CC Certificate 

Security Target 

Validation Report 

Assurance Activity 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 v17.12 Common Criteria Configuration Guide 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Embedded Service 6300 Series Software Configuration Guide 

Administrative Guide: Cisco Embedded Service 6300 Series RouterHardware TechnicalGuide 

Administrative Guide: Release Notes for Cisco Catalyst IR1101, IR1800, IR8140, IR8340, and Cisco ESR 6300 Routers 

The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models included in the evaluation are the ESR-6300-NCP-K9 and ESR-6300-CON-K9.  The TOE software is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE version 17.12.

The ESR6300 consists of the following architectural features and components:

·        Compact 3” x 3.75” form factor board optimized for custom solutions

·        DRAM: 4-GB DDR4 memory capacity

·        Flash Memory: 4-GB usable eMMC flash

·        Optional router enclosure as described in Table 4

·        Integrated multi-pin BTB Interface Connector - provides pins dedicated for power input, ethernet ports, and console ports. The following interfaces were used during testing:

·        Console: 1 UART RS232 RJ45 console port

·        WAN Interfaces: 2 Combo Layer 3 GE WAN ports

·        LAN Interfaces: 4 Layer 2 GE LAN ports

The ESR6300 is an embedded router module with a compact form factor of 3.0 by 3.775 inches. Its compact, modular, ruggedized design allows Cisco partners and integrators to build a wide variety of custom embedded solutions. The TOE can be inserted into an enclosure that can accommodate the TOE's size (3.0 x 3.775 in) and provides no compute capabilities. The ESR6300 is available with a custom-designed cooling plate, as well as without the cooling plate. Both versions of the ESR6300 board include an integrated multi-pin Board-to-Board (BTB) interface connector with pins dedicated for power input, ethernet ports, and console ports. The TOE functionality is implemented inside the ESR 6300 physical chassis, as the chassis includes the underlying board (with or without a cooling plate) and all electronic components attached to it; therefore, no computational capabilities outside of the TOE boundary are required to secure the TOE. Refer to Annex A in the Guidance Document (AGD) for hardware technical guidance on the ESR6300 board layout and dimensions and Multi-pin BTB Interface Connector description that includes pinout mapping descriptions for network interfaces and power inputs.

The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models included in the evaluation are the ESR-6300-NCP-K9 and ESR-6300-CON-K9.  The TOE software is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE version 17.12.

The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance.  The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target.  The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.  The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 v17.12 CC Configuration Guide, Version 1.0, May 30, 2024 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 v17.12 Security Target, Version 1.1, June 10, 2024.  The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.  The evaluation was completed in June 2024.  Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11483-2024) prepared by CCEVS.

The logical boundaries of the Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.

Security audit:

The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event.  Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity.  The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations and manages audit data storage.  The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail. The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server over an encrypted channel.

Cryptographic support:

The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality.  

The TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.

Identification and authentication:

The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.  Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.  The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.  Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE supports use of IKEv1 (ISAKMP) and IKEv2 pre-shared keys for authentication of IPsec tunnels. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.

The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator interface.  The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality.  The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database.  Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces.  The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.  The TOE supports the use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.

The TOE provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information.  After a defined number of authentication attempts exceeding the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable the user account.

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec connections.

Security management:

The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE.  All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection.  The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:

o   Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;

o   All TOE administrative users;

o   All identification and authentication;

o   All audit functionality of the TOE;

o   All TOE cryptographic functionality;

o   NTP configuration;

o   Update to the TOE and verification of the updates;

o   Configuration of IPsec functionality.

The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged administrator.  Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions. Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators. The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE is restricted to authorized administrators.

Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of inactivity.

Packet filtering:

The TOE provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling.  The tunnels can be established between two trusted VPN peers and the TOE.  More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs).  The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to be used.  SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol.  An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using IPsec Virtual Tunnel Interfaces (VTI).

Protection of the TSF:

The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators.  The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.

The TOE has an internal clock, however the TOE synchronizes time with an NTP server and then internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE.

The TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and that of the cryptographic module.

The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.

Whenever a failure occurs within the TOE that results in the TOE ceasing operation, the TOE securely disables its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from the TOE and reloads.

TOE access:

The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period.  Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session.  Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters the “exit” or “logout” command.

The TOE can also display a Security Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

Trusted path/channels:

The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers.  In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers.  The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions.  The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server, as well as to protect communications with a CA or remote administrative console.  In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the remote authentication servers and uses NTPv4 to secure the connection to the NTP server.

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