrity verification to complete. Cryptographic services provided by the iOS platform are invoked to verify the digital signature of the TOE’s executable files. If the integrity verification fails to successfully complete, the GUI will not load, rendering the app unusable. If the integrity verification is successful, the app GUI will load and operate normally.

3.2.2 PREPARATIVE PROCEDURES (AGD_PRE.1)

Assurance Activities: As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation - especially when configuring the operational environment to support TOE functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the TOE adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the TOE in the ST.

Section “Preparative Procedures and Operational Guidance for IT Environment” of the [Admin Guide] describes the TOE installation and configuration steps. This includes certificate management, VPN connection configuration, Certificate revocation, certificate trust and FIPS mode configuration. Tests of AnyConnect on the TOE platforms demonstrated the capabilities that users and administrators have when the TOE is in FIPS mode. The VPN is simply an application on the TOE Platform and has no effect on the overall management of the TOE Platform. The configuration of the TOE was tested in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.

3.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT (ALC)

3.3.1 LABELLING OF THE TOE (ALC_CMC.1)

Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator shall check the AGD guidance and TOE samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.

The evaluator verified that the ST, TOE and Guidance are all labeled with the same versions. The evaluator checked the TOE version during testing by examining the actual devices used for testing.

3.3.2 TOE CM COVERAGE (ALC_CMS.1)

Assurance Activities: The 'evaluation evidence required by the SARs' in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that



the TOE is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for ALC_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.

The evaluator shall ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler flags). The evaluator shall ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.

The evaluator verified that the ST, TOE and Guidance are all labeled with the same versions. The evaluator checked the TOE version during testing by examining the actual devices used for testing.

3.3.3 TIMELY SECURITY UPDATES (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)

Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator shall verify that this description addresses the entire application.

The evaluator shall also verify that, in addition to the TOE developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator shall also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described. The evaluator shall verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the TOE patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator shall verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days. The evaluator shall verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the TOE.

The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.

Section 6 (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) of the [ST] states Cisco's security update procedure.



All Cisco communications relating to security issues are handled by the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT). Cisco aims to provide fixes in 30 days but depending on the timing it may be greater than 30 days though not more than 60 days for most security issues. Fixes may be delayed longer for low-risk security issues. Updates are then made available at Cisco Software Central available at: <https://software.cisco.com>.

Customers can subscribe to the Cisco Notification Service allows users to subscribe and receive important information regarding product updates. Full information is provide in the Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy available at: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html

3.4 TESTS (ATE)

3.4.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING - CONFORMANCE (ATE_IND.1)

Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [CEM] and the body of this PP's Assurance Activities.

While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the TOE and its platform.

This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS, SSH). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.

The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a 'fail' and 'pass' result (and the supporting details), and not just the 'pass' result.



The evaluator created a Detailed Test Report (DTR) to address all aspects of this requirement. The DTR discusses the test configuration, test cases, expected results, and test results. The test configuration consisted of the following TOE platform along with supporting products.

The following diagrams indicate the test environment.




Figure 1 - General Test Setup




Figure 2 - NAT-T Test Setup



TOE Platforms:

- ios 16 on iPhone 11
- Cisco Secure Client – AnyConnect for iOS, Version 5.0

Supporting Products:

- Test platform
 - iPhone 11 running iOS 16 on A13 Bionic chip
- Cisco ASA5506 Firewall (VPN Gateway), version 9.12(2)165
- Windows TestLab (TestLab 19) – Windows 10
 - Used to interface the ASA via Adaptive Security Device Manager
 - Standard Windows utilities (File Browser, notepad, ...)
- Linux TestLab (tl19-16x.gss.com) – Ubuntu 16.04
 - Used to import certificates, from certificate directory, that are used to authenticate TOE connection to the VPN Gateway.
- Evaluator’s Laptop – Windows 10
 - Used to interface with the Windows TestLabs (with Remote Desktop Protocol) or with the Linux TestLabs (through ssh and putty).
 - Not present in network packet captures.
- MacBook Air 2014 running macOS Big Sur 11.7.7 on Intel Core i5
 - Used to interface with the decompiled TOE and for key dumping tests under FCS_CKM_EXT.4
 - Standard Linux utilities (grep, ls, find, ...)

Supporting Software:

- SSH Client – Putty version 6.2
- SSH Client – SecureCRT version 5.1.2
- Big Packet Putty version 6.2
- Wireshark version 4.0.4
- Nmap version 6.25
- Dedexer 1.17 (Java decompiler)
- Canary Detector (Python tool)
- Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) 7.8(2)

3.5 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (AVA)

3.5.1 VULNERABILITY SURVEY (AVA_VAN.1)



Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator shall also run a virus scanner with the most current virus definitions against the application files and verify that no files are flagged as malicious. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report. For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerabilities.

The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database (<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search>), Vulnerability Notes Database (<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>) on 09/21/2023 with the following search terms: : "anyconnect 5.0", "cisco anyconnect ikev2", "cisco anyconnect encapsulating security payload", "cisco anyconnect", "Anyconnect ios", "Apple A13 Bionic", "iOS 16", "Ciscossl ", "OpenSSL", "Boost ", "Libxml ", "libcurl ", "libc++", "libresolv".